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Abstract
Cryptanalysis of Symmetric Cryptographic Primitives
Aleksandar Kircanski, Ph.D.
Concordia University, 2013
Symmetric key cryptographic primitives are the essential building blocks in modern information se-
curity systems. The overall security of such systems is crucially dependent on these mathematical functions,
which makes the analysis of symmetric key primitives a goal of critical importance. The security argument
for the majority of such primitives in use is only a heuristic one and therefore their respective security eval-
uation continually remains an open question. In this thesis, we provide cryptanalytic results for several
relevant cryptographic hash functions and stream ciphers.
First, we provide results concerning two hash functions: HAS-160 and SM3. In particular, we de-
velop a new heuristic for finding compatible differential paths and apply it to the the Korean hash function
standard HAS-160. Our heuristic leads to a practical second order collision attack over all of the HAS-160
function steps, which is the first practical-complexity distinguisher on this function. An example of a collid-
ing quartet is provided. In case of SM3, which is a design that builds upon the SHA-2 hash and is published
by the Chinese Commercial Cryptography Administration Office for the use in the electronic authentica-
tion service system, we study second order collision attacks over reduced-round versions and point out a
structural slide-rotational property that exists in the function.
Next, we examine the security of the following three stream ciphers: Loiss, SNOW 3G and SNOW
2.0. Loiss stream cipher is designed by Dengguo Feng et al. aiming to be implemented in byte-oriented
processors. By exploiting some differential properties of a particular component utilized in the cipher,
we provide an attack of a practical complexity on Loiss in the related-key model. As confirmed by our
experimental results, our attack recovers 92 bits of the 128-bit key in less than one hour on a PC with 3
ii
GHz Intel Pentium 4 processor. SNOW 3G stream cipher is used in 3rd Generation Partnership Project
(3GPP) and the SNOW 2.0 cipher is an ISO/IEC standard (IS 18033-4). For both of these two ciphers,
we show that the initialization procedure admits a sliding property, resulting in several sets of related-key
pairs. In addition to allowing related-key key recovery attacks against SNOW 2.0 with 256-bit keys, the
presented properties reveal non-random behavior of the primitives, yield related-key distinguishers for the
two ciphers and question the validity of the security proofs of protocols based on the assumption that these
ciphers behave like perfect random functions of the key-IV.
Finally, we provide differential fault analysis attacks against two stream ciphers, namely, HC-128
and Rabbit. In this type of attacks, the attacker is assumed to have physical influence over the device that
performs the encryption and is able to introduce random faults into the computational process. In case of
HC-128, the fault model in which we analyze the cipher is the one in which the attacker is able to fault a
random word of the inner state of the cipher but cannot control its exact location nor its new faulted value.
Our attack requires about 7968 faults and recovers the complete internal state of HC-128 by solving a set of
32 systems of linear equations over Z2 in 1024 variables. In case of Rabbit stream cipher, the fault model
in which the cipher is analyzed is the one in which a random bit of the internal state of the cipher is faulted,
however, without control over the location of the injected fault. Our attack requires around 128−256 faults,
precomputed table of size 241.6 bytes and recovers the complete internal state of Rabbit in about 238 steps.
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1Introduction
1.1 Background and motivation
Historically, the goal of cryptography was to allow two parties to communicate over an insecure
channel with an adversary not able to understand what is being said. Nowdays, the goal of cryptography,
understood in a broader sense, is to provide means to enforce diverse security goals such as integrity, au-
thenticity and non-repudiation [104].
Modern information security systems widely implement cryptographic functions to enforce such se-
curity goals and the very basic constructions that are employed for this purpose are called cryptographic
primitives. In the past twenty five years, a variety of efficient cryptographic primitives has been developed.
The cryptographic primitives that use the same cryptographic key for both encryption of plaintext and de-
cryption of ciphertext are called symmetric-key primitives. Examples of such primitives are block ciphers
and stream ciphers. Although hash functions do not fall into the category of symmetric key primitives in
the strict sense since they are keyless, many currently used hash functions are constructed based on block
ciphers and in this sense are naturally related to the area of symmetric key cryptography.
Many of the symmetric-based cryptosystems designed in the last fifteen years owe their existance
to public competitions for cryptographic primitives. In such a competition, a standardization body issues
a submission request for the cryptographic primitive to be developed and coordinates the process of analy-
sis/standardization of the primitive. So far, NIST has organized two such competitions, one for block cipher
standard AES (1997-2000) and one for the cryptographic hashing standard SHA-3 (2007-2012). Another
such competition called eStream (2004-2007) was organized for new stream cipher designs by ECRYPT,
1
the Network of Excellence within the European Information Societies Technology. These competitions
sparked a great deal of cryptanalytic and design efforts and also had a strong impact on communities outside
cryptography.
The security of a particular symmetric cryptographic primitive relies on the fact that experienced
cryptanalysts have not been able to breach the security claims that come with the primitive in question. In
other words, in most of the cases, there exists no proof that the cryptosystem is secure and the security claim
is only a heuristic one. Devising cryptanalytic attacks can thus be seen as providing better lower bounds on
the attack complexities for the primitive in question.
In the last 15 years, the cryptographic community witnessed several interesting cryptanalytic attacks.
As for cryptographic hash functions, attacks against MD5 and SHA-1 hash functions [130] by Wang based
on differential cryptanalysis have shown that MD5 and SHA-1 are not collision resistant. Given these
cryptanalytic results as well as the dramatic attacks that built upon collision attacks (e.g., the construction
of two X.509 certificates containing identical signatures and differing only in the public keys [128]), the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) started a public hash function competition SHA-3
that resulted in choosing Keccak as the new hash function standard. In the area of stream ciphers, Fluhrer,
Mantin and Shamir described an attack against RC4 used in the WEP mode, which allowed breaking the
WEP key in real time. Finally, as for block ciphers, AES block cipher that has been believed to be secure
for around 10 years, is now shown to be susceptible to boomerang related-key analysis [20] (Biryukov,
Khovratovich and Nikolic´) and also biclique attacks [29] (Bogdanov, Khovratovich and Rechberger) in
the single-key model. It should be noted that, while the MD5/SHA-1 and the WEP attack are practically
feasible, the AES analysis did not provide attacks that threaten security in practice so far.
Motivation: The cryptanalytic work done in this thesis is motivated by the fact that the security
of symmetric cryptographic primitives continually remains an open question. This is especially true when
diverse new cryptographic primitives are publicly proposed by different groups and there exists no assurance
in the security of these primitives. Our goal is to achieve better understanding of the real security of these
primitives and to provide our independent findings to the public.
1.2 Thesis contributions
The contributions of this thesis are as follows:
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- We propose a heuristic algorithm [71] for searching for compatible differential paths and apply it to
the Korean hash function standard HAS-160. Our heuristic leads to a practical second order collision
attack over all of the HAS-160 function steps, which is the first practical-complexity distinguisher on
this function. An example of a colliding quartet is provided. In the context of second order collision
attacks, constructing compatible differentials paths plays a central role. Previously, searching for
compatible differentials was done in an ad-hoc manner and in case of HAS-160 (and SHA-2), the
known compatible paths for HAS-160 spanned over a suboptimal number of steps. Our proposed
heuristic aims to provide a systematic and efficient way to search for compatible paths over large
number of steps, which extends the overall number of attacked steps.
- SM3 is a hash function designed by Xiaoyun Wang et al., and published by the Chinese Commer-
cial Cryptography Administration Office for the use of electronic authentication service system. The
design of SM3 builds upon the design of the SHA-2 hash function, but introduces additional strength-
ening features. In Chapter 4, using a higher order differential cryptanalysis approach, we present
a practical 4-sum distinguisher against the compression function of SM3 reduced to 32 rounds [72]
In addition, we point out a slide-rotational property of SM3-XOR, which exists due to the fact that
constants used in the rounds are not independent.
- Loiss is a byte-oriented stream cipher designed by Dengguo Feng et al. Its design builds upon the de-
sign of the SNOW family of ciphers. The algorithm consists of a linear feedback shift register (LFSR)
and a non-linear finite state machine (FSM). Loiss utilizes a new structure called Byte-Oriented Mixer
with Memory (BOMM) in its filter generator, reminiscent of the RC4 S-box and aiming to improve re-
sistance against algebraic attacks, linear distinguishing attacks and fast correlation attacks. In Chapter
5, by exploiting some differential properties of the BOMM structure during the cipher initialization
phase, we provide an attack of a practical complexity on Loiss in the related-key model [21]. As
confirmed by our experimental results, our attack recovers 92 bits of the 128-bit key in less than one
hour on a PC with 3 GHz Intel Pentium 4 processor. The possibility of extending the attack to a
resynchronization attack in a single-key model is discussed.
- SNOW 3G is a stream cipher chosen by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) as a crypto-
primitive to substitute KASUMI in case its security is compromised. SNOW 2.0 is one of the stream
3
ciphers chosen for the ISO/IEC standard IS 18033-4. In Chapter 6, we show that the initialization
procedure of the two ciphers admits a sliding property, resulting in several sets of related-key pairs
[77]. In case of SNOW 3G, a set of 232 related key pairs is presented, whereas in case of SNOW
2.0, several such sets are found, out of which the largest are of size 264 and 2192 for the 128-bit and
256-bit variant of the cipher, respectively. In addition to allowing related-key key recovery attacks
against SNOW 2.0 with 256-bit keys, the presented properties reveal non-random behavior which
yields related-key distinguishers and also questions the validity of the security proofs of protocols that
are based on the assumption that SNOW 3G and SNOW 2.0 behave like perfect random functions of
the key-IV.
- HC-128 is a high speed stream cipher with a 128-bit secret key and a 128-bit initialization vector. It
has passed all the three stages of the ECRYPT stream cipher project and is a member of the eSTREAM
software portfolio. In Chapter 7, we present a differential fault analysis attack on HC-128 [75]. The
fault model in which we analyze the cipher is the one in which the attacker is able to fault a random
word of the inner state of the cipher but cannot control its exact location nor its new faulted value. To
perform the attack, we exploit the fact that some of the inner state words in HC-128 may be utilized
several times without being updated. Our attack requires about 7968 faults and recovers the complete
internal state of HC-128 by solving a set of 32 systems of linear equations over Z2 in 1024 variables.
- Rabbit is a high speed scalable stream cipher with 128-bit key and a 64-bit initialization vector. It has
passed all three stages of the ECRYPT stream cipher project and is a member of eSTREAM software
portfolio. In Chapter 8, we present a practical fault analysis attack on Rabbit [74]. The fault model in
which we analyze the cipher is the one in which the attacker is assumed to be able to fault a random
bit of the internal state of the cipher but cannot control the exact location of injected faults. Our attack
requires around 128 − 256 faults, precomputed table of size 241.6 bytes and recovers the complete
internal state of Rabbit in about 238 steps.
The work in this thesis was published in [21, 71, 72, 74, 75, 77]. In addition, the work which was executed
during this Ph.D. but not included in the thesis appeared in [76, 78, 120].
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2Background
2.1 Basic symmetric key primitive design approaches
In this chapter, we provide a short overview of the basic symmetric key cryptography constructions
and their respective cryptanalysis methods. We start by providing common design methods for block ci-
phers, stream ciphers and hash functions.
2.1.1 Block Ciphers
A block cipher is a function that maps n-bit plaintext into n-bit ciphertext, parameterized by a k-bit
secret key. More formally [104], a block cipher is a mapping
EK : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}k 7→ {0, 1}n
such that for each key K ∈ {0, 1}k, E(P,K) is an invertible mapping (the encryption function for K) from
{0, 1}n 7→ {0, 1}n written EK(P ). The inverse mapping is the decryption function, denoted DK(C). Here,
n is called the blocksize and k is the keylength. It is generally assumed that the key is chosen at random.
Modern block ciphers are built by cascading simple operations which are individually insufficient to
provide the required properties, but, when combined, achieve a high degree of mixing of the plaintext and
secret key bits. The schematic view of iterative block cipher design is shown in Fig. 2.1. Before use, the
secret key is expanded according to the key expansion, which aims to mix the secret key bits into the different








Key expansion Iterated layers/rounds
Figure 2.1: Block cipher: key expansion and layers of simple round functions
linear, but in the case of AES block cipher, the key expansion includes non-linear mixing operations. One
iteration layer is called a round and typically consists of linear and non-linear sub-layer. The linear layer
is specified using permutations, XOR, finite field multiplications by constants and similar linear operations.
The non-linear layer is often implemented using S-boxes which implement operations that are non-linear
with respect to the ones used in the linear layer.
In Fig. 2.2, two common approaches to construct a round function are provided. The Feistel Net-
work round function, similar to the one used in the design of DES [109] block cipher and the Substitution
Permutation Network, similar to the one used in AES [110] are presented. In the basic Feistel network
construction, the input to the round function is divided in two words Li, Ri and processed as follows:
Li+1 = Ri
Ri+1 = Li ⊕ F (Ri, Ki)
where Ki is the i-th round subkey and F is the mixing function. The advantage of the Feistel network
construction lies in the fact that decryption function can be implemented by reusing the implementation
of the encryption function where only the subkey expansion is different. In the Substitution Permutation
Network construction depicted in Fig. 2.2, all of the input is uniformly mixed by applying a non-linear
S-box layer followed by a linear layer, such as permutation.
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Feistel Network Substitution Permutation Network
Figure 2.2: Approaches for constructing the round function in a cryptographic primitive
text and key bits and render the algorithm resistant to key or plaintext recovery algorithms. Classical secu-
rity requirements for block ciphers include resistance to known-plaintext attacks, chosen-plaintext attacks
and chosen-ciphertext attacks [104]. A more recent security requirement includes resistance to related-key
attacks, in which the attacker is assumed to have access to the ciphertext typically for chosen plaintext
encryption under multiple unknown keys that follow some pre-specified relation.
It is important to note that there exist even stronger security requirements, such as resistance to
known-key attacks and chosen-key attacks. These scenarios are relevant to the analysis of the block ciphers
in the hash function modes. As will be seen in subsection 2.1.3, when a block cipher is turned into a
compression function according to the Davies-Meyer construction, the input message that is to be hashed is
passed to the block cipher through the secret key mechanism and thus the attacker is in control of the key
input.
2.1.2 Stream Ciphers
Instead of processing the plaintext block by iterating layers of transformations as done in block
ciphers, stream ciphers generate pseudo-random sequences of data that is used to mask the plaintext. In
that sense, stream ciphers can be seen pseudo-random number generators that depend on secret keys. Apart
from the secret key, modern stream ciphers make use of another parameter called the initial vector (IV),
which allows reusing the same secret key for different plaintexts. Unlike block ciphers, stream ciphers have
memory, i.e., keep an inner state over different generated outputs.
Before the encryption starts, the secret inner state is initialized depending on the supplied secret key













Figure 2.3: One possible stream cipher work flow
resynchronization attacks on the initialization phase of the cipher. It is important to point out the similarity
between the stream cipher initialization phase and a hash function. Namely, the initialization can be seen as
hashing of the key and the IV into the starting inner state. The schematic view of a stream cipher is provided
on Fig. 2.3.
The design of some stream ciphers is reminiscent of the block cipher design explained in 2.1.1. For
example, this is the case in the LFSR-based software-oriented SNOW family of stream ciphers [49,51]. In a
block cipher, the plaintext is processed by iterating a comparatively large number of similar transformations
(i.e., rounds) on the plaintext. Contrarily, the idea of a stream cipher is to release a small portion of the
inner state after each stream cipher inner state update step. The state update step in the SNOW family of
ciphers consists of a linear and a non-linear part. The linear part corresponds to an LFSR over GF(232) and
the non-linear part to an FSM consisting of a transformation similar to one S-box based block cipher round.
Apart from the fact that the FSM can be seen as one block cipher round, the analogy can be extended and
the LFSR can be seen as the key schedule in a block cipher. The work flow of such a design approach is
provided in Fig. 2.4, where NL and L denote non-linear and linear transformations, respectively. The length
and the choice of the released keystream at each step have to be chosen carefully to eliminate the chances
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Figure 2.4: One possible approach to designing a stream cipher
2.1.3 Hash Functions
In this subsection, common ways to construct a hash function out of a block cipher are reviewed.
The widely used hash functions such as SHA-2 [112], SHA-1 [111] and MD5 [119] are all built based on
an underlying block cipher.
It is assumed that the input message to be hashed is divided into blocks of some fixed size. In the
case the length of the message is not a multiple of the message block length, padding is applied. Now, a
block cipher is used as a building block for a hash function as follows. First, a block cipher E : {0, 1}n ×
{0, 1}k 7→ {0, 1}n is turned into a compression function, which compresses a single message block into a
digest. Three common ways to achieve this are provided on Fig. 2.5. In the Davies-Meyer mode [104],
which is utilized in SHA-1, SHA-2 and MD5, the compression function is specified by computing Hi =
Emi(Hi−1, K) ⊕ Hi−1. In other words, the input message is passed as a key to the block cipher and the
output of the cipher is XOR-ed to its input. In the Matyas-Meyer-Oseas (MMO) mode [104], the function
is specified by Hi = Eg(Hi−1)(mi) ⊕ mi. Finally, in the Miyaguchi-Preneel (MP) mode [104], we have
Hi = Eg(Hi−1)(mi)⊕mi ⊕Hi−1. The g function used in the two latter modes accomodates the fact that the
block cipher may have different block and key sizes and therefore the key length is adjusted by applying the
function g to overcome this problem.
The compression function is then plugged in a mode that allows processing of an arbitrary number
of message blocks. One way to achieve this functionality is the well-known Merkle-Damga˚rd construction,
shown in Fig. 2.6. Although limitations of this method have been exposed [64, 66], it is one of the most


















Figure 2.5: Turning a block cipher into a compression function
. . .h h h
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Figure 2.6: Merkle-Damga˚rd mode
The main security goals of cryptographic hash functions are:
- Preimage resistance: Given a hash h, it is difficult to find any message m such that h = hash(m).
- Second Preimage resistance: Given input m1, it is difficult to find another m2 s.t. h(m1) = h(m2).
- Collision resistance: It is difficult to find any two messages m1 and m2 such that h(m1) = h(m2).
The collision resistance property is the generic attack complexity of 2n/2, due to the birthday paradox [104],
where n is the digest size. The second preimage and the preimage attacks have a higher generic complexity
of 2n−1 operations.
2.2 Background on cryptanalysis of cryptographic primitives
In an effort to render cryptographic primitives more secure, researchers in the cryptanalytic commu-
nity discovered many powerful attacks against symmetric key systems. Each proposed cryptanalytic attack
is characterized by the following parameters:
- Amount of required input data: The number of input/output data required to successfully execute the
attack.
10
- Number of necessary operations: The amount of necessary computations required to execute the
attack, often measured in terms of the number of executions of the cryptographic primitive.
- Storage complexity: The amount of memory required to perform the cryptanalytic task.
- Number of necessary physical actions on the encrypting device: This can include the number of
necessary measurements in the case of side channel analysis (such as power analysis attacks [84] and
timing attacks [83]) or the number of induced faults in the memory of the cipher, in the case of fault
analysis.
As stated above, apart from having available some amount of the input/output data related to the crypto-
graphic primitive, sometimes the attack model includes physical access to the device. Thus, another classifi-
cation of cryptanalytic attacks is with respect to whether or not the attacker has some sort of physical access
to the encrypting device. In more detail, the classification is as follows:
- Pure cryptanalytic attacks: If there is no information that leaks from the physical implementation of
the primitive, the attacker attempts to breach the security goals of the cryptographic primitive given
some input/output data. In the case of stream and block ciphers, this can include an attempt to recover
the key given plaintext/ciphertext material, whereas in the case of hash functions this may include
attempting to find a preimage for a given hash value, or to construct a collision for the primitive,
solely based on the specification of the primitive.
- Physical access dependent attacks: This attack model assumes that the attacker has some physical
access to the device executing the cryptographic primitive in question. It should be noted that side
channel attacks are applied against primitives that utilize a secret parameter, such as stream ciphers,
block ciphers or hash functions in MAC modes [104]. The model includes side channel analysis
where the attacker measures certain leaking parameters, e.g., the power consumption of the crypto-
graphic device or the time used to perform the encryption operation. A careful analysis of this side
channel information may enable the attacker to find some information about the inner workings of the
encrypting process under the given secret parameter, which leads to information recovery. Another
cryptanalytic model that falls into this category is differential fault analysis of ciphers in which the
attacker induces faults (errors) by applying physical influence such as ionizing radiation to the de-
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vice during the encryption. Similarly to side-channel analysis, a careful inspection of the results of
encryption in a faulty environment may help the cryptanalyst to pin down the secret parameter.
In the sequel, some of the most important cryptanalytic techniques applied against symmetric key based
primitives are reviewed, after which we provide a short introduction to side-channel attacks.
2.2.1 Pure cryptanalytic attacks
In the literature, cryptanalytic attacks are defined conservatively: a break of a cryptosystem is
achieved if the effort required by the attacker is less than the effort required by the generic attacks (such
as exhaustive key search or collision attack based on the birthday paradox). At the same time, in many prac-
tical scenarios, the attackers may have access to the cryptographic device. For such scenarios, side-channel
attacks are expected to recover the secret information in practical complexities.
Differential cryptanalysis: Instead of following the input/output values through layers of mixing, in dif-
ferential cryptanalysis, one follows the propagation of differences throughout the primitive. Differential
cryptanalysis is one of the most often used tools in cryptanalysis of symmetric key primitives. It was intro-
duced in [18] in the context of the block cipher DES, where efficient attacks on reduced-round variants of
the cipher have been proposed by noting biases in the corresponding plaintext-ciphertext differences. Apart
from block ciphers, differential cryptanalysis can be naturally applied to all other symmetric-key-based
cryptographic primitives.
The first stage in the differential analysis of a primitive is to study differential properties of particular
components used in the function. As for linear parts, such as bit permutations or key addition, the resulting
differences are deterministically computed by the differences in the input and therefore their behavior is
completely deterministic. In the case of non-linear components, such as s-boxes, knowledge of the input
difference does not guarantee knowledge of the output difference. In this case, the differentials
∆X
p→ ∆Y
are traced probabilistically. Here, p denotes the probability that the input difference ∆X will cause the
output difference ∆Y when passed through the considered non-linear function. To obtain a differential for
R − 1 rounds of the cipher, differentials are combined along a differential path and the final differential
12




where n is the number of s-boxes used in the differential path and pi the probability of the difference
propagation within the i-th s-box.
In the case of block ciphers, portions of the last round subkey are guessed and if the distribution of
differences for the current key guess does not correspond to the expected one, the key candidate is discarded.
Since the said portion of the last round subkey is usually smaller than the full key, significant reduction of
the key space is achieved. In the case of stream ciphers, differential attacks are typically applied on the
initialization procedure of the cipher which depends on the secret key. Finally, in the case of collision
attacks on hash functions, the attacker attempts to control the propagation of differences in order to find a
colliding input pair.
Linear Cryptanalysis: This type of analysis uses probabilistic linear relations between the input and output
of the non-linear components of the cryptographic primitive. It has been successfully applied to block
ciphers [96], providing the first attack on the full DES block cipher. Also, it turns out to be effective
against stream ciphers [32]. Recently, it has been applied to construct distinguishers in the context of hash
functions [7].
When applied to block ciphers, linear cryptanalysis is a known plaintext attack that relies on linear
relations between plaintext and ciphertext bits. The relation that is exploited needs to hold with biased
probability, i.e., with probability different from 1
2
. To construct such a relation, the first stage is to find linear
approximations of the non-linear building blocks of the cipher. In other words, the relation among input and
output bits of a given non-linear function is established
Xi1 ⊕Xi2 ⊕ . . .⊕Xim ⊕ . . .⊕ Yi1 ⊕ Yi2 ⊕ . . .⊕ Yin
where X and Y denote the input and output of the component. If the particular component is an s-box
with n input bits and m output bits, there exist (2n − 1)× (2m − 1) possibilities and the cryptanalyst needs
to investigate which ones hold with high bias, defined as ǫ = p − 1
2
. Next, these linear approximations
are combined using the Piling-Up Lemma [96] and a biased linear approximation among the key bits, the
plaintext and ciphertext for the cipher reduced to R − 1 rounds is obtained. In particular, the Piling-Up
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Lemma provides how the bias behaves when several biased random variables are XOR-ed together.
Lemma 1 Let Xi be independent random variables of which the values are 0 with the probability of pi and









Once the distinguisher for R − 1 round of a block cipher is obtained using the linear relation, the key-
recovery stage can proceed as follows. The R-th round subkey bits are then guessed and determined by the
guesses that provide most of the plaintext-ciphertext pairs satisfying the linear relation. When applied to a
stream cipher, similar to the way linear relations are constructed in block ciphers, one follows the evolution
of the inner state bits that participate in keystream generation at different cipher clocks and combines the
linear approximations of non-linear components. This allows construction of linear relations between bits at
different clocks, which allows the keystream produced by the stream cipher to be distinguished from random
and also in some cases secret inner state recovery [32]. Finally, linear relations have been used to construct
distinguishers for hash functions [7]. An important difference is that, since there is no key involved, one
does not aim to recover the key but rather attempts to construct a distinguisher for the function.
Higher-order differential cryptanalysis: While ordinary differential cryptanalysis utilizes differences of
the form
∆af(x) = f(x⊕ a)⊕ f(x)
higher-order differential cryptanalysis attempts to generalize these first order difference to the i-th deriva-
tives. It has been shown [80] that it is possible to construct a cipher that is unbreakable by means of classical
differential cryptanalysis and at the same time weak with respect to higher order differential cryptanalysis,
making the attack relevant. For instance, in [80] it was shown that for the function f(x, k) = (x+k)2 mod p
with input/output size of 2log2p, where p is prime, every non-trivial one round differential has probability
of 1
p
and the second order derivative is a constant. The problem with high-order differentials is to combine
them to more than two rounds, as is possible with first order differentials.
More precisely, the notion of higher order differentials as introduced by Lai in [85] is as follows.
Definition 1 Let (S,+) and (T,+) be Abelian groups. For a function f : S → T , the derivative of f at
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a ∈ S is defined as
∆af(x) = f(x+ a)− f(x)





In the case of the function f : Fm2 → F n2 , we have (Proposition 3, [85]):
Lemma 2 Let L[a1, . . . , ai] be the list of all 2





Below, we review the higher-order analysis of hash functions. In particular, the two equivalent no-
tions of second order collisions and zero-sums are defined. As defined in [22], an i-th order differential
collision for f is an i-tuple (a1, . . . , ai), together with a value x such that
∆(a1,...,ai)f(x) = 0
As argued in [22], since the i+1 input parameters a1, . . . , ai and x can be chosen freely, the query complexity
of finding an i-th order collision is 2n/(i+1), where n denotes the bit-size of the output of the function f .
Here, the query complexity denotes the number of queries made to the f function oracle. Thus, the query
complexity of finding a second order collision for the function f , i.e., values x, a1 and a2, such that
f(x⊕ a1 ⊕ a2)⊕ f(x⊕ a1)⊕ f(x⊕ a2)⊕ f(x) = 0 (2.1)
is 2n/3. As for the computational complexity, which would include evaluating f around 2n/3 times and
finding, among the outputs, a quartet that sums to 0, no algorithm with complexity better than 2n/2 is known.




























Figure 2.7: Boomerang attack against a compression function
x2, x3, introduced in [8], such that
x0 ⊕ x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3 = 0
f(x0)⊕ f(x1)⊕ f(x2)⊕ f(x3) = 0
(2.2)
It is easy to verify that the notions zero-sum quartet and second order collision notions are equivalent. For
example, given a zero-sum quartet, it suffices to put x = x0, a1 = x0⊕x1, a2 = x0⊕x2 to have (2.1) satisfied.
An efficient technique to construct second order collision utilizes the boomerang attack, as explained below.
Boomerang Attacks: This is a combined attack in which two different differential paths are combined in
order to pass through a larger number of rounds. The attack was devised in 1999 by Wagner [129] and in its
basic version, the attack required chosen-ciphertext queries, but in later versions [65] this requirement was
removed.
Boomerang attacks were applied to construct second order collisions for hash functions in 2011
independently by Biryukov et al. [23] and Lamberger et al. [86]. The general idea is to construct a quartet
that forms a boomerang structure [129] for a block cipher in the Davis-Meyer mode. The differentials used
in the boomerang are related key differentials, where the secret key of the block cipher corresponds to the
message block in the case of a compression function. The encryption function is divided into two parts,
E1 ◦ E0. As shown in Fig. 2.7, for the bottom part of the boomerang, a related-key differential (∆,∆K)→
β for E1 with probability q is constructed. Similarly, another related-key differential (δ, δK) → α with
probability p is used for E−10 . Then, an attempt to randomly satisfy the differentials in the boomerang
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structure with probability p2q2 would proceed as follows:
- Randomly choose X , the inner state in the middle of the hash function execution, representing the
input to E1 (and the output of E0). Let X
∗ = X ⊕∆, Y = X ⊕ δ and Y ∗ = X ⊕∆⊕ δ.
- Compute backward from X , X∗, Y , Y ∗ using E−10 to obtain P , P
∗, Q, Q∗, using keys K, K ⊕∆K ,
K ⊕ δK , K ⊕ δK ⊕∆K , respectively.
- Compute forward from X , X∗, Y , Y ∗ using E1 to obtain C, C
∗, D, D∗ using keys K, K ⊕ ∆K ,
K ⊕ δK , K ⊕ δK ⊕∆K , respectively.
- Verify whether C ⊕ C∗ = D ⊕D∗ and P ⊕Q = P ∗ ⊕Q∗.
If the last condition is satisfied, a zero-sum quartet is found for the encryption function in Davis-Meyer
mode, since P ⊕Q⊕ P ∗ ⊕Q∗ = 0 and also (C ⊕ P )⊕ (C∗ ⊕ P ∗)⊕ (D ⊕Q)⊕ (D∗ ⊕Q∗) = 0.
To improve the efficiency of the process above, instead of trying to satisfy the boomerang randomly,
message modification can be used for some of the differential paths in the boomerang. For example, in
[22], message modification is applied to satisfy the middle part of the boomerang, i.e., to satisfy the two
differentials paths of the function E1. The other paths in the boomerang are satisfied randomly.
Truncated differential cryptanalysis: Truncated differential cryptanalysis was introduced in 1994 by
Knudsen [80]. The idea of this technique is to view the differences in an abstracted way, instead of fully
specifying them. In particular, in a conventional differential attack, each bit of the input and output difference
is specified. In truncated differential cryptanalysis, the differences are not fully specified. For instance,
instead of specifying each bit in a 32-bit difference, one can only take into account whether each of the four
bytes in a difference are active and write, say, 1001, if only the least and most significant bytes are active.
Here, the particular 8-bit value of the difference is abstracted away from the picture.
Truncated differentials are a versatile tool in cryptanalysis. One of the first applications of truncated
differentials was provided in [80], where truncated differentials are used to attack a 6-round DES with only
46 chosen plaintext-ciphertext pairs. Another interesting early truncated differential is the one used to attack
the reduced round Skipjack block cipher [82] (an algorithm developed by the US National Security Agency),
where it was shown that there exists a truncated differential that spans over 24 steps with probability 1.
Over the last 20 years, truncated differentials have been extensively used. A recent truncated differential
attack includes an attack against the recently proposed block cipher WIDEA [91], which is a successor of
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the widely used IDEA block cipher. In the case of hash functions, truncated differentials are naturally used
against block cipher based hash functions that rely on S-boxes, such as ECHO and Grøstl [117]. An example
of an application of truncated differentials on a stream cipher is cryptanalysis of round-reduced versions of
the Salsa stream cipher [115].
Differential-linear cryptanalysis: This type of attack was introduced in 1994 by Langford and Hellman
[87]. It is a combined attack in the sense that it combines two different probabilistic patterns (a differential
pattern and a linear pattern). Ideally, combining the two patterns outperforms a pure differential or linear
attack over the same number of rounds. This is the case when this attack is applied against 8-round DES, as
shown in [87]. In particular, a chosen-plaintext attack against 8-round DES is obtained, in which differential
cryptanalysis is applied to the first three rounds and linear cryptanalysis is applied on the remaining five
rounds. The main observation on which the attack relies is that inverting certain bits in the input of the first
round leaves certain third round bits unchanged, implying that the XOR sum of these third round bits is also
left unchanged. From rounds four to seven, a linear approximation involving exactly these unchanged four-
round input bits and certain 7-th round bits is then used. For each 8-th round subkey portion, it is verified
whether for each plaintext, the XOR sum of the bits in question changes or not. Using differential-linear
cryptanalysis, the number of necessary chosen plaintext-ciphertext pairs was reduced to 512 to recover 10
bits of the key, for 8-round DES. In this case, the differential-linear combination yielded an attack that
requires fewer plaintext-cipher text pairs, when compared to the the classical Biham-Shamir differential
attack, which requires over 5000 chosen pairs. The differential-linear attack has mostly been applied to
block ciphers. One recent application of this technique is a 12-round cryptanalysis of the Serpent block
cipher [46], which was a finalist in the AES block cipher competition.
Impossible differential cryptanalysis: Instead of using biased differentials, differentials with probability
0 can also be used to mount key recovery attacks on cryptographic primitives [14]. Let the input difference
δ0 never propagate to the output difference δ1. If this property holds for rounds 1 to R − 1, then the final
round subkey can be attacked as follows. We encrypt many plaintext pairs with difference δ0 and guess the
corresponding portion of the round R subkey. If the guess is correct, the difference δ1 will not occur. If,
however, such a difference occurs, we can prune the key space based on the current key guess. One notable
early application of this attack was on the Skipjack block cipher [15], where 31 out of 32 rounds where
shown to be susceptible to this technique.
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Multiset attacks, Integral attacks: The first application of multiset attacks was against the predecessor
of AES, a block cipher called Square [43]. The main probabilistic pattern utilized in such attacks is the
preservance of certain properties of sets of values. For example, consider a set of inputs such that each
two inputs differ in exactly one byte i0 and this byte takes all possible values, i.e., a set of 2
8 inputs are
considered. Namely, if a byte-wise bijective transformation is applied, the output set will also satisfy the
said property, i.e., the corresponding output byte will take all possible values. Useful sets of another type are
sets where each value occurs exactly k times. Multiset attacks trace this kind of properties through as many
rounds as possible. Integral cryptanalysis refers to the attack when the used set property is that
∑
x∈G x = 0,
where G is the group that the elements belong to, i.e., the set is balanced. The property is conserved after
the addition of two sets and this is what is important for pushing the property through several rounds in
the cipher. One relatively recent application of this technique is against AES [81], where it is shown that
7-round AES does not behave as a random oracle.
Slide attacks: A particularity of this type of attack is that it is independent of the number of rounds
employed in the primitive. The idea is quite simple: one attempts to instantiate the inner state at round
i + 1 with values exactly equal to values in state i of another instance of the primitive. If the same round
functions are applied throughout the primitive, the property is preserved with probability 1 until the end
of the execution of the primitive. Slide attacks have been introduced in the context of block ciphers by
Biryukov and Wagner [26] and have been applied to stream ciphers [34] and hash function as well [56].
When applied to block ciphers, the attack relies on the key schedule weakness by which parts of the
key are reused subsequently in different rounds. For simplicity, assume that the same key is used in each
round transformation; let property of the cipher be called self-similarity. The first stage of the key-recovery
attack on such a block cipher is to find slid pairs, defined as follows. Let F be the round function of an
iterated block cipher. If a pair of known plaintexts (P,C), (P ′, C ′) satisfies F (P ) = P ′, then due to the self-
similarity of both the rounds and the key schedule, the corresponding ciphertexts also satisfy F (C) = C ′.
Such a pair is called a slid pair.
By finding a slid pair, which is possible using O(2
n
2 ) plaintexts due to the birthday paradox [104],
the attacker obtains a plaintext P and its one-round ciphertext, P ′. The key idea here is that the attacker is
able to verify that the corresponding ciphertexts (C,C ′) are on a one-round difference. Now, if from the pair
(P, P ′) it is possible to deduce the information about the key K, the secret key is compromised. A common
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way to defend against slide attacks is to use different constants in each round of the transformation.
2.2.2 Side channel attacks
Side channel attacks usually exploit the information leaked by the physical characteristics of the
cryptographic modules during the execution of the algorithm. This extra information can be extracted from
timing, power consumption or electromagnetic radiation features. Other forms of side-channel information
can be a result of hardware or software failures, changes in frequency or temperature and computational
errors. In the following subsections, we briefly review some of the side channel cryptanalytic models.
Fault Analysis: In fault analysis, the cryptanalyst applies some kind of physical influence on the internal
state of the cryptosystem, such as ionizing radiation which flips random bits in the memory of the device. By
careful study of the results of computations under such faults, an attacker may be able to retrieve information
about the secret key. Smartcards are especially susceptible to this kind of attack. Fault attacks were first
introduced by Boneh et al. [30] in 1996 where they described attacks that targeted the RSA public key
cryptosystem by exploiting a faulty Chinese Remainder Theorem computation to factor the modulus n.
Subsequently, fault analysis attacks were extended to symmetric systems such as DES [19] and later to
AES [48] and other primitives. Fault analysis attacks became a more serious threat after cheap and low-tech
methods of applying faults were presented (e.g., [6, 126]).
Hoch and Shamir [58] addressed the problem of fault analysis of stream ciphers in 2004. Ciphers
based on LSFRs, LILI-128, SOBER-t32 and also RC4 were analyzed and it has been shown that none of
these constructions are secure in the random-location fault model, i.e., in the case where the attacker can
not choose the exact location of induced faults. As for RC4, the key recovery attack required 216 faults and
226 keystream words.
In [17], Biham et al. assessed the RC4 stream cipher in the chosen-location model, where an attacker
chooses a location at which a fault is induced. An interesting idea to push the cipher into a specific state
called a Finney state, by means of inducing faults, is used to find the secret internal state of RC4. A Finney
state is a state in which RC4 in normal mode of operation, i.e., without faults, can not enter. However, once
the internal state is artificially pushed into one of the Finney states, it can not go out anymore, the length
of a cycle becomes very small and what is more, the secret S table can be read solely by looking at the
keystream output. The attack required 216 chosen-location faults. Another, more advanced fault analysis
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attack on RC4 which requires 210 faults was also introduced in the same paper.
Timing Analysis: The majority of optimized implementations of cryptographic algorithms execute the
computation in a non-constant time. If these operations involve secret parameters, these timing variations
can leak some information that can provide enough critical knowledge to recover secret information. Timing
attacks were first introduced in 1996 by Kocher [83] who demonstrated the power of these attacks against
the RSA cryptosystem. Subsequently, Schindler [4] presented timing attacks on the implementation of RSA
exponentiation that employs the Chinese Remainder Theorem. Other uses of timing attacks can be found
in [45, 57].
A particular type of timing analysis, called cache-timing analysis was proposed in 2005 by Osvik
et al. [113]. A simple cache-timing attack in a scenario where the attacker and the legitimate user share
the same CPU, named prime-then-probe, is as follows. First, the attacker fills the cache with data and then
stops using the CPU. Then, the legitimate user performs the encryption on the CPU. Finally, the attacker
measures loading times and finds which of his data has been removed from the cache. It should be noted
that the attacker does not learn the content of the cache registers, but only positions that have been used
by the legitimate user. From such information, a cipher’s internal values leak and can lead to the recovery
of the secret key. An important example of ciphers particularly vulnerable to cache-timing analysis is the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [31,113]. Bertoni et al. [13] describes how cache misses can be used
for cryptanalysis.
As for the stream ciphers, a cache-timing model was applied to analyze the HC-256 stream cipher by
Zenner [138], where, given 6148 precise cache measurements and computational, effort equivalent to around
255 key tries in the brute force setting, the secret internal state of the stream cipher can be recovered. In [88],
Leander et al. have shown how to apply cache-timing attacks against Linear Feedback Shift Register based
stream ciphers. In particular, it was shown how to recover the secret key for SOSEMANUK [12], another
software oriented eStream finalist, given the precise cache measurements in 40 and 60 clocks of the cipher,
respectively.
Power Analysis Attacks: Useful information about the operations being executed in cryptographic hard-
ware can leak through power consumption information. Power analysis has been shown to be effective
against smart cards and embedded devices. In general, power analysis attacks [84] can be either simple
power analysis (SPA) or differential power analysis (DPA). In SPA attacks, using the measured power
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traces, the attacker guesses what instruction is being carried out at a specific time as well as the input
and the output values of the instruction. Such analysis requires the attacker to know the exact structure of
the implementation. In contrast, DPA attacks do not require detailed knowledge of the implementation and
utilize statistical methods in the process. Experimental results of power analysis against smartcards have
been reported in [5, 114].
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3A heuristic for finding compatible differential
paths with application to HAS-160
In this chapter, a heuristic that searches for compatible differential paths is proposed. The application
of the proposed heuristic in the case of HAS-160 yields a practical second order collision over all of the hash
function steps, which is the first practical result that covers the full HAS-160 compression function.
In general, whenever two probabilistic patterns are combined for the purpose of passing through a
maximal number of rounds of a cryptographic primitive, a natural question that arises is the question of
compatibility of the two patterns. Particularly, the question of compatibility of differential paths in the
context of boomerang attacks was tackled in 2011, by Murphy [107], who showed that care should be
exercised when estimating the boomerang attack success probability, since there may exist dependency
between the two combined differentials. The extreme case is the total impossibility of combining the two
paths, where the corresponding probability is equal to 0.
In the context of constructing second order collisions for compression functions using the start-from-
the-middle technique, due to availability of message modification in the steps where the primitive follows
the two paths, the above mentioned probability plays less of a role as long as it is strictly greater than 0.
In that case, the two paths are said to be compatible. Several paths that were previously believed to be
compatible have been shown to be incompatible in the previously described sense, e.g., by Leurent [89] and
Sasaki [123] for the BLAKE and RIPEMD-160 hash functions, respectively.
The compatibility requirement in this context can be stated with more precision as follows. Let φ and
ω be two differential paths over some number of steps of an iterative function f = fj+n ◦ . . . ◦ fj . If there
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exists a quartet of f inputs x0, x1, x2 and x3 such that computations (x0, x1) and (x2, x3) follow φ whereas
(x0, x2) and (x1, x3) follow ω, we say that φ and ω are compatible. Usually the path φ is left unspecified
over the last k steps (backward path) and ω is unspecified over the remaining steps (forward path). Such
paths have also been previously called independent [23]. Another closely related notion is the concept of
non-interleaving paths in the context of biclique attacks [67].
New Contributions. In this chapter, we present a heuristic that allows us to search for compatible differ-
ential paths. The heuristic builds on the previous de Cannie`re and Rechberger automatic differential path
search method. Instead of working with pairs, our proposed heuristic operates on quartets of hash execu-
tions and includes cross-path propagations. We present detailed examples of particular propagations applied
during the search. As an application of our proposed heuristic, a second order collision for the full HAS-160
compression function is found. The best previous practical distinguisher for this function covered steps 5
to 80 [124]. This is the first practical distinguisher for the full HAS-160. This particular hash function is
relevant as it has been standardized by the Korean government (TTAS.KO-12.0011/R1) [1].
RelatedWork. The differential paths used in groundbreaking attacks on MD4, MD5 and SHA-1 [130,131]
were found manually. Subsequently, several techniques for automatic differential path search have been
studied [35, 54, 125, 128]. The de Cannie`re and Rechberger heuristic [35] was subsequently applied to
many MDx/SHA-x based hash functions, such as RIPEMD-128, HAS-160, SHA-2 and SM3 [99–102]. To
keep track of the current information in the system, the heuristic relies on 1-bit constraints that express the
relations between pairs of bits in the differential setting. This was generalized to multi-bit constraints by
Leurent [89], where the finite state machine approach allowed uniform representation of different constraint
types. Multi-bit constraints have been used in the context of differential path search in [90].
The boomerang attack [129], originally applied to block ciphers, has been adapted to the hash func-
tion setting independently by Biryukov et al. [23] and by Lamberger and Mendel [86]. In particular,
in [23], a distinguisher for the 7-round BLAKE-32 was provided, whereas in [86] a distinguisher for the
46-step reduced SHA-2 compression function was provided. The latter SHA-2 result was extended to 47
steps [22]. Subsequently, boomerang distinguishers have been applied to many hash functions, such as
HAVAL, RIPEMD-160, SIMD, HAS-160, SM3 and Skein [72, 92, 98, 121, 123, 124, 136]. Outside of the
boomerang context, the zero-sum property as a distinguishing property was first used by Aumasson [8].
As for the previous HAS-160 analysis, in 2005, Yun et al. [137] found a practical collision for
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the 45-step (out of 80) reduced hash function. Their attack was extended in 2006 to 53 steps by Cho et
al. [36], however, with computational complexity of 255 53-step compression function computations. In
2007, Mendel and Rijmen [103] improved the latter attack complexity to 235, providing a practical two-
block message collision for the 53-step compression function. Preimage attacks on 52-step HAS-160 with
complexity of 2152 was provided in 2008 by Sasaki and Aoki [122]. Subsequently, in 2009, this result was
extended by Hong al. to 68 steps [61] where the attack required a complexity of 2156.3. In 2011, Mendel et
al. provided a practical semi-free-start collision for 65-step reduced compression function [99]. Finally, in
2012, Sasaki et al. [124] provided a theoretical boomerang distinguisher for the full HAS-160 compression
function, requiring 276.6 function computations. In the same work, a practical second order collision was
given for steps 5 to 80 of the function.
In the next section, we provide a review of boomerang distingiushers and a recapitulation of the de
Cannie`re and Rechberger search heuristic, along with the HAS-160 specification. In Section 3.2, the general
form of our search heuristic is provided and its application to HAS-160 is discussed. The three propagation
types used in the heuristic are explained in Section 3.3. Concluding remarks are in given Section 3.4.
3.1 Review of related work and the specification of HAS-160
In the following subsections, we provide a description of a commonly used strategy to construct
second order collisions, an overview of the de Cannie`re and Rechberger path search heuristic and finally the
specification of the HAS-160 hash function.
3.1.1 Review of boomerang distinguishers for hash functions
First, we provide a generic definition of the property used for distinguishing the compression function
from a random function. Let h be a function with n-bit output. A second order collision for h is a set
{x,∆,∇} consisting of an input for h and two differences, such that
h(x+∆+∇)− h(x+∆)− h(x+∇) + h(x) = 0 (3.1)
As explained in [22], the query complexity for finding a second order collision is 3 ·2n/3 where n denotes the



























Figure 3.1: Start-from-the-middle approach for constructing second-order collisions
to the function h is considered. On the other hand, for the computational complexity, which would include
evaluating h around 3 · 2n/3 times and finding a quartet that sums to 0, the best currently known algorithm
runs in complexity no better than 2n/2. If for a particular function a second order collision is obtained with
a complexity lower than 2n/2, then this hash function deviates from the random function oracle.
Next, we explain the strategy to construct quartets satisfying (3.1) for Davies-Meyer based functions,
as commonly applied in the previous literature. An overview of the strategy is provided in Fig. 3.1. We
write h(x) = e(x) + x, where e is an iterative function consisting of n steps. The goal is to find four inputs
xA, xB, xC and xD that constitute the inputs in (3.1) according to Fig. 3.1 (c). In particular, the goal is to
have
xA − xD = xB − xC
e(xA)− e(xB) = e(xD)− e(xC)
(3.2)
where the two values specified by (3.2) are denoted respectively by α and β in Fig. 3.1 (c). In this case, we
have h(xA)−h(xB)+h(xC)−h(xD) = e(xA)+xA− e(xB)−xB + e(xC)+xC − e(xD)−xD = 0. Now,
one can put xA = x, ∆ = xD − xA and ∇ = xB − xA and (3.1) is satisfied.
A preliminary step is to decide on two paths, called the forward path and the backward path. As
shown in Fig. 3.1, these paths are chosen so that for some n0 < n1 < n2 < n3 < n4 < n5, the forward path
has no active bits between steps n3 and n4 and the backward path has no active bits between steps n1 and
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Compression function n0 n1 n2 n3 n4 n5 Reference Message block size
SHA-2 0 6 22 31 47 47 [22] 16× 32
HAVAL 0 2 61 97 157 160 [121] 32× 32
HAS-160 5 13 38 53 78 80 [124] 16× 32
Table 3.1: Overview of some of the previously used boomerang paths
n2. The forward path is enforced on faces (xA, xB) and (xD, xC) (front and back) whereas the backward
differential is enforced on faces (xA, xD) and (xB, xC) (left and right). In the case of MDx-based designs,
the particular n values depend mostly on the message schedule specification.
The procedure can be summarized as follows:
(a) The first step is to construct the middle part of the quartet structure, as shown in Fig. 3.1 (a). The
forward and backward paths end at steps n3 and n2, respectively. In steps n2 to n3, the two paths need
to be compatible for this stage to succeed.
(b) Following Fig. 3.1 (b), the paths are extended to steps n1 backward and n4 forward with probability
1, due to the absence of disturbances in the corresponding steps.
(c) Some of the middle-step words are randomized and the quartet is recomputed backward and forward,
verifying if (3.2) is satisfied. If yes (see Fig. 3.1 (c)), return the quartet, otherwise, repeat this step.
This strategy, with variations, has been applied in several previous works, such as [22, 121, 123, 124]. In
Table 3.1, we provide the forward/backward path parameters for the previous boomerang distinguishers on
some of the MDx/SHA-x based compression functions following the single-pipe design strategy.
In [22,124], the number of steps in the middle was 9 and 16 steps, respectively. It can be observed that
these numbers of middle steps are suboptimal, since simple message modification allows trivially satisfying
16 steps in the case of SHA-2 and HAS-160. Since the forward and backward paths are sparse towards steps
n3 and n2, one can easily imagine satisfying more than 16 steps, while there remains enough freedom to
randomize the inner state although some penalty in probability has to be paid. In the case of HAVAL [121],
simple message modification allows passing through 32 steps and the middle part consists of as many as 36
steps. However, it should be noted that this is due to the particular property of HAVAL that allows narrow
paths [70].
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δ(x, x′) meaning (0,0) (0,1) (1,0) (1,1)
? anything
√ √ √ √




x x 6= x′ - √ √ -
0 x = x′ = 0
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- - -
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Table 3.2: Symbols used to express 1-bit conditions [35]
3.1.2 Review of the de Cannie`re and Rechberger search heuristic
This search heuristic is used to find differential paths that describe pairs of compression function
executions. The symbols used for expressing differential paths are provided in Table 3.2. For example,
when we write -x-u, we mean a set of 4-bit pairs
-x-u = {T, T ′ ∈ F 42 |T3 = T ′3, T2 6= T ′2, T1 = T ′1, T0 = 0, T ′0 = 1}
where Ti denotes i-th bit in word T .
Next, an example of condition propagation is provided. Suppose that a small differential path over
one modular addition is given by
----+ ---x = ---x (3.3)
Here (3.3) describes a pair of additions: x + y = z and x′ + y′ = z′, and from this “path” we have that
x = x′ and also that y and y′ are different only in the least significant bit (likewise for z and z′). However,
this can happen only if x0 = x
′
0 = 0, i.e. if the lsb of x and x
′ is equal to 0. We thus propagate a condition
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by replacing (3.3) with
---0+ ---x = ---x
The de Cannie`re and Rechberger heuristic [35] searches for differential paths over some number of com-
pression function steps. It starts from a partially specified path which typically means that the path is fully
specified at some steps (i.e., consisting of symbols {-,u,n}) and unspecified at other steps (i.e., symbol
‘?’). The heuristic attempts to complete the path, so that the final result is non-contradictory by proceeding
as follows:
- Guess: select randomly a bit position containing ‘?’ or ‘x’. Substitute the symbol in the chosen bit
position by ‘-’ and {u,n}, respectively.
- Propagate: deduce new information introduced by the Guess step.
When a contradiction is detected, the search backtracks by jumping back to one of the guesses and attempts
different choices.
3.1.3 HAS-160 specification
The HAS-160 hash function follows the MDx/SHA-x hash function design strategy. Its compression
function can be seen as a block cipher in Davies-Meyer mode, mapping 160-bit chaining values and 512-bit
messages into 160-bit digests. To process arbitrary-length messages, the compression function is plugged in
the Merkle-Damga˚rd mode.
Before hashing, the message is padded so that its length becomes multiple of 512 bits. Since here
padding is not relevant, we refer the reader to [1] for further details. The underlying HAS-160 block cipher
consists of two parts: message expansion and state update transformation.
Message expansion: The input to the compression function is a message m = (m0, . . . m15) represented
as 16 32-bit words. The output of the message expansion is a sequence of 32-bit words W0, . . .W79. The
expansion is specified in Table 3.3. For example, W26 = m15.
State update: One compression function step is schematically described by Fig. 3.2 (a). The Boolean
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
m8 ⊕m9 m0 m1 m2 m3 m12 ⊕m13 m4 m5 m6 m7 m0 ⊕m1 m8 m9 m10 m11 m4 ⊕m5 m12 m13 m14 m15⊕m10 ⊕m11 ⊕m14 ⊕m15 ⊕m2 ⊕m3 ⊕m6 ⊕m7
m11 ⊕m14 m3 m6 m9 m12 m7 ⊕m10 m15 m2 m5 m8 m3 ⊕m6 m11 m14 m1 m4 m15 ⊕m2 m7 m10 m13 m0⊕m1 ⊕m4 ⊕m13 ⊕m0 ⊕m9 ⊕m12 ⊕m5 ⊕m8
m4 ⊕m13 m12 m5 m14 m7 m8 ⊕m1 m0 m9 m2 m11 m12 ⊕m5 m4 m13 m6 m15 m0 ⊕m9 m8 m1 m10 m3⊕m6 ⊕m15 ⊕m10 ⊕m3 ⊕m14 ⊕m7 ⊕m2 ⊕m11
m15 ⊕m10 m7 m2 m13 m8 m11 ⊕m6 m3 m14 m9 m4 m7 ⊕m2 m15 m10 m5 m0 m3 ⊕m14 m11 m6 m1 m12⊕m5 ⊕m0 ⊕m1 ⊕m12 ⊕m13 ⊕m8 ⊕m9 ⊕m4
Table 3.3: Message expansion in HAS-160
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Figure 3.2: Two equivalent representations of the state update
functions f used in each step are given by
f0(x, y, z) = (x ∧ y)⊕ (¬x ∧ z)
f1(x, y, z) = x⊕ y ⊕ z
f2(x, y, z) = (x ∨ ¬z)⊕ y
where f0 is used in steps 0-19, f1 is used in steps 20-39 and 60-79 and f2 is used in steps 40-59. The
constant Ki that is added in each step changes every 20 steps, taking the values 0, 5a827999, 6ed9eba1 and
8f1bbcdc. The rotational constant si1 is specified by the following table
i mod 20 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
si1 5 11 7 15 6 13 8 14 7 12 9 11 8 15 6 12 9 14 5 13
The other rotational constant si2 changes only each 20 steps and s
i
2 ∈ {10, 17, 25, 30}. Following the Davies-
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Message quartet
MA F6513317 810F1084 FFB71009 78CC955E C3C09F18 5379FC99 435586DA 9C9AD3B4
00440C80 E174316A 006D1670 2B5CF68A AB3DE600 02C9E9D3 5FE95AFF E351DE04
MB F6513317 810F1084 FFB71009 78CC955E C3C09f18 5379FC99 435786DA 9C9AD3B4
00440C80 E174316A 006D1670 2B5CF68A AB3FE600 02C9E9D3 5FE95AFF E351DE04
MC 76513317 010F1084 FFB71009 78CC955E 43C09F18 5379FC99 435786DA 1C9AD3B4
00440C80 E174316A 006D1670 2B5CF68A AB3FE600 02C9E9D3 5FE95AFF E351DE04
MD 76513317 010F1084 FFB71009 78CC955E 43C09f18 5379FC99 435586DA 1C9AD3B4
00440C80 E174316A 006D1670 2B5CF68A AB3DE600 02C9E9D3 5FE95AFF E351DE04
Chaining values quartet
IVA 1143BE75 9A9CA381 85B3F526 DA6ABE66 70EBE920
IVB 3AF7BD99 D08E2E63 245C2AF0 C4456954 CAC046EA
IVC 3AF7B599 D08E2E63 B45C2AF0 C425694C 3BE146F2
IVD 1143B675 9A9CA381 15B3F526 DA4ABE5E E20CE928
Table 3.4: Second order collision for the full HAS-160 compression function
Meyer mode, feedforward is applied and the output of the compression is
(A80 + A0, B80 + B0, C80 + C0, D80 +D0, E80 + E0)
Alternative description of HAS-160: In Fig. 3.2 (b), the compression function is shown as a recurrence
relation, where Ai+1 plays the role of A in the usual step representation. Namely, A can be considered as the
only new computed word, since the rotation that is applied to B can be compensated by properly adjusting
the rotation constants in the recurrence relation specification. One starts from A−4, A−3, A−2, A−1 and A0,
putting these values to the previous chaining value (or the IV for the first message block) and computes the
recurrence until A80 according to
Ai+1 = Ai−4 <<< t
i
1 +Ki + fi(Ai−1, Ai−2 <<< t
i
3, Ai−3 <<< t
i
2) +Wi + Ai <<< t
i
4 (3.4)
The rotational values tij , 1 ≤ j ≤ 4 are derived from si1 and si2, where the constants related to the rotation of
B in the usual representation change around the steps 20 × k, k = 0, 1, 2, 3. For instance, to compute A42,
we have t411 = 17, t
41
2 = 17, t
41
3 = 25 and t
41
4 = 11.
3.2 Compatible paths search heuristic and application to HAS-160
In this section, we provide a new search heuristic that can be used to find compatible paths in the
boomerang setting. The particular colliding quartet found by applying the heuristic on HAS-160 is provided
in Table 3.4.
The heuristic uses quartets of 1-bit conditions from Table 3.2 to keep track of the bit differences in
each of the four compression function executions. Apart from the single-path propagations proposed in [35],
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
m8 ⊕m9 m0 m1 m2 m3 m12 ⊕m13 m4 m5 m6 m7 m0⊕m1 m8 m9 m10 m11 m4⊕m5 m12 m13 m14 m15⊕m10 ⊕m11 ⊕m14 ⊕m15 ⊕m2 ⊕m3 ⊕m6⊕m7
m11 ⊕m14 m3 m6 m9 m12 m7 ⊕m10 m15 m2 m5 m8 m3 ⊕m6 m11 m14 m1 m4 m15 ⊕m2 m7 m10 m13 m0⊕ m1⊕ m4 ⊕m13⊕ m0 ⊕m9 ⊕m12 ⊕m5 ⊕m8
m4 ⊕m13 m12 m5 m14 m7 m8 ⊕m1 m0 m9 m2 m11 m12⊕m5 m4 m13 m6 m15 m0 ⊕m9 m8 m1 m10 m3⊕ m6⊕m15 ⊕m10 ⊕m3 ⊕m14 ⊕m7 ⊕m2 ⊕m11
m15 ⊕m10 m7 m2 m13 m8 m11⊕m6 m3 m14 m9 m4 m7 ⊕m2 m15 m10 m5 m0 m3 ⊕m14 m11 m6 m1 m12⊕m5 ⊕m0 ⊕m1⊕m12 ⊕m13 ⊕m8 ⊕m9 ⊕m4
Table 3.5: Message differentials. Backward: steps 0-39, forward: steps 40-79
step ∆[A,B] ∆[D,C] ∆[B,C] ∆[A,D] step
9 ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? -------------------------------- -------------------------------- 9
10 ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? -------------------------------- -------------------------------- 10
11 ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? -------------------------------- -------------------------------- 11
12 ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? -------------------------------- -------------------------------- 12







29 ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? -------------------------------- -------------------------------- 29
30 ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? -------------------------------- -------------------------------- 30
31 ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? -------------------------------- -------------------------------- 31
32 ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? -------------------------------- -------------------------------- 32
33 ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? -------------------------------- -------------------------------- 33
34 ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? 34
35 ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? 35
36 ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? 36
37 ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? 37
38 ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? 38
39 ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? 39
40 ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? 40
41 ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? 41
42 ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? 42
43 ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? 43
44 ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? 44
45 ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? 45
46 ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? 46
47 ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? 47
48 ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? 48
49 ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? 49
50 -------------------------------- -------------------------------- ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? 50
51 -------------------------------- -------------------------------- ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? 51
52 -------------------------------- -------------------------------- ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? 52
53 -------------------------------- -------------------------------- ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? 53







76 -------------------------------- -------------------------------- ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? 76
77 -------------------------------- -------------------------------- ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? 77
Table 3.6: Input for the search heuristic
two additional types of boomerang (cross-path) propagations are added. These boomerang propagations
were previously listed in [89].
To specify the problem on which the heuristic is applied in the context of HAS-160, the forward and
backward message differentials are provided next. Let the forward message differential consist of a one-bit
difference in messages m6 and m12 and the backward differential of a one-bit difference in m0, m1, m4
and m7, as shown in Table 3.5. The particular bit-position of differences is left unspecified. The choice of
these difference positions is justified by the following start/end points of the expanded message differences,
expressed in terms of the notation used in Fig. 3.1: (n0, n1, n2, n3, n4, n5) = (0, 8, 34, 53, 78, 80). It can be
observed that the middle part consists of 20 steps.
Now, the particular problem schematically described by Fig. 3.1 (a) is represented more specifically
by Table 3.6, where the backward and forward message differentials are indicated in the first and the last
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step ∆[A,B] ∆[D,C] ∆[B,C] ∆[A,D] step
29 ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? -------------------------------- -------------------------------- 29
30 ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? -------------------------------- -------------------------------- 30
31 ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? -------------------------------- -------------------------------- 31
32 ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? -------------------------------- -------------------------------- 32
33 ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? -------------------------------- -------------------------------- 33
34 0??????????????????????????????? 1??????????????????????????????? u------------------------------- u------------------------------- 34
35 0??????????u???????x0???x-0????? 1??????????u???????x0???x-1????? u----------1--------0-----u----- u----------0--------0-----u----- 35
36 1x????????xu?-01B?--0Bx--u0D???? 0x????????xu?-11B?--1Bx--u0D???? n----------1--u1----u----10----- n----------0--u1----u----00----- 36
37 11-0D0B??0n0?101-x-10-01u01C???x 11-0D1B??0n1?100-x-10-00u10C???x 11-0-u---00u-10n---10-0n1un----- 11-0-u---01u-10n---10-0n0un1---- 37
38 00u0nn-1n01uu000uu-011u00nnn-01- 01u0nn-1n01uu110uu-001u10nnn-11- 0u1000-100111uu011-0n11u0000-u1- 0u0011-110100uu000-0n10u0111-u1- 38
39 n101-1000100-0-0000-1---100-010n n110-0010101-0-1001-1---001-100n 01un-n0u010u-0-u00u-1---n0u-un00 11un-n0u010u-0-u00u-1---n0u-un01 39
40 1-100010001-01--0n1-u-0-00--11-1 1-010011101-00--1n1-u-0-10--11-1 1-nu001uu01-0n--u01-1-0-u0--11-1 1-nu001uu01-0n--u11-0-0-u0--11-1 40
41 u--1--00--0-01--0--0u--001-0---1 u--0--00--0-11--1--1u--001-0---1 1--n--00--0-u1--u--u1--001-0---1 0--n--00--0-u1--u--u0--001-0---1 41
42 u---1-01001-110--n01011--n10---1 u---0-11110-011--n00000--n00---0 1---n-u1uun-n1u--00n0nn--0n0---n 0---n-u1uun-n1u--10n0nn--1n0---n 42
43 n------01----0------u------00-un n------00----0------u------01-un 0????--0nD???0x?????1x??x--0u-10 1????--0nD???0x?????0x??x--0u-01 43
44 0-----10----------------1u------ 0------0----------------1u------ 0?????C0????????????????11?????x 0?????C0????????????????10?????x 44
45 ------00------------u------1---- ------00------------u------1---- ??????00????????????1??????1???? ??????00????????????0??????1???? 45
46 u------------------------------- u------------------------------- 1??????????????????????????????? 0??????????????????????????????? 46
47 -------------------------------- -------------------------------- ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? 47
48 -------u------------------------ -------u------------------------ ???????1???????????????????????? ???????0???????????????????????? 48
49 -------n------------------------ -------n------------------------ ???????0???????????????????????? ???????1???????????????????????? 49
50 -------------------------------- -------------------------------- ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? 50
51 -------------------------------- -------------------------------- ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? 51
52 -------------------------------- -------------------------------- ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? 52
53 -------------------------------- -------------------------------- ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? 53
54 -------------------------------- -------------------------------- ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? 54
Table 3.7: Output of the heuristic: compatible paths for HAS-160
Step Conditions
33 A33,14 6= A32,14
34 A34,20 = A33,20
35 A35,0 6= A34,0 ,A35,16 6= A33,31 ,A35,26 6= A34,26
36 A36,3 = A35,3 ,A36,9 6= A35,9 ,A36,21 = A35,21 ,A36,22 = A34,5 ,A36,23 = A35,23
37 A37,0 = A36,0 ,A37,1 = A36,1 ,A37,2 6= A35,17 ,A37,13 = A36,13 ,A37,23 6= A36,23
38 A38,25 = A36,8
39 A39,19 ∨ A37,2 = 1
40 A40,17 ∨ A38,0 = 1,A40,30 ∨ A38,13 = 1
41 A41,16 ∨ A39,23 = 1
Table 3.8: Backward differential conditions not shown in Table 3.7
column, respectively. At this point, the only information that is present in the system is that the two paths
end at the corresponding steps n2 = 34 and n3 = 53. The output of the heuristic in the case of HAS-160 is
given in Table 3.7. The full specifications of the two paths intersect at 5 steps, which is the number of inner
state registers in HAS-160. Provided that the paths are compatible, one can now start from step 42 and apply
the usual message modification technique to satisfy both paths, which resolves the middle of the boomerang
as shown in Fig. 3.1 (a).
3.2.1 Search strategy
The approach consists of varying the position of the message difference bit, gradually extending the
two paths, propagating the conditions in the quartet and backtracking in the case of a contradiction. In more
detail, the heuristic proceeds as follows:
(1) Randomize the positions of active bits in the active message words.
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Step Conditions
37 A37,2 = A36,2 ,A37,3 6= A36,3 ,A37,10 6= A36,10 ,A37,13 = A36,28 , A37,15 = 0,A37,25 = A36,8 , A37,29 = A36,12
38 A38,0 = 1
39 A39,4 = 1,A39,8 = 0,A39,9 = 1,A39,12 = 0,A39,17 = 0,A39,19 = 1
40 A40,4 = 0,A40,5 = 0,A40,8 = 0,A40,12 = 1
41 A41,13 = 0,A41,14 = 0
42 A42,7 = 0,
43 A43,6 = 0,A43,7 ∨ A41,14 = 1
44 A44,0 = 0,A44,1 = 0,A44,4 ∨ A42,11 = 1,A44,26 ∨ A42,1 = 1
45 A45,26 = 0
46 A46,4 ∨ A44,11 = 1
47 A47,4 = 1,A47,24 ∨ A45,31 = 1,A47,31 = 1
48 A48,31 = 0
49 A49,17 = 0
50 A50,17 = 0,A50,24 = 1
51 A51,17 = 0
Table 3.9: Forward differential conditions not shown in Table 3.7
step ∆[WA,WB] ∆[WD,WC ] ∆[WB,WC ] ∆[WA,WD]
33 1------------------------------- 0------------------------------- n------------------------------- n-------------------------------
34 1------------------------------- 0------------------------------- n------------------------------- n-------------------------------
35 -------------------------------- -------------------------------- -------------------------------- --------------------------------
36 1------------------------------- 0------------------------------- n------------------------------- n-------------------------------
37 -------------------------------- -------------------------------- -------------------------------- --------------------------------
38 -------------------------------- -------------------------------- -------------------------------- --------------------------------
39 1------------------------------- 0------------------------------- n------------------------------- n-------------------------------
40 0-------------u----------------- 1-------------u----------------- u-------------1----------------- u-------------0-----------------
41 --------0-----u----------------- --------0-----u----------------- --------0-----1----------------- --------0-----0-----------------
42 -------------------------------1 -------------------------------1 -------------------------------1 -------------------------------1
43 -------------------------------- -------------------------------- -------------------------------- --------------------------------
44 1------------------------------- 0------------------------------- n------------------------------- n-------------------------------
45 1------------------------------- 0------------------------------- n------------------------------- n-------------------------------
46 1------------------------------- 0------------------------------- n------------------------------- n-------------------------------
47 -------------------------------- -------------------------------- -------------------------------- --------------------------------
48 -------------------------------- -------------------------------- -------------------------------- --------------------------------
Table 3.10: Message differences after propagation
(2) Extend the specification of the forward/backward path backward/forward, respectively. Ensure that
paths are randomized over different step invocations.
(3) Propagate all new conditions. In the case of contradiction, backtrack
(4) If the paths are fully specified on a sufficient number of steps, return the two paths
In step (1), the message disturbance position in the two differentials is randomized to achieve varia-
tion in the paths. Alternatively, one position can be fixed to bit 31 and the other position randomized at each
step invocation. As for step (2), at the point where the probability of contradiction between the two paths
is negligible, one can extend paths simply by randomly sampling them in the required steps and discard-
ing non-narrow ones. Once the probability of contradiction becomes significant, the substitute/backtrack
strategy according to the Table 3.11 is applied to the remaining steps. In step (3), apart from propagations
34
1. ???? 7→ --??
2. ??-- 7→ ----
3. ??xx 7→ --xx
4. xx?? 7→ {uu10,nn01}
5. xx-- 7→ {uu10,nn01}
6. xxxx 7→ {unnu,nuun}
1. ???? 7→ ??--
2. --?? 7→ ----
3. xx?? 7→ xx--
4. ??xx 7→ {01uu,10nn}
5. --xx 7→ {01uu, 10nn}
6. xxxx 7→ {unnu,nuun}
Table 3.11: Substitution rules: adding information to the forward path (left) and backward path (right)
on a single path [35], quartet and quartet addition propagations (explained in Section 3.3) are applied. The
heuristic ends when the full specification of two paths (containing only {-,u,n}) intersects on the number
of words equal to the number of registers in the compression function inner state, as is the case in Table 3.7.
When new constraint information is to be added at a particular bit position, one can either add in-
formation to the forward path or to the backward path. Here, a clarification is necessary regarding the fact
that in Table 3.7, four paths are shown, whereas the heuristic searches for a pair of paths (forward and back-
ward). This is due to the fact that the paths on the opposite faces of the boomerang are equal (up to 0 and
1 symbols) and thus one can consider a pair of paths. Nonetheless, the inner state of the search algorithm
keeps all the four paths explicitly.
The substitutions provided in Table 3.11 represent generalizations of the substitutions used in [35].
The choice whether the information will be added to the forward or the backward path is made randomly
each time. The left-hand and the right-hand tables correspond to adding constraints to the forward and the
backward path, respectively. Consider for example rule xx-- 7→ {uu10,nn01}. In this notation, the
symbols xx-- describe a bit position for which δ[Aji , B
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-. The rule simply replaces the ‘x’ symbol in the forward path by ‘u’ or ‘n’, while at the same time
applying the immediate propagation of the ‘-’ symbols to ‘0’ and ‘1’, respectively. This rule represents a
generalization of the x 7→ {u,n} rule used in [35]. Other rules can be explained in a similar manner.
One possible variation of the general heuristic above is as follows. Once the two paths are suffi-
ciently specified so that the contradictions are likely to occur, instead of adding new constraints randomly,
XYZXYZ[graduality] one can choose a parameter k and extend both paths by only k steps. If the heuristic
succeeds in extending the paths by k steps, reporting that there is no contradiction in the system, more steps
can be attempted. If in the intermediate steps of the search, the path was in fact contradictory and this was
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not reported by 1-bit conditions, further attempts to extend or find the messages satisfying the paths will
fail.
3.2.2 Application to HAS-160
In this section, we describe how the above heuristic can be applied in the case of HAS-160. First,
we fix the position of the active bit in the backward differential to b1 = 31. The following sequence of steps
randomizes steps in the light-gray area in Table 3.6:
- Randomize the position of the forward message difference active bit b2.
- With the message difference fully specified by b1, b2, sample narrow paths in the inner state words in
steps denoted by light-gray in Table 3.6.
- Propagate conditions with respect to the three propagation types explained in Section 3.3. This step is
applied repeatedly until none of the three propagation types can be applied at any of the bit positions.
Here, the path sampling is performed simply by initializing randomly the two instances of the path at the
given step, calculating the recurrence over the required number of steps and extracting the path. If the
Hamming weight of the path is greater than some pre-specified threshold, it is discarded and a new path is
sampled. Using the sampling above of partial solution to the paths, the following procedure aims to find the
full solution:
(1) Randomize steps in the light-gray area according to the procedure above (steps 43-49 and 34-37 in
the forward and backward paths, respectively).
(2) Randomly choose (i, j), 0 ≤ i ≤ 31, 38 ≤ j ≤ 42, a position within the steps denoted by dark-grey in
Table 3.6. If applicable, apply the substitution specified by Table 3.11. If not, choose another position.
In the case there is none, return the state.
(3) Propagate conditions and backtrack in the case of contradiction. After a contradiction is reached a
sufficient number of times, go to step (1).
After reducing the number of steps in which the two differentials meet from 5 to 3 (i.e., putting
k = 4, where it should be noted that after the propagation the number of unconstrained bits will be relatively
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small), we receive several paths reported as non-contradictory. At that point, there are two possible routes
to verify the actual correctness of the intermediate result. One is to switch from 1-bit conditions to multi-bit
conditions (such as 1.5-bit or 2.5-bit conditions [89]) that capture more information. ARXtools [89] can
readily be used for this purpose. Each 2.5-bit verification using ARXtools for checking the compatibility
of two paths took around 3-5 minutes. Another option is to continue with the search heuristic towards
extending the specification of the paths to more steps, restarting always from the saved intermediate path
state. As the knowledge in the system grows, the propagations turn a high proportion of bits into 0 and 1,
which diminishes the possibility of contradiction. If the solution cannot be found after some time threshold
t, the path can be abandoned. We experimented with both options above and concluded that both approaches
are successful.
3.2.3 Full complexity of finding the HAS-160 second order collision
Our implementation of the heuristic found a correct pair of compatible paths in less than 5 days of
execution on an 8-core Intel i7 CPU running at 2.67GHz. In more detail, as explained in Section 3.2.2, we
ran the heuristic to search for paths that meet at 3 instead at 5 steps. It should be noted that due to many
propagations, after the search stops, the resulting paths in fact have a small number of remaining unspecified
bits in steps 38-42 (less than 32). The heuristic yielded around 8 solutions per day and among 40 returned
path pairs, one turned out to be compatible and was successfully extended by one step more, as shown in
Table 3.7.
The conditions for the two paths that are not explicitly given as u,n,0,1 bits in Table 3.7 are
provided in Tables 3.8 and 3.9. To find the quartet of message words and inner states that follow the two
differentials in steps 34 to 49, inner state registers in step 42 are chosen to follow the conditions specified
by Tables 3.8,3.9 and Table 3.7 and then the usual message modification procedure is applied backward and
forward.
Once the middle steps of the quartet structure n2 = 34 to n3 = 53 are satisfied, the second order
collision property extends to steps n1 = 8 to n4 = 78 with probability 1 (see Fig. 3.1 (b)). To cover all of the
compression function steps, the middle steps are kept constant and the remaining ones are randomized until
the second order collision property is satisfied. In particular, if m6 and m15 are randomized while m6⊕m15
is kept constant, according to the message expansion specification, the inner state will be randomized for
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54 ≤ i ≤ 80 and 0 ≤ i ≤ 35. Similarly, if m6 and m4 are randomized where m6 ⊕m4 is kept constant, the
randomization will happen for 52 ≤ i ≤ 79 and 0 ≤ i ≤ 34. Here, a small penalty in probability is paid due
to the fact that the paths may be corrupted towards the start/end points. The two mentioned randomizations
provide around 64 bits of freedom.
The probability that one randomization explained above yields a second-order collision can be bounded
from below by p2q2, where p and q are the probabilities of two selected sparse differentials in steps 0 ≤ i ≤
n1 and n4 ≤ i < 80, respectively. By counting the number of conditions in sparse paths that happened in
the quartet in Table 3.4, we obtain p = 2−22 and q = 2−3 and the probability lower bound p2q2 = 2−50. The
actual time of execution on the above mentioned PC was less than two days, due to the additional differential
paths which contribute to the exact probability of achieving the second order collision property (previously
named amplified probability [22, 89]).
3.3 Details on condition propagation
The heuristic keeps track of the current state of the system by keeping the following information in
memory:
- Four differential path tables keeping the current state of bit-conditions
- 4× r carry graphs [106] (one carry graph for each of four paths consisting of r steps)
In our implementation, we used r = 16, keeping the information about steps 33-48. The carry graphs model
the carry transitions allowed by the knowledge present in the system. Below, the three types of knowledge
propagation are described. The propagations are applied as long as the system is not fully propagated with
respect to all three types below.
3.3.1 Single-path propagations
An explicit example of a single-path propagation [35] (see also [106, 116]) is provided below. The
constraints and the corresponding carry graphs for a particular bit position are all explicitly shown. The new
propagated constraints as well as the omitted carry graph edges are indicated.
Throughout the compression function execution specified by (3.4), for any 1 ≤ i ≤ 80 and 0 ≤


























Figure 3.3: Extract of single-path path constraints
as a particular constant bit. Moreover, bit Aji depends on the carries coming from the computations at bit
positions j < k ≤ 0.
In Fig. 3.3, an extract of the path is provided, borrowed from the ∆[B,C] path in Table 3.7. The
bit positions treated in this case are δ[B142, C
1




42] (right). The shaded bits are the bit
positions participating in the computation of the two bits. As for the carry graph, it consists of 32 subgraphs,
each comprising of 5 × 5 nodes. In Fig. 3.3, only the subgraphs corresponding to bit positions 1 (left)
and 0 (right) are shown. Each subgraph node represents a particular carry configuration at the particular
bit position. Due to the fact that there are 5 summands in (3.4), the carry value is limited to {0, . . . 4} and
thus each subgraph contains 5 × 5 nodes. The edges in the graphs represent possible carry configuration
transitions from bit position i to i+ 1.
Next, the edges connecting subgraphs for bit positions i = 0 to i = 1 in Fig. 3.3 are explained.
The edges shown and the corresponding bit-conditions are aligned in the sense that there are no possible
propagations at the particular positions, neither from the bit-conditions to graphs nor vice-versa. According
to the bit-conditions on position 0, we have
c1B|B042 = c1B|1 = 1 +W 0B,41 +B1537 + f2(1, 1, 1) + 0 = 1 +W 0B,41 + B1537
c1C |C042 = c1C |0 = 1 +W 0C,41 + C1537 + f2(1, 0, 1) + 0 = 1 +W 0C,41 + C1537 + 1
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C) ∈ {(0, 1), (1, 2)}, which correspond
to the two edges between the two subgraphs.
Whenever it is possible to deduce new information from what is already present in the system, prop-
agations need to be carried out until no new information can be derived. Continuing with the setting in Fig.
3.3, assume that during the heuristic, the symbol - at position δ[W 0B,41,W
0
C,41] is replaced by 0. Then, the
propagation at this bit consists of replacing - at position δ[B1537 , C
15
37 ] by 0 and deleting the (0, 0) 7→ (1, 2)
graph edge. The edge deletion continues to the left and to the right. in the case of Fig. 3.3, this amounts to
deleting the edges coming out of node (1, 2) and continuing in the same manner throughout the rest of the
subgraphs. Next, all of the influenced bit positions, either through carry graphs or through bit-conditions,
need to be repropagated in a manner similar to the process described above.
3.3.2 Quartet propagations
This type of propagation is the simplest of all three types presented in this section, since it does not
involve carry graphs. An example of this type of propagation is as follows. Let (i, j) denote a specific bit













i ] in the four paths be equal to u, x, -, and ?, respectively. It follows that A
j
i = 0, B
j
i = 1, C
j
i = 1
and Dji = 0 and thus the quartet can be readily replaced by a new one
(ux-?) 7→ (uu10)
Given a quartet of conditions, the substitution quartet is found by going through all the bit value quartets that
satisfy the given condition quartet. The new quartet consists of the symbols from Table 3.2 that represent
minimal sets containing the valid bit value pairs.
3.3.3 Quartet addition propagations
In this subsection, the following terminology is adopted: carry subgraphs as shown in Fig. 3.3 are
called 2-graphs. Nodes with at least one input/output edge in the 2-graphs are called active nodes. During















Figure 3.4: Example: 2-carry graphs and the corresponding 4-carry graph before and after propagation
has not yet been ruled out by the heuristic.
Quartet addition propagation is illustrated in Fig. 3.4. The four graphs in the top part represent a
particular case of the 2-graphs that correspond to a single bit position (i, j) on paths [A,B], [B,C], [D,C],
[A,D], respectively from left to right. The active nodes are circled and the information about the number
of input/output edges is abstracted from the picture. The quartet addition propagation is based on the fact
that the four different 2-graphs may impose incompatible constraints on the carry configurations at the
considered bit position. For instance, according to the 2-graph corresponding to the path [D,C] (third graph
from the left in Fig. 3.4), since node (cD, cC) = (3, 2) is active, it follows that having a carry equal to 3
at this bit position in the branch D is not ruled out. However, since there are no active nodes in the third
column of the (cA, cD) graph, the node (cD, cC) = (3, 2) should be deactivated.
For the purpose of deciding which 2-carry graph nodes should be deactivated, it is convenient to
introduce another type of carry graph that will be called a 4-carry graph. For each bit-position covered by
the heuristic, the four 2-carry graphs are represented as one 4-carry graph, as shown in the bottom part of
Fig. 3.4. The 4-carry graphs abstract the information about active nodes in the 2-carry graphs.
As shown in Fig. 3.4, the 4-carry graph has four groups of nodes that simply represent the carry
values cA, cB, cC and cD, respectively. The edges in the 4-carry graph are constructed simply by mapping
the active nodes in the corresponding 2-carry graphs to the edges between the corresponding node groups.
This mapping is specified by an example as follows. The active nodes in the (cA, cD) 2-carry graph are (0, 0)
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and (2, 1). This is translated to the edges (0, 0) and (2, 1) between the cA and cD branches in the 4-carry
graph. The other three 2-carry graph active nodes are mapped to the edges analogously.
The 4-carry graph representation allows the quartet addition propagation rules to be expressed in a
natural way. For that purpose, let a cycle denote a closed path connecting four nodes, where no two nodes
are members of the same node group in the 4-graph. The propagation rules are then as follows:
(R1) Remove all “dead-end” edges, i.e., the ones with an end node of degree 1
(R2) Remove all edges that do not participate in any cycle
In the case of the propagation given in Fig. 3.4, the quartet addition propagation consisted of three ap-
plications of (R1) and one application of (R2). Since each 4-graph edge corresponds to a node in the
corresponding 2-graph, the edge removal according to rules (R1) and (R2) amounts to deactivating the cor-
responding nodes in the 2-graph. The node deactivation is done by deleting all input and output edges for
the corresponding 2-graph node. In the case of our HAS-160 search, implementing only rule (R1) turned
out to be sufficient.
3.4 Conclusion
We have proposed a heuristic for searching for compatible differential paths and have applied it to
HAS-160. Instead of working with 0/1 bit values, we used the reasoning on sets of bits described by 1-
bit constraints. The three types of propagation used during the search (single-path propagation, quartet
propagation and quartet addition propagation) are explained through particular examples. Using the 1-bit
constraints along with these propagations yielded an acceptable rate of false positives and the second order
collision was found. One possible future research direction is to evaluate the performance of the proposed
heuristic in the case of SHA-2 with a goal of improving the attack [22] and to assess the impact of a high
rate of contradictory paths reported in [100] in this context.
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4Boomerang and slide-rotational analysis of the
SM3 hash function
In December of 2007, the Chinese National Cryptographic Administration Bureau released the spec-
ification of a Trusted Cryptography Module, detailing a cryptoprocessor to be used within the Trusted Com-
puting framework in China. The module specifies a set of cryptographic algorithms that include the SMS4
block cipher, the SM2 asymmetric algorithm and SM3, a new cryptographic hash function designed by Xi-
aoyun Wang et al. [62]. The design of SM3 resembles the design of SHA-2 but includes additional fortifying
features such as feeding two message-derived words into each round, as opposed to only one in the case of
SHA-2.
In this chapter, we present a practical 4-sum distinguisher against the compression function of SM3
reduced to 32 rounds. In addition, we point out a slide-rotational property of SM3-XOR, which exists due to
the fact that the constants used in the rounds are not independent. As explained in the previous chapter, the
main idea of the second order differential cryptanalysis of hash functions [22, 23] is to use the boomerang
technique [129], previously used for block ciphers, whereby the additional freedom to choose the key is
exploited by using message modification techniques. Unlike in the context of first order analysis, where
message modification is applied on a pair of messages, in second order analysis, this technique is applied to
a quartet of values. Generally, the aim here is to find zero-sum quartets, i.e., quartets of input-output function
values, for which the four inputs as well as the four outputs sum to zero. In case of a compression function
that follows Davies-Meyer mode, a zero-sum can be seen as a second order collision for the compression
function [22]. Finally, the zero-sum condition can be considered as an evasive property [55]. Such a property
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is impossible to achieve with a non-negligible probability using oracle accesses to an ideal primitive. Thus,
if it can be shown that the property can be satisfied for a particular construction, then it can be used for
disproving its indifferentiability claims [37]. Another example of evasive properties in the context of hash
functions are rotational properties [67]. Two words are said to be rotational if they are equal up to bit-wise
rotation by some number of positions. If among the outputs for some carefully chosen inputs, the rotational
relations hold with probability higher than the corresponding one for ideal function, then a distinguisher can
be mounted [69].
In the first part of this chapter, we present a practical algorithm to find a second order collision for 32
rounds reduced version of the SM3 compression function. An interesting feature of our approach is that the
two differential paths that are used for the bottom and the top part of the boomerang are not independent,
as was required in [22]. This results in seemingly conflicting bit conditions [107] in the early rounds of the
bottom part of the boomerang. However, as will be shown by the analysis in this chapter, the bit conflict
that occurs is recoverable and it can be bypassed by using a long carry propagation on the left and the
right face of the boomerang. The long carry propagation that is required to happen in order to resolve
the conflicting condition is a relatively low-probability event. However, in our approach, it is ensured by
message modification and does not affect the overall probability of the second-order collision search.
In the second part of the chapter, we note a slide-rotational property of SM3 and, we analyze the SM3-
XOR compression function, which is the SM3 compression function with the addition mod 232 replaced by
XOR. In particular, we show that, for SM3-XOR, one can easily construct input-output pairs satisfying a
simple rotational property. Such a property exists due to the fact that, unlike in SHA-2, the constants in
rounds i, i + 1, for i = 0, . . . , 63, i 6= 15 are computed by bitwise rotation starting from two predefined
independent values. Previously, SHA2-XOR was analyzed in [135].
As for previous work related to the work in this chapter, in [22,23], Biryukov et al. presented second
order analysis of SHA-2 and BLAKE. In particular, for the SHA-2 hash function, a second order collision
for its compression function reduced to 46 rounds was computed [22]. The BLAKE hash function reduced
to 8 rounds was shown to be suspectable to a second order attack which requires around 2242 compression
function calls [23]. Sasaki [121] provided a second order collision for the compression function of the 5-
pass HAVAL. A distinguisher for 32-round Skein-256 [92] requiring 2114 compression function calls was
presented by Leurent et al. Rotational cryptanalysis was introduced by Khovratovich et al [67]. The SHA2-
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Figure 4.1: One round of the SM3 hash function
XOR compression function was analyzed by Yoshida et al. [135], where it was shown that an iterative
differential can be used to detect non-randomness for up to 31 rounds of SHA2-XOR. The probability of
the 31-round iterative differential for SHA2-XOR is 2−246 whereas for a random function the corresponding
probability should be 2−256. This allowed an attack against 32-round SHACAL-2-XOR and also a pseudo-
collision attack for SHA2-XOR reduced to 34 rounds.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The relevant specifications of the SM3 hash function
are briefly reviewed in the next section. In Section 4.2, relevant background on higher order analysis of
hash functions and the notation used throughout the chapter are given. Our second order attack against a
reduced-round SM3 compression function is described in Section 4.3. The slide-rotational property of SM3
is discussed in Section 4.4. Finally, our conclusion is given in Section 4.5.
4.1 Specifications of the SM3 hash function
SM3 is a Merkle-Damga˚rd construction that processes 512-bit input message blocks and returns a
256-bit hash value. Before hashing, the message of length l is padded by a bit set to 1, followed by k bits
set to 0, where k is the smallest integer such that l + 1 + k = 448 mod 512. Finally, the remaining 64 bits
are set to the value of l in the binary form. SM3 consists of two parts: the message expansion and the state
update function (see Fig. 4.1). Below, we describe the two parts. The auxiliary functions, P0 and P1, both
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operating on 32-bit words are used in the specifications and are defined by:
P0(X) = X ⊕ (X <<< 9)⊕ (X <<< 17)
P1(X) = X ⊕ (X <<< 15)⊕ (X <<< 23).
Message expansion: The input here is the 512 message block represented as 16 32-bit words, M0, . . . ,M15.
It is expanded to 68 32-bit words by letting Wi = Mi for 0 ≤ i < 16 and
Wi = P1(Wj−16 ⊕Wj−9 ⊕ (Wj−3 <<< 15))⊕ (Wj−13 <<< 7)⊕Wj−6 (4.1)
for 16 ≤ i < 68. Another expanded message array used in SM3 is W ′i , 0 ≤ i < 64, defined by
W ′i = Wi ⊕Wi+4
State update transformation: In SM3, the state update starts from the fixed initial value of 8 32-bit
words [62] and updates them in 64 rounds. Let A,B,C,D,E, F,G and H denote the inner state registers.
As shown in Fig. 4.1, the j-th round transformation is given by
SS1 = ((A <<< 12) + E + (Tj <<< j)) <<< 7,
SS2 = SS1⊕ (A <<< 12)
TT1 = FFj(A,B,C) +D + SS2 +W
′
j
TT2 = GGj(E,F,G) +H + SS1 +Wj
D = C, C = B <<< 9, B = A, A = TT1
H = G, G = F <<< 19, F = E, E = P0(TT2)
(4.2)
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where the functions FFj and GGj are defined by
FFj(X, Y, Z) =


X ⊕ Y ⊕ Z, 0 ≤ j ≤ 15
(X ∧ Y ) ∨ (Y ∧ Z) ∨ (X ∧ Z) 16 ≤ j < 64
GGj(X, Y, Z) =


X ⊕ Y ⊕ Z, 0 ≤ j ≤ 15
(X ∧ Y ) ∨ (¬X ∧ Z) 16 ≤ j < 64
The round constants are Tj = 0x79cc4519 for j ∈ {0, . . . , 15} and Tj = 0x7a879d8a, for j ∈ {16, . . . , 63}.
Comparison with SHA-2: The major difference between SHA-2 and SM3 is that in each round of SM3,
two expanded message words are fed to the inner state, as opposed to just one in SHA-2. Also, the maximal
distance between taps in the message expansion mechanism in SM3 is 4, whereas in SHA-2, it is 8. Another
difference is that while addition modulo 232 is used in the message expansion and the feedforward mecha-
nisms in case of SHA-2, only XOR is used in SM3. Finally, one round of the SM3 hash function contains 8
mod 232 additions, as opposed to 7 such additions in the case of SHA-2.
4.2 Background and notation
The following notation is used throughout the chapter:
- x(b): the bth bit of an n-bit word x
- x(c···b): the word x(c)x(c−1) · · · x(b)
- ei: an n-bit unit vector with 1 in the i
th bit position
- x: the bit-wise complemented word (or bit) corresponding to x
- W ij , 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, 0 ≤ j ≤ 63: expanded message words, where i denotes the boomerang branch. More
precisely, i = 1, 2 signify the left and right branches on the front face and i = 3, 4 signify the left and




























Figure 4.2: Boomerang attack against a compression function
- hj , 0 ≤ j ≤ 63: the 256-bit compression function inner state after j rounds (e.g., h0 is the state before
any round has been executed)
- i-th round: the transformation that maps hi into hi+1
- hij , 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, 0 ≤ j ≤ 63: the 256-bit inner state after j rounds at the i-th boomerang branch, where
h1i and h
2




i correspond to the back face branches.
4.2.1 Higher-order analysis of hash functions
In this section, the main idea of how to use the boomerang attack in the context of compression
functions is provided. The goal of this attack on the function f is to find a quartet (x0, x1, x2, x3) such that
x0 ⊕ x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3 = 0
f(x0)⊕ f(x1)⊕ f(x2)⊕ f(x3) = 0
(4.3)
which is called a zero-sum or equivalently, a second-order collision. For a more detailed exposition of these
notions, please refer to the higher order cryptanalysis part of the Section 2.2. The strategies to construct
a second order collision previously applied to SHA-2 and BLAKE [22, 23] varied to some degree. Here,
we review the approach used in [22]. The general idea is to construct a quartet that forms boomerang
structure [129] for a block cipher in the Davis-Meyer mode. The differentials used in the boomerang are
related key differentials, where the secret key of the block cipher corresponds to the message block in the
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case of a compression function. The encryption function is divided into two parts, E1 ◦E0. As shown in Fig.
4.2, for the bottom part of the boomerang, a related-key differential (∆,∆K) → β for E1 with probability
q is constructed. Similarly, another related-key differential (δ, δK) → α with probability p is used for E−10 .
Then, an attempt to randomly satisfy the differentials in the boomerang structure, with probability p2q2
would proceed as follows:
- Randomly choose X , the inner state in the middle of the hash function execution, representing the
input to E1 (and the output of E0). Let X
∗ = X ⊕∆, Y = X ⊕ δ and Y ∗ = X ⊕∆⊕ δ.
- Compute backward from X , X∗, Y , Y ∗ using E−10 to obtain P , P
∗, Q, Q∗, using keys K, K ⊕∆K ,
K ⊕ δK , K ⊕ δK ⊕∆K , respectively.
- Compute forward from X , X∗, Y , Y ∗ using E1 to obtain C, C
∗, D, D∗ using keys K, K ⊕ ∆K ,
K ⊕ δK , K ⊕ δK ⊕∆K , respectively.
- Verify whether C ⊕ C∗ = D ⊕D∗ and P ⊕Q = P ∗ ⊕Q∗.
If the last condition is satisfied, a zero-sum quartet is found for the encryption function in Davis-Meyer
mode, since P ⊕Q⊕ P ∗ ⊕Q∗ = 0 and also (C ⊕ P )⊕ (C∗ ⊕ P ∗)⊕ (D ⊕Q)⊕ (D∗ ⊕Q∗) = 0.
To improve the efficiency of the above process, instead of trying to satisfy the boomerang randomly,
message modification can be used for some of the differential paths in the boomerang. For example, in
[22], message modification is applied to satisfy the middle part of the boomerang, i.e., to satisfy the two
differentials paths of the function E1. The other paths in the boomerang are satisfied randomly.
4.3 Zero-sum for reduced-round SM3
Here, a method for finding a zero-sum for the 32-round SM3 compression function is detailed. An
example for the found zero-sum for the 32-round reduced SM3 compression function is given in Table 4.3.
4.3.1 Choosing the differential paths
In what follows, the backward and the forward differential paths used in the boomerang are provided
and we explain why the two chosen paths are favorable. The 32-round block cipher used in the Davis-
Meyer mode in the SM3 compression function is decomposed into E1 ◦ E0. The function E0 consists
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of rounds r = 0, . . . , 14 and the function E1 consists of rounds 15, . . . , 31. The forward and backward
differential paths for E1 and E0 used in the attack are given at the end of the Appendix (Tables 4.1 and 4.2,
respectively). For example, the last row in Table 4.1 denotes that there is no active bits between the two
inner states representing the output of round 14.
The paths have been found by linearizing the compression function and then applying Coding-
Tool [108], a tool for effective search for low Hamming weight codewords of a given linear code. The
linearization amounted to replacing addition mod 232 by XOR and the functions FFi and GGi, 16 ≤ i < 64
by zero functions. Functions FFi and GGi, 0 ≤ i < 16, have been left unchanged, since they are al-
ready linear. The input to CodingTool is a generating matrix of a linear code and the output is a low
Hamming-weight codeword. Here, the linear code in question is the linear mapping from the message to
the concatenated bit-vectors representing consecutive inner states of the compression function. The matrix
describing this mapping, i.e., the generating matrix of the linear code, is obtained by applying the linearized
compression function to the unit vectors. Then, the matrix is fed to the low Hamming weight codeword
search algorithm. The search is done for both functions E−10 and E1.
The probabilities for the provided differentials are obtained by multiplying the round probabilities
provided in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. As shown in the tables, the overall probabilities for E−10 and E1 paths are
2−25 and 2−57, respectively. Therefore, assuming that the events of satisfying the two differential paths are
independent, by using a naive search, the probability of finding a quartet that yields a zero-sum would be
2−2×(25+57) = 2−164. Instead of applying a naive search, message modification allows a major improvement
to this complexity. The differential path for E1 in rounds 15− 19 is satisfied by using message modification
and the rest, that is, rounds 0 − 4 and also round 31, is satisfied by a random search. Then, the search
complexity drops to 22×(25+2) = 254.
To clarify the advantage of the paths given in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, first we note that the Hamming
weight of the two paths does not change if the paths are rotated by some fixed number of bit-positions.
Therefore, the rotation amount is a free parameter that can be chosen to maximize the probability of success.
As for the backward path shown in Table 4.1, the choice of the rotation amount is simply due to the fact that
the number of active most significant bits is maximized, which improves the differential probability, given
that the active most significant bits do not affect such probability.
As for the rotational amount used for the forward differential, the number of most significant bits in
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rounds 15− 19 is less important, because in these rounds, the path is satisfied by message modification and
there is no need to minimize the path probability by forcing bits to be on the most significant bit position.
What matters for the forward differential is that one of the active bits in round 31 would correspond to
the most significant bit since, as explained above, this condition is satisfied by a random search, as is the
case with the particular paths in Table 4.2. This reduces the exhaustive search by more than a factor of 2
and when the alternative paths for the path in round 31 are taken into account, the reduction is by a factor
of around 3. This reduction is relatively significant, since our goal is to find a zero-sum efficiently with a
practical complexity.
In addition to the path given in Table 4.2, it can be easily verified that there exist two more paths
obtained by rotating the one in Table 4.2 such that, in round 31, one of the active bits is the most significant
bit. These two paths are obtained using rotation to the left by 17 and 9 positions. However, each of the three
paths have conflicting bit conditions in rounds 15 − 16 with respect to the backward differential, including
the path given in Table 4.2. In the next subsection, we show that the conflict between the backward path and
the forward path given in Table 4.2 is recoverable, i.e., it can be bypassed by message modification, which
is the reason why we focus on this path.
4.3.2 Message modification and the conflicting bits
In this section, we provide some details on the message modification technique in the context of the
boomerang, i.e., where the message modification is performed on a quartet of values, instead of on a pair of
values. The focus is put on resolving the particular conflict between the bit-conditions on the two faces of
boomerang that occurs in our SM3 analysis. A simple general tool for bypassing such conflicts, in the case
when this is possible, is provided.
The message modification procedure that satisfies rounds 15 − 19 of the forward differential on the
front and the back face of the boomerang proceeds as follows. Here, by message modification, we also
assume the modification of the middle inner state registers. Following the notation specified in Section 4.2,
let h115 and h
2
15 denote the inner states satisfying the difference specified by the first row of Table 4.2. In the
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15 propagates according to
Table 4.2. Now, if the bit-conditions for controlling the propagation between h115 and h
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15, the message modification procedure can be applied again, but this
time on h115 and h
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as the difference between h115 and h
2
15 and the goal is fulfilled. Also, due to the boomerang property, the
difference between h215 and h
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However, the conflicting bit condition occurs due to the backward and forward paths in Tables 4.1
and 4.2. The conflicting condition and how it is resolved is explained below and also visualized in Fig. 4.3,
where rounds 15 and 16 are shown. As depicted in the figure, the front-side and back-side differences (due
to the forward path) are denoted by ∆ and the left-side and right-side differences (due to the backward path)
by δ. The conflict arises when one attempts to force the bit 22 difference coming from D15 not propagate
to more than one bit in both front-side and back-side of A16. The problem is that bit 22 is also active on
the left-side and the front-side, as shown in Fig. 4.3 beside the W15 ⊕W19 word. In particular, due to the
message difference specified by the backward differential, we have
(W 115 ⊕W 119)⊕ (W 315 ⊕W 319) = e14 ⊕ e22 ⊕ e31 (4.4)
At the same time, due to (4.2), for the active bit 22 of D15 to propagate only to a 1-bit difference in A16 in





























If, however, there is a carry generated at position 21 in both (4.5) and (4.6), then the above bit b needs to
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Figure 4.3: Resolving the conflicting bit condition in round 16
be fixed to 1. Thus, under the assumption that the carry is either generated at position 21 in both (4.5) and
(4.6), or not generated in neither of these two additions, both the front and the back face of the boomerang
cannot be satisfied, since bit 22 is active in (4.4).
Thus, to bypass the conflicting bit, the fact that, in (4.4), bit 14 is also active should be utilized. Then,
by using an 8-bit long carry propagation from bit 14 to bit 22 on the left and the right face of the boomerang,
the existence of carry at bit 21 can be ensured in exactly one of the additions (4.5) and (4.6), which cancels
out the activation of bit 22 on the left and the right face of the boomerang.
Next, a simple lemma that ensures long carry propagation for the purpose of deactivating a particular
bit is provided. The lemma can be used during the message modification process, i.e., whenever a deactiva-
tion of a bit by a carry chain is needed. Consider sums of n-bit words X + S and X ′ + S and suppose that
bits k and l, where k < l are active in X . The lemma specifies how to perform message modification on X
so that the bit l in X + S and X ′ + S remains inactive.
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Lemma 3 Let X , X ′, and S be n-bit words. Also, let 0 ≤ k < l ≤ n and X ⊕X ′ = el ⊕ ek. If
2k ≤ X(k−1..0) + S(k..0) < 2k+1 (4.7)
X(k) = X(l) (4.8)
X(l−1..k+1) = S(l−1..k+1) (4.9)
then
(X + S)⊕ (X ′ + S) = el−1 ⊕ . . .⊕ ek+1 ⊕ ek. (4.10)
Proof: Due to (4.7) and the fact that X(k) 6= X ′(k), exactly one of the values in {X(k..0) + S(k..0), X ′(k..0) +
S(k..0)} will have a carry propagation from bit position k to k + 1. Therefore, using (4.9), it is clear that
(X + S)(l−1..k) ⊕ (X ′ + S)(l−1..k) = el−1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ ek+1 ⊕ ek. Since X(l) 6= X ′(l), X + S and X ′ + S will
be equal on bit l. Finally, from (4.8), (X + S)(m) = (X ′ + S)(m) for m > l, m < n, which completes the
proof. 2
To resolve the round 15 bit conflict explained above, the Lemma can be applied by letting X =
(W 115 ⊕W 119), X ′ = (W 315 ⊕W 319), S = (FF15(A115, B115, C115) + SS2115 + D115), k = 14, l = 22, n = 32,
where the active bit 31 in (W 115 ⊕W 119) can be ignored since it is on the most significant position. Then,
X = (W 115 ⊕W 119) is modified to satisfy requirements (4.7)-(4.9). This message modification is done by
only modifying a subset of bits {21, 20 . . . , 0} of W 119. Now, on the front face of the boomerang, A116 and
A216 will have a signed difference of −22, while, at the back face of the boomerang, A316 and A416 will have
the same signed difference, as specified by the forward differential, i.e., the conflicting bit condition has
been bypassed.
As can be verified, this is the only conflicting condition in rounds 15 and 16. The application of
Lemma 3 can also be seen as a way to increase the probability of satisfying the paths in the boomerang by
28, since the event of the carry propagation takes place with probability of around 2−8. As for the conflicting
conditions in rounds 17 − 19, they are resolved by repeated applications of Lemma 3. The result of the
message modification procedure described above is a quartet that satisfies the differences in rounds 15− 19.
The quartet is used as input for the next stage of the zero-sum search procedure.
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Table 4.1: Backward differential path with probability 2−25
4.3.3 Searching for the zero-sum
After the differences in rounds 15−19 have been satisfied, the remaining paths in the boomerang are
satisfied randomly. The corresponding search procedure is facilitated due to the existence of many neutral
bits with respect to the majority of already satisfied conditions. Namely, all the bits in words W8, . . . ,W14
are neutral with respect to the rounds 15 − 19. The search proceeds by randomly satisfying the remaining
conditions, i.e., the path given in Table 4.1 and also the last round of the path in Table 4.2. Although the
nominal probability is as low as 22×(25+2) = 2−54, this probability does not take into account the alternative
differential paths that are similar to the ones specified above. Due to these additional paths, the actual
probability is much larger, as was confirmed by executing the search procedure. Similar observation have
been reported in for example in [23, 92].
The zero-sum for 32 rounds of the SM3 compression function, given in Table 4.3, was found after
around 20 days of computation using 4 workstations, each with four 2.4 GHz Dual-Core AMD Opteron
processors.
A natural way to extend the attack to more rounds would be to increase the number of rounds on
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31 −31,−22, +14 2−2
32 A:−31,−22, +14
Table 4.2: Forward differential path with probability 2−57
which the message modification is performed. Namely, it should be noted that the consequence of the
neutral bits described above is the fact that the complexities to satisfy the bottom and the top differential
add up and do not multiply, similar as in [22]. Thus, one can imagine extending the middle rounds so
that the message modification procedure terminates after a practical amount of computation. However,
caution should be exercised when estimating the number of rounds that can be added since the number of
conflicting bits grows quickly which consequently increases the number of necessary applications of Lemma
3. According to our experience, satisfying the conditions in the boomerang becomes increasingly difficult
without an automated systematic procedure as the number of conflicting conditions grows. Thus, extending
the number of rounds to be dealt with by an automated message modification procedure is the goal of our
future research. Such a procedure would also be relevant for the SHA-2 boomerang analysis [22].
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A1, B1, . . . , H1
0x7a0d7b2f 0x776a25d5 0xcff768ac 0xd2eb20d5
0xd2c08d9b 0x744d3e5c 0xdf04e2ba 0x2cd3bb94
W10 , . . . ,W
1
15
0x31c2ba4f 0x336fa0d6 0x94a32431 0x9d3caeaa
0x814d29d5 0xc8ebf2e6 0x7a41c51f 0x3aa0bedd
0xaac4fb81 0xd584f8b 0x619690c2 0xfac9a4d1
0x2a28a333 0x175fb61c 0x6133d9ab 0x81e48a5e
A2, B2, . . . , H2
0x3c6a7d6d 0xbbdf98c0 0x5da6c569 0x89c62255
0xd75bec0e 0x6117de9c 0xb3f56bd3 0x3445d8b4
W20 , . . . ,W
2
15
0x2dc2be4f 0x33efa256 0xbc9b2c69 0x3d6cfeaa
0x3cea950 0x48ebf2e6 0x7241ad1f 0x32a0bedd
0xaac4fb81 0xbd083f9b 0x618698ca 0xfac9a4d1
0xaa28a333 0x1f5f9e1c 0x6133d9ab 0x81e48a5e
A3, B3, . . . , H3
0x7a4d7b2f 0x772a25d5 0x4fb768ac 0x6a7b1aa9
0xd2c09d9b 0x744d2e5c 0x5f04d2ba 0xc493b1cc
W30 , . . . ,W
3
15
0x19fab217 0x336fa0d6 0x94a32431 0x1d3caeaa
0x814d29d5 0xc8ebf2e6 0x7a41c51f 0x3aa0bedd
0xaac4fb81 0xd584f8b 0x619690c2 0xfac9a4d1
0x2a28a333 0x175fb61c 0x6133d9ab 0x81e48a5e
A4, B4, . . . , H4
0x3c2a7d6d 0xbb9f98c0 0xdde6c569 0x31561829
0xd75bfc0e 0x6117ce9c 0x33f55bd3 0xdc05d2ec
W40 , . . . ,W
4
15
0x5fab617 0x33efa256 0xbc9b2c69 0xbd6cfeaa
0x3cea950 0x48ebf2e6 0x7241ad1f 0x32a0bedd
0xaac4fb81 0xbd083f9b 0x618698ca 0xfac9a4d1
0xaa28a333 0x1f5f9e1c 0x6133d9ab 0x81e48a5e
Table 4.3: An example for a zero-sum for 32 rounds of the SM3 compression function
A1, B1, . . . , H1
0x565060b7 0x125d5655 0x285c7653 0xeaf5fe1e
0xda8bd7dd 0xb8bb1904 0x43bcaf18 0x7cf88895
W10 , . . . ,W
1
15
0x8f450bbd 0x4a0c9922 0x73dd44f8 0x9eceaaf8
0x33b13e20 0xb59d9c33 0x6b5a5f23 0xc0d2b468
0x7a9a1e16 0xaff62878 0x3fbb01f4 0x75278787
0xac0b849e 0x498f3045 0x62687c15 0xd3498eb
A2, B2, . . . , H2
0x24baacaa 0x53285c76 0xd5ebfc3d 0xdf1ee2a6
0x71763209 0x2bc610ef 0xf9f1112a 0xffeb86a4
W20 , . . . ,W
2
15
0x7efa7542 0x1e8a177b 0x94193244 0xe7ba89f0
0x3d9d55f1 0x67627c40 0x6b3b3867 0xd6b4be46
0x81a568d1 0xf5343c2c 0x5fec50f1 0x7f7603e8
0xea4f0f0e 0x5817093d 0x931e608a 0xc4d0f82a
Table 4.4: An example for a slide-rotational pair for the SM3-XOR compression function
4.4 A slide-rotational property of SM3-XOR
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the SHA2-XOR compression function was previously
studied by Yoshida et al. [135]. In this section, we show that, in the case of the full SM3-XOR, pairs
satisfying a certain rotational relation can be easily generated. An example of such a pair for the SM3-
XOR is provided in Table 4.4. The possibility of practical generation of such evasive [55] SM3-XOR pairs
demonstrates the existence of a non-trivial property which is not known to exist in SHA2-XOR.
The above mentioned property exists due to the fact that the constants over the 64 rounds of SM3 are
related. According to the SM3 specification, in rounds j ∈ {0, . . . , 15}, one constant rotated by j is utilized,
whereas the other constant rotated by j is used in rounds j ∈ {16, . . . , 63}. Since operations like XOR,
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FFi, GGi, 0 ≤ i < 64, that are used in the SM3-XOR round function preserve the rotational property, it is
natural to attempt a rotational attack, as provided below. We note that if instead of SM3-XOR, the original
SM3 compression function is used, the addition mod 232 transforms the attack into a probabilistic one, as
outlined below. Due to the high number of additions per round, it appears difficult to exploit this rotational
property directly and therefore the security of the SM3 compression function, at this stage of analysis, does
not seem to be directly affected.
Two 32-bit words X, Y are said to be rotational if X = Y <<< n. Let messages W and W ∗ satisfy
W ∗1 = W0 <<< 1,W
∗
2 = W1 <<< 1, . . . ,W
∗
16 = W15 <<< 1. Below, a procedure for the instant generation of
pairs v, v∗ such that
v∗1 = v0 <<< 1, v
∗
2 = v1 <<< 8, v
∗
3 = v2 <<< 1
v∗5 = v4 <<< 1, v
∗
6 = v5 <<< 18, v
∗
7 = v6 <<< 1
V ∗1 = V0 <<< 1, V
∗
2 = V1 <<< 8, V
∗
3 = V2 <<< 1
V ∗5 = V4 <<< 1, V
∗
6 = V5 <<< 18, V
∗
7 = V6 <<< 1
(4.11)
is provided, where V = SM3-XOR(v,W ), V ∗ = SM3-XOR(v∗,W ∗) and vi, Vi for 0 ≤ i ≤ 7 denote
i-th 32-bit word in the v and V , respectively. For a random function, a random (v,W ), (v∗,W ∗) satisfying
the above constraints will yield the corresponding V and V ∗ with probability 2−6×32 = 2−192, since (4.11)
imposes 6 32-bit conditions on V , V ∗.
4.4.1 Constructing a slide-rotational pair
We start by the following observations:
- The slide rotational messages expand to slide-rotational expanded messages with probability 1. In
particular, fix W0, . . . ,W15 and let
W ∗1 = W0 <<< 1,W
∗
2 = W1 <<< 1, . . . ,W
∗
16 = W15 <<< 1 (4.12)





i <<< 1, for i = {0, 1, . . . , 66}.
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Figure 4.4: The slide-rotational attack against SM3-XOR
- We recall that Ti, 0 ≤ i ≤ 63 are the round constants. If we have




i <<< 1, Ti+1 = Ti <<< 1 (4.13)
A∗i+1 = Ai <<< 1, B
∗
i+1 = Bi <<< 1, . . . , H
∗
i+1 = Hi <<< 1 (4.14)
for i = k, then (4.14) will also hold for i = k + 1, where k = 0, . . . , 62.
The observations above suggest that sliding can be introduced, as depicted in Fig. 4.4. Namely, consider
randomly initializing W and letting W ∗ satisfy (4.12). Moreover, A0, B0 . . . , H0 is chosen randomly and the
inner state registers after the first round in the second instance of the hash function are initialized according
to (4.14). Then, until round 15, due to (4.13), the rotational property in the inner state registers will be
preserved. Once the two instances reach rounds 15 and 16, respectively, a different round transformation
is applied in the two instances and the rotational property may discontinue. This problem is bypassed by
starting from the middle, i.e., by populating the inner states entering the critical rounds 15 and 16 (see Fig.
4.4).
Next, we explain how to bypass the critical rounds 15 and 16 which may discontinue the rotational
property. That way, it is possible to have the slide property hold over all rounds of the two hash function
instances. The idea is to start by populating the inner states entering the critical rounds 15 and 16 (see Fig.
4.4). In particular, a rotational pair (A15, . . . , H15), (A
∗
16, . . . , H
∗
16) is carefully chosen so that (A16, . . . , H16)
and (A∗17, . . . , H
∗
17) satisfy relation (4.14). It should be noted that the rotational property may be destroyed
only betweenA16 andA
∗
17 and betweenE16 andE
∗
17, since the other registers go through identical rotational-
preserving transformations in round 15 and round 16. As for A16 and A
∗
17, for the purpose of tracking the
possible rotational disturbance between the two registers, the equation to compute these two registers can
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be rewritten as







16)⊕ (T16 <<< 23)⊕ α∗ (4.16)
where α = D15⊕W15⊕W19⊕(((A15 <<< 12)⊕E15) <<< 7)⊕(A15 <<< 12) and α∗ = D∗16⊕W ∗16⊕W ∗20⊕
(((A∗16 <<< 12) ⊕ E∗16) <<< 7) ⊕ (A∗16 <<< 12). Since (4.14) and (4.13) hold for i = 15, α∗ = α <<< 1.
Therefore, to have A16 and A
∗







16) ⊕ (T16 <<< 23) satisfy the rotational property. After expressing A∗16, B∗16, C∗16 in
terms of A15, B15, C15 and using that FF15 and FF16 preserve the rotational property, the condition can be
expressed in terms of A15, B15, C15 as follows:
FF15(A15, B15, C15)⊕ FF16(A15, B15, C15) = (T15 ⊕ T16) <<< 22 (4.17)
When applied on 1-bit values X , Y and Z, the equation FF15(X, Y, Z) ⊕ FF16(X, Y, Z) = 0 is satisfied
for 2 out of 8 (X, Y, Z) values. Since the Hamming weight of the right-hand side of (4.17) is equal to 14,
the number of solutions to the equation is 218 × 614 = 232 × 314. As for preserving the rotational property
between E16 and E
∗
17, developing the registers as in (4.15) and then forming the equation of the form (4.17)
yields that the number of solutions E15, F15 and G15 is 4
32 = 264. Therefore, the number of solutions for
(A15, . . . , H15) that pass the disturbance in rounds 15 and 16 is 2
32 × 314 × 264 × 264 ≈ 2182.19, since D15
and H15 are free variables. For such pairs, it follows that relations (4.11) are satisfied.
When instead of SM3-XOR, the SM3 compression function is considered, this property turns into a
probabilistic one. Following [68], if pr = P [(x <<< r) + (y <<< r) = (x+ y) <<< r] where x and y are 32-
bit words, then p1 = 2
−1.415. Since there exists 8 additions in one SM3 round, the probability that one round
and its corresponding slided round will preserve the rotational property is given by (p1)
8 = 2−11.320 [68].
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, a second order collision for the SM3 compression function reduced to 32 rounds
is presented. The top and the bottom differentials, used in the boomerang, impose seemingly conflicting
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conditions. The novelty of our method is that these conditions are resolved during message modification by
using long carry propagation on the left and right face of the boomerang. In the second part of the chapter,
a slide-rotational property of SM3-XOR function is exposed and an example of a slide-rotational pair for
SM3-XOR compression function is given.
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5Cryptanalysis of the Loiss stream cipher
Several word-oriented LFSR-based stream ciphers have been recently proposed and standardized.
Examples include ZUC [50], proposed for use in the 4G mobile networks and also SNOW 3G [51], which is
deployed in the 3GPP networks. The usual word-oriented LFSR-based design consists of a linear part, which
produces sequences with good statistical properties and a finite state machine which provides non-linearity
for the state transition function.
In 2011, the Loiss stream cipher [53] was proposed by a team from the State Key Laboratory of
Information Security in China. The cipher follows the above mentioned design approach: it includes a byte-
oriented LFSR and an FSM. The novelty in the design of Loiss is that its FSM includes a structure called
a Byte Oriented-Mixer with Memory (BOMM) which is a 16 byte array adopted from the idea of the RC4
inner state. The BOMM structure is updated in a pseudorandom manner.
The Loiss key scheduling algorithm utilizes a usual approach to provide non-linearity over all the
inner state bits. During the initialization phase, the FSM output is connected to the LFSR update function.
This ensures that after the initialization process, the LFSR content depends non-linearly on the key and the
IV. Such an approach has been previously used in several LFSR-based word-oriented constructions such
as the SNOW family of ciphers [51]. In Loiss, however, the FSM contains the BOMM element which is
updated slowly in a pseudo-random manner. The feedback to the LFSR, used in the initialization phase,
passes through this BOMM which turns out to be exploitable in a differential-style attack since the BOMM
does not properly diffuse differences.
In this chapter, we provide a related-key attack of a practical complexity against the Loiss stream
cipher by exploiting this weakness in its key scheduling algorithm (see also [93] for a work that was done
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independently of our results). The attack requires two related keys differing in one byte, a computational
work of around 226 Loiss initializations, 225.8 chosen-IVs for both of the related keys, offline precomputation
of around 226 Loiss initializations and a storage space of 232 words. This shows that the additional design
complication, i.e., the addition of the BOMM mechanism, weakens the cipher instead of strengthening it.
We also discuss the possibility of extending such a related-key attack into a resynchronization single-key
attack. Finally, we show that Loiss does not properly resist to slide attacks.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 5.1, we briefly review relevant specifications
of the Loiss stream cipher. Our related-key attack is detailed in section 5.2 where we also discuss the
possibility of extending the attack to the single-key scenario. In section 5.3, we show that Loiss is not
resistant to slide attacks. Finally, our conclusion is given in section 5.4.
5.1 Specifications of Loiss
Figure 5.1 shows a schematic description of the Loiss stream cipher. In here, we briefly review
s31 s26s29 s24 s20 s17 s15 s11 s7 s5 s2 s0
αα -1α-1α
y15 y14 y13 y12
y11 y10 y9 y8
y7 y6 y5 y4









Figure 5.1: Loiss stream cipher
relevant components of the cipher. Let F28 denote the quotient field F2[x]/(π(x)), where the corresponding
primitive polynomial π(x) = x8 + x7 + x5 + x3 + 1. If α is a root of the polynomial π(x) in F28 , then the
LFSR of Loiss is defined over F28 using the characteristic polynomial
f(x) = x32 + x29 + αx24 + α−1x17 + x15 + x11 + αx5 + x2 + α−1.
The usual bijection between the elements of F28 and 8-bit binary values is used. The LFSR consists of 32
byte registers denoted by si, 0 ≤ i ≤ 31. Restating the above equation, if st0, . . . , st31 denote the LFSR
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registers after t LFSR clocks, then the LFSR update function is defined by
st+131 = s
t
29 ⊕ αst24 ⊕ α−1st17 ⊕ st15 ⊕ st11 ⊕ αst5 ⊕ st2 ⊕ α−1st0 (5.1)
and st+1i = s
t
i+1 for 0 ≤ i ≤ 30.
The FSM consists of the function F and the BOMM. The function F compresses 32-bit words into
8-bit values. It utilizes a 32-bit memory unit R and takes LFSR registers s31, s26, s20 and s7 as input. In
particular, in each step, the output of F is taken to be the 8 leftmost bits of the register R, after which the R
value is updated by
X = st31|st26|st20|st7
Rt+1 = θ(γ(X ⊕ Rt))
where γ is the S-box layer which uses 8× 8 S-box S1 and is defined by
γ(x1|x2|x3|x4) = S1(x1)|S1(x2)|S1(x3)|S1(x4)
and θ is a linear transformation layer defined by
θ(x) = x⊕ (x <<< 2)⊕ (x <<< 10)⊕ (x <<< 18)⊕ (x <<< 24)
Since the attack technique provided in this work does not depend on the particular choice of the used S-
boxes, we refer the reader to [53] for the specifications of S1 and S2.
As for the BOMM structure, it utilizes 16 memory units, i.e., bytes y0, . . . , y15. The BOMM function
maps 8-bit values to 8-bit values. Let w and v denote the input and output of the BOMM function. Denote
the nibbles of its input w as h = w >> 4 and l = w mod 16. Then, the BOMM function returns v = yth⊕w,




If h 6= l, then
yt+1h = y
t





l ⊕ S2(yt+1l )
yt+1i = y
t
i , for 0 ≤ i ≤ 15 and i /∈ {h, l}
where S2 is an 8 × 8 S-box. In the FSM update step, the input to the BOMM function, i.e., the w
value, is taken to be leftmost byte of the output of the F function.
The initialization procedure of Loiss proceeds as follows. The register R is set to zero, i.e., R0 = 0.
If the key K and the initialization vector IV are represented byte-wise as
K = K15|K14| · · · |K0
IV = IV15|IV14| · · · |IV0,
(5.2)
then the starting inner state (s031, . . . , s
0
0, R
0, y015, . . . , y
0
0) is loaded with the K and IV as follows:
s0i = Ki, s
0
i+16 = Ki ⊕ IVi, y0i = IVi (5.3)
for 0 ≤ i ≤ 15. Then, Loiss runs for 64 steps and the output of the BOMM takes part in the LFSR update
step. In other words, instead of (5.1), the following LFSR update function is used:
st+131 = s
t
29 ⊕ αst24 ⊕ α−1st17 ⊕ st15 ⊕ st11 ⊕ αst5 ⊕ st2 ⊕ α−1st0 ⊕ vt (5.4)
Then, the keystream generation stage starts. Loiss generator produces one byte of keystream per step:
zt = st0 ⊕ vt.
In general, except for the new BOMM component, the whole Loiss design is very similar to the design of
the SNOW 3G cipher. It is also interesting to note that the same θ linear layer has been used in the SMS4
block cipher [2] and also in ZUC [50].
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5.2 Proposed Attack
In this section, a differential-style attack against the Loiss key scheduling algorithm is presented.
The attack requires two related keys that differ in one byte. It also requires the ability to resynchronize the
cipher under the two keys with chosen IV values.
The attack starts by having the pair of inner states right after the key loading step differ only in one
LFSR byte and one BOMM byte. Then, the idea is to have the LFSR difference fully cancelled. We use the
fact that the BOMM output participates in the LFSR update step during the initialization and the BOMM
difference helps us to cancel out the LFSR difference through the feedback. Once the difference in the LFSR
is fully cancelled, only the BOMM component is active and moreover, with a single byte difference. Then,
since the BOMM does not have proper diffusion properties, the single-byte difference stays localized in the
BOMM until the end of the initialization, which can be detected from the keystream.
The probability of the event that a given BOMM byte is not used during the initialization is (15
16
)128 ≈
2−12, since a BOMM element is consulted 128 times during the 64 initialization steps. If the active byte
has not been used until the end of the initialization, the two instances of the cipher generate several equal
keystream bytes with high probability. Namely, the difference at the point where the keystream is to be
produced will be of low-weight and localized in the BOMM. Therefore, spotting large number of zero bytes
in the starting keystream byte difference indicates that the LFSR difference cancellations described above
took place. These cancellations happen only when certain equations in the starting LFSR bytes are satisfied
and consequently, since the starting LFSR bits are related to the key bits, information about the key bits
leaks.
Let K and K ′ differ only in the byte K3. The steps of the attack can be summarized as follows:
- Construct a list of (IV, IV ′) pairs for which the LFSR state difference cancellation happens. The
cancellation event is described in section 5.2.1, the distinguisher used to detect this event is given in
section 5.2.2 and a procedure for collecting the (IV, IV ′) pairs is provided in section 5.2.3.
- Use this collection of IVs as input to the filtering procedure to filter the wrong key candidates, as
described in section 5.2.4.
The attack recovers 92 bits of the key and the remaining 128− 92 = 36 bits can be obtained by brute force.
In another variant of the attack, 112 bits of the key are recovered and the rest are found by brute-force.
66
5.2.1 Cancelling the LFSR difference
In this section, a necessary and sufficient condition for the starting inner state difference to be fully
cancelled in the LFSR after 4 steps is provided. The condition is specified in terms of the leftmost byte of
the R register in the first 4 steps. Then, the conditions on the R register as provided by Observation 1 below
leak information on the early LFSR bytes and thus about the secret key.
The key-loading mechanism (5.3) allows having a chosen difference only at bytes s3 and y3 at time
t = 0. Namely, it suffices to have
K3 ⊕K ′3 = IV3 ⊕ IV ′3 = δ (5.5)
and the rest of the K,K ′ and also IV, IV ′ bytes to have a zero-difference. Moreover, the key-loading
mechanism trivially allows choosing the starting values of the y3 register. This is done by choosing the
IV3 byte, since the IV is simply copied into the BOMM. This shows that the assumptions required by
Observation 1 (i.e., the particular difference value 0x02 in s3 and y3 and also the y3 = 0x9d constant) can
be satisfied. Recall that wt denotes the leftmost byte of the R register at time t ≥ 0.
Observation 1 Let a pair of Loiss inner states have only s3 and y3 bytes active, both with difference 0x02.
Also, let y3 = 0x9d. Then, after 4 steps, the LFSR does not contain any active byte if and only if
(w0, w1, w2, w3) = (0x00, 0x33, 0xK?, 0x3?) (5.6)
where K is any hexadecimal digit different from 0x3 and the symbol ‘?” denotes any hexadecimal digit.
Proof: From the cipher specification, w0 = 0x00 is true regardless of the condition on the left-hand side.
The two directions of the proof are provided as follows.
(⇐): The change of the difference in the BOMM is described in Figure 5.2. In the first step, since w0 =
0x00, both the value and the difference of y03 remain unchanged and the LFSR difference is moved from
s3 to s2. Since w
1 = 0x33 and both s2 and y
1
3 are active with the same difference, they cancel out and the
corresponding LFSR byte becomes inactive. As for the LFSR difference, it is just moved to s1. Another
effect of the second step is the change of the difference in y3 byte from 0x02 to α
−1×2. Namely, expanding
the difference in the y3 byte and substituting the initial choice of y
0
3 = 0x9d and also the choice of the
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starting difference δ = 0x02 gives
y23 ⊕ y
′2
3 = δ ⊕ S2(y03 ⊕ S2(0x33))⊕ S2(y03 ⊕ δ ⊕ S2(0x33)) = α−1 × 0x02 (5.7)
The third step moves the s1 active byte to s0, since w
2 >> 4 6= 3 and leaves the y3 difference unchanged.
Finally, since w3 >> 4 = 0x3, the difference in y3 cancels out the difference in the LFSR update function
(5.4) in the fourth step and this direction of the proof follows.
(⇒): Clearly, w1 >> 4 = 0x3 since otherwise s131 would be active and the LFSR after 4 steps would
necessarily have at least one active byte. Moreover, K = w2 >> 4 6= 0x3 holds since y23 is necessarily
active and otherwise there would be a difference introduced to the LFSR on byte s231.
To show that w1 mod 4 = 0x3, assume the contrary. In that case, the full LFSR cancellation in the
fourth step cannot happen. Namely, in the second step, the difference in register y13 remains unchanged, i.e.,
it remains equal to 0x02. Therefore, during the third step, the existing one byte difference in the BOMM has
to evolve to α−1 × 2 in order for the LFSR cancellation to happen in the fourth step. However, according
to the S2 specification, the input S2 difference 0x02 cannot be transformed to the output difference α
−1 × 2
and thus w1 mod 4 = 0x3.
Now, according to the (⇐) direction of the proof, (5.7) holds. To show that w3 >> 4 = 0x3, suppose
the contrary. Since the LFSR byte s0 is active at the fourth step (with the difference 0x2), for this difference
to be cancelled out, the BOMM output byte at step four has to be active with the same difference. Thus,
the difference in y23 which is equal to α
−1 × 0x02 has to remain α−1 × 0x02 after passing through the S2
S-box. This difference will necessarily be induced on some other BOMM byte since K 6= 3. However, such
a possibility is ruled out by the S2 specification: the S2 S-box cannot map the input difference α
−1 × 2 to
α−1×2 output difference. It should be noted that this was possible in (5.7), since the same byte was updated
twice in step 1. Therefore, w3 >> 4 = 0x3 has to hold. 
A descriptive overview of the cancellation specified by Observation 1 is as follows. In Figure 5.2,
the BOMM and the LFSR bytes s3, s2, s1, s0 are shown during the first four steps. In the second and the
fourth states in the figure, the cancellation of the LFSR difference by the feedback byte to the LFSR update
is denoted. In the first step, the difference does not enter neither the LFSR update function nor the feedback
value (since w0 = 0x00). In the second step, it is required that w1 = 0x33 for the difference to be cancelled
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Figure 5.2: Illustration of the differences in the BOMM structure at times t = 0, 1, 2, 3
is neither passed to the LFSR nor changed in the BOMM. Finally, in the fourth step, the difference in the
LFSR byte s0 is cancelled and the LFSR becomes fully inactive.
It should be noted that Observation 1 holds for other difference values apart from δ = 0x02. This set
is give explicitely:
∆ = {2, 5, 7, 9, d, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 1a, 1c, 1d, 1f, 20, 21, 25, 27, 2a, 2b, 2c, 2e, 2f, 31,
32, 37, 38, 39, 3d, 3e, 45, 48, 4a, 4b, 4d, 4f, 50, 54, 56, 57, 5b, 5c, 5d, 60, 61, 63, 64, 65, 66, 69, 6a,
6b, 6c, 6f, 70, 72, 74, 75, 77, 79, 7a, 7b, 7d, 7f, 80, 81, 82, 87, 89, 8b, 8d, 8e, 92, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99,
9a, 9c, 9d, 9e, a0, a1, a9, aa, ac, ae, af, b0, b2, b5, b8, ba, bc, bd, bf, c0, c1, c3, c4, c5, c7, ca, cd,
d1, d2, d3, d4, d6, d7, d8, da, dc, de, df, e1, e2, e8, eb, ed, f0, f1, f2, f3, f4, f7, f9, fb, fc, ff}
In particular, Observation 1 is true for any δ ∈ F 82 such that the input differences α−1 × δ and δ cannot be
mapped to the output differences α−1×δ by the S2 S-box (see the (⇒) part of the proof). For each difference
from the set ∆, the initial constant for y30 is calculated from (5.7).
The overall probability that there will be only one BOMM byte, y3, active after all of the 64 steps of
the key scheduling procedure is estimated next. For this event to happen, it suffices to have (5.6) satisfied
in addition to ensuring that the y3 difference does not propagate to other bytes during the initialization
procedure. The event (5.6) happens with probability pw = 2
−8 × 15
16
× 2−4 ≈ 2−12.1. The event by which
the y3 difference does not propagate to any other byte is equivalent to the event of w
t mod 16 6= 0x3 and
wt >> 4 6= 0x3 for 4 ≤ t ≤ 63, and w2 mod 16 6= 3. The latter condition is included since Observation 1
does not rule out the possibility of the spreading of the y3 difference to another byte during step 3. Thus, the
probability that y3 does not spread to any other byte is ps = (
15
16
)2×60+1 ≈ 2−11.3. Thus, a randomly chosen
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key-IV pair satisfying (5.5) such that the assumptions of Observation 1 are satisfied produces a pair of inner
states with only one active byte with probability
p = ps × pw = 2−12.1 × 2−11.3 = 2−23.4 (5.8)
under the usual independence assumption.
5.2.2 Distinguishing Loiss pairs
In the previous subsection, we showed that it is possible to have a pair of Loiss inner states with
only one active byte (located in the BOMM) after the initialization. Here, a distinguisher for the keystreams
generated by a pair of such states is provided. The goal is to minimize the probability of false positives and
false negatives.
Let the time at which the two instances of the cipher differ by only one BOMM byte be t = 0. Since
at this time most of the words are inactive, it is natural to attempt distinguishing Loiss key stream pairs
from random keystream pairs by simply counting the number of equal bytes in the two outputs. Such a
distinguisher depends on parameters n and m, where n is the number of keystream generation steps that will
be considered and m is the number of equal corresponding words in steps 0, . . . , n − 1. The distinguisher
can be formulated as:
- Count the number of indices 0 ≤ i < n such that zi = z′i
- If this count is ≥ m return Loiss keystreams, otherwise return Random.
Good values for (n,m) can be chosen by consulting Table 5.1. In this table, the probability of false positives
and false negatives for some representative (n,m) points has been tabulated. Details on how the values in
the table have been calculated are provided below.
The false positive probability signifies the probability that in two random sequences of n bytes, more
than m corresponding bytes will be equal. On the other hand, the false negative probability signifies the
probability that two Loiss instances with only one active byte located in the BOMM, will produce strictly
less than m equal bytes. For the purpose of the attack above, it is necessary to keep the probability of false
positives low, since a false positive would lead to generating equations that have incorrect key values as
solutions.
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(n,m) P[false positive] ≈ P[false negative] ≈
(16, 6) 2−35.1 2−22.41
(16, 8) 2−50.4 2−16.00
(24, 8) 2−44.6 2−24.01
(24, 10) 2−59.2 2−19.91
(32, 10) 2−54.2 2−27.6
(32, 12) 2−68.3 2−20.68
Table 5.1: Effectiveness of the distinguisher for different (n,m) parameters
As for the false positive probability, it has been calculated by using the formula describing the prob-
ability that in n randomly generated bytes, at least m of them are equal to zero. Namely, if l denotes the











The false negative probability has been calculated experimentally by randomly generating a pair of
equal Loiss inner states and then inducing a random difference at a random BOMM byte. After running the
cipher for n steps, the number of equal bytes is counted. If such number is strictly smaller than m, a counter
is incremented. After repeating the previous procedure for 228 times and dividing the resulting counter by
228, an approximation of the probability of a false negatives is obtained.
For the purpose of the distinguisher used in the next subsection, taking (n,m) = (32, 10) makes the
probability of the attack failure marginally small, i.e., equal to around 225.8 × 2−54.2, since the distinguisher
is applied for around 225.8 times and a false positive answer would lead to wrong conclusions about the value
of key bytes.
5.2.3 Finding the correct IVs
According to the cancellation probability (5.8), for around one in 223.4 randomly chosen IVs, if the
key-IV pair satisfies (5.5), the inner state right after the initialization will have only the y3 BOMM byte
active. Given the choices for the distinguisher given in Table 5.1, such event can be reliably detected.
Hereafter, such IVs will be called correct IVs. In this section, it is shown that the correct IVs can be found
with probability better than 2−23.4, which helps us reduce the final number of chosen-IVs required for the
attack.
In particular, once one correct IV is obtained, more such correct IVs can be found with better prob-
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ability. Namely, changing certain IV bytes in a correct IV does not influence all w1, w2 and w3 bytes. For
instance, perturbing byte IV11 in a correct IV does not change w
1 = 0x33 value and the the probability
(5.8) that the new IV will also be a correct one increases by a factor of 28. More precisely, let T1 denote a
collection of IV bytes such that any change in bytes from T1 leaves R
1 unchanged, but changes Rt, t ≥ 2.
It is easy to verify that T1 = {IV1, IV5, IV8, IV11, IV13}.
Thus, after finding one correct IV, varying only the bytes from T1 can serve to find more correct
IVs with better probability. Such a set of IVs would result in the IVs for which the R1 word is constant.
However, the attack step provided in subsection 5.2.4, which takes the correct IV set as its input, requires
that the IVs produce about 5 different R1 values. Similarly, there have to be around 360 different R2 values.
These two numbers of required different R1 and R2 values are necessary to minimize the number of key
byte candidates that will be recovered, as will be explained in the next subsection. Therefore, the search
procedure that produces the input to the procedure in the next subsection can proceed as follows:
- Let sets L0 = L1 = L2 = L3 = L4 = ∅.
- Generate 5 correct IVs randomly and place them in sets Li, 0 ≤ i ≤ 4, respectively. In more detail,
for each randomly generated IV , compute IV ′ according to (5.5) and apply the distinguisher from
subsection 5.2.2. If the distinguisher returns a positive answer, a correct IV has been found.
- For 0 ≤ i ≤ 4
- Using the IV from each Li, generate more corrects IVs such that the Li sets contain 72 IVs each.
In particular, the new correct IVs are generated by randomizing the starting IV bytes specified
by T1 and applying the distinguisher.
The output of the above procedure are sets Li, 0 ≤ i ≤ 3, each containing 72 IVs for which the R1 is
constant. This procedure takes around 5× 223.4 + 5× 72× 223.4−8 ≈ 226 chosen-IV queries on both Loiss
instances. If instead of applying the previous procedure, all of the 5× 72 = 360 correct IVs were generated
randomly, the number of chosen IV queries would be 360× 223.4 ≈ 231.9.
5.2.4 Filtering the key bytes
In each Loiss step, the function F updates the register R by a transformation similar to one round of
a block cipher, where the R value plays the role of the plaintext and the four LFSR registers play the role
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k00iv1       k10 0iv2       k20 0iv3       k3 0 0
R00
γ θ
k01iv1       k11 1iv2       k21 1iv3       k3 1 1
R01
γ θ
k02iv1       k12 2iv2       k22 2iv3       k3 2 2
R02
γ θ









Figure 5.3: The R register in times 0 ≤ t ≤ 3
of the round key. The goal hereafter is to recover the LFSR registers fed to F in the first three initialization
steps, i.e., s7+i, s20+i, s26+i, s31+i for 0 ≤ i ≤ 2. In particular, since the LFSR bytes in question can be
represented as a sum of the key and the IV, the goal is to recover the key part in these bytes. First, the
application of the F function in the first three steps is represented in the form of
Ri+1 = F (Ri, ki3 ⊕ ivi3|ki2 ⊕ ivi2|ki1 ⊕ ivi1|ki0) (5.9)
for 0 ≤ i ≤ 2, where ki3, ki2, ki1 and ki0 depend only on the original key bytes and ivi3, ivi2 and ivi1 depend
only on the IV bytes. More precisely, in the first step
k03 = K15, k
0
2 = K10, k
0
1 = K4, k
0
0 = K7
iv03 = IV15, iv
0




In the second step, we have
k13 = K13 ⊕ αK8 ⊕ α−1K1 ⊕K15 ⊕K11 ⊕ αK5 ⊕K2 ⊕ α−1K0
k12 = K11, k
1
1 = K5, k
1
0 = K8
iv13 = IV13 ⊕ αIV8 ⊕ α−1IV1 ⊕ IV15 ⊕ IV11 ⊕ αIV5 ⊕ (5.11)
IV2 ⊕ α−1IV0 ⊕ f 1




and in the third step
k23 = K14 ⊕ αK9 ⊕ α−1K2 ⊕K0 ⊕K12 ⊕ αK6 ⊕K3 ⊕ α−1K1
k22 = K12, k
2
1 = K6, k
2
0 = K9
iv23 = IV14 ⊕ αIV9 ⊕ α−1IV2 ⊕ IV0 ⊕ IV12 ⊕ αIV6 ⊕ IV3 ⊕ (5.12)
α−1IV1 ⊕ f 2
iv22 = IV12, iv
2
1 = IV6
where f 1, f 2 represent the feedback bytes. If the IV bytes in the right-hand side of (5.10), (5.11) and (5.12)
are taken from a correct IV, then (5.6) will hold. In that case, also, the feedback bytes will be f 1 = IV0
and f 2 = IV3 ⊕ 0x33. The first three steps of the F function when a correct IV is used are represented
schematically in Figure 5.3.
Then, the filtering procedure for recovering kij , 0 ≤ i ≤ 2, 0 ≤ j ≤ 3 amounts to substituting the F
function key guesses into (5.9) along with the iv bytes derived from a correct IV and then verifying whether
(5.6) holds. In particular, the filtering procedure is done round by round. As for the first F round, (5.6)
amounts to R1 >> 24 = 0x33 and thus a candidate for k0 = k03|k02|k01|k00 passes the criterion with probability
2−8, which implies that 5 correct IVs are sufficient to uniquely determine k0 with a good probability. We
have verified experimentally that there is enough diffusion in one F -round to find the key uniquely with just
5 correct IVs.
As for the second step of the initialization phase, where (5.9) is executed for i = 1, first it should
be noted that R1 is known for each IV since k03|k02|k01|k00 is known. According to (5.6), the second F round
criterion amounts to R2 >> 28 6= 3. Thus, a guess for k1 = k13|k12|k11|k10 passes the criterion with probability
15
16
. Assuming that all the wrong key bits can be eliminated, around 332 correct IV values will be required,
since 232 × (15
16
)332 ≈ 1. In the previous section, 360 correct IVs has been generated, which ensures the
unique recovery of k1 with good probability. Throughout all our experiments, the number of candidates
for k1 that pass the test was consistently equal to 16. Without going into why 16 candidates always pass
the test, it is noted that these candidates can be eliminated during the third F round filtering. The third F
round criterion is R3 >> 28 = 3 and one can expect that the candidate for k2 = k23|k22|k21|k20 passes with
probability 2−4, meaning that around 8 correct IV values will be required. The filtering is done for each of
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the 16 candidates for k1. Again, experimentally, it was found that 16 candidates for k2 always pass the test
and therefore there will be 16 candidates at the end of the filtering procedure.
It remains to state how the correct IVs are drawn from Li, 0 ≤ i ≤ 4 to derive the ivi values specified
by (5.10), (5.11) and (5.12). For the first F round filtering, the 5 IVs are chosen from L0, L1, L2, L3 and L4,
respectively, which ensures that different 5 iv0 values will be derived and that the filtering procedure will
properly work. The second and third round choice of the IVs is arbitrary.
Attack complexity: After the filtering procedure described above, there will remain 16 candidates for kij ,
0 ≤ i ≤ 2, 0 ≤ j ≤ 3 (96 bits). Each of the 16 candidates yields a linear system in the cipher key bytes
determined by (5.10), (5.11) and (5.12). Since the linear equations in the system are independent, it follows
that a 96− 4 = 92-bit constraint on the key K is specified. At this point, the attacker can either brute-force
the remaining 128− 92 = 36 key bits or continue with the filtering process described above to deduce more
key bits. In case of brute-forcing the 36 bits, the total complexity of the attack is dominated by around 236
Loiss initialization procedures.
In the case where the filtering process is continued, the criterion R4 >> 28 6= 3 can be used to
filter out more key bits. Namely, expanding the corresponding iv3 and k3 values in a way analogous to
(5.10)-(5.12), while taking into account the feedback byte in the LFSR update, reveals that altogether 20
more key bits can be recovered. In that case, the total complexity is dominated by the complexity of the
above filtering procedures. The most expensive step is the filtering based on the second F round. We recall
that in this filtering step, for each of the 360 correct IVs, each 32-bit key value is tested and eliminated if
R2 >> 28 6= 3 does not hold. Instead of applying the F function 232 × 360 ≈ 240.5 times, one can go
through all key candidates for a particular IV, eliminate around 15
16
of them and then, for the next IV, only go






To have further optimization, a table containing 232 entries and representing F function can be prepared
in advance. To measure the computational complexity of the attack in terms of Loiss initializations, a
conservative estimate that one table lookup costs around 2−4 of a reasonable implementation of one Loiss
initialization step could be accepted. Then, since there are 64 = 26 steps in the initialization, the final
complexity amounts to around 226 Loiss initializations, 225.8 chosen-IVs for both keys, storage space of 232
32-bit words and offline precomputation of 232 applications of F , which is less than 226 Loiss initializations,
since each Loiss initialization includes 26 F computations.
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Our attack was implemented and tested on a PC with 3 GHz Intel Pentium 4 processor with one
core. Our implementation takes less than one hour to recover 92 bits of the key information and the attack
procedure was successful on all the tested 32 randomly generated keys.
5.2.5 Towards a resynchronization attack
Here, some preliminary observations on the possibility of adapting the above attack to the single-key
model are provided. In the single-key resynchronization attack, only the IV can have active bytes, which
means that only the left-hand half of the LFSR, i.e., registers s16, . . . , s31 as well as the BOMM will contain
active bytes. As in the related-key attack above, the strategy is to have the difference cancelled out in the
LFSR and localized only in the BOMM early during the initialization. One of the obstacles is that the R
register will necessarily be activated when the difference reaches byte s7, since the left-hand half of the LFSR
contains active bytes. We note that this obstacle can be bypassed by cancelling the introduced R difference
by having more than one LFSR byte active. Let LFSR bytes s9, s8 and s7 be active with differences δ2, δ1,
δ0 at some time t during the initialization procedure. Also, assume that the word R and the BOMM bytes
to be used in the next three steps are inactive. Below, we determine how many of the (δ2, δ1, δ0) values can
leave R inactive after 3 steps (after having passed through s7) and also the probability of occurrence of such
an event. For this purpose, note that the R cancellation event occurs if
γ(F (xt)⊕ ut+1)⊕ γ(F (xt ⊕ δ0)⊕ ut+1 ⊕ δ1) = θ−1δ2 (5.13)
where xt = Rt ⊕ ut and ut denotes the 32-bit words fed to the F function from the LFSR in t-th step.
By using a precomputed table for the S-box S1 that, for each input and output difference, contains the
information whether it is possible to achieve the input-output difference pair or not, we exhaustively checked
for which values of (δ2, δ1, δ0) equation (5.13) has solutions in x
t and ut+1. The result of the finding is
that only 2−12.861 of (δ2, δ1, δ0) values cannot yield an R difference cancellation event. For the remaining
(δ2, δ1, δ0), for which (5.13) does have a solution, the probability of the R difference cancellation is 2
−4 ×
2−28 = 2−32.
The analysis above indicates that attackers can choose almost any (δ2, δ1, δ0) starting difference at
three consecutive LFSR bytes and then bypass an R activation with a probability of 2−32. A possible favor-
76
able position to introduce such (δ2, δ1, δ0) difference can be in registers s18, s17, s16, since the R register will
only be activated through byte s7. This can be done by activating IV2, IV1, IV0 bytes. The 3-byte difference
that arises in the BOMM then needs to be used for cancellations whenever some of the active LFSR bytes
pass through the taps. Due to the relatively high number of cancellations that need to happen as the differ-
ence moves towards the right, we have not been able to bring the cancellation probability sufficiently high
enough to have a practical attack. Controlling the difference propagation as done in [79] may be useful for
that purpose. It is left for future research to verify whether a practical resynchronization single-key attack
can be mounted against Loiss.
5.3 Sliding properties of Loiss
In [73], a slide attack on SNOW 3G and SNOW 2.0 was provided. This attack is a related-key attack
and involves a key-IV pair (K, IV ) and (K ′, IV ′). The idea is to have the inner state of the (K, IV ) instance
after n ≥ 1 steps be a starting inner state. Then, the corresponding (K ′, IV ′) initializes to this starting state
and the equality of the inner states is preserved until the end of the procedure. The similarity between the
two keystreams is detected and this provides a basis for the key-recovery attack. Since LFSR-based word-
oriented stream ciphers usually do not use counters which are the usual countermeasure against this kind
of slide attacks, one way to protect against sliding is to have the initial inner state populated by the key, IV
and constants so that it disallows the next several states to be starting states. For example, in ZUC [50],
constants are loaded in a way that makes it difficult to mount a slide attack.
In the following, we point out that Loiss, similar to SNOW 2.0 and SNOW 3G, does not properly
defend against sliding. If C0 = S
−1
1 (0) and C1 = S2(0), a slide by one step can be achieved as follows.
Observation 2 LetK = (K15, . . . , K0) and IV = (A, . . . , A,B), where
A = (α⊕ α−1 ⊕ 1)−1(K0 ⊕ α−1K0 ⊕ α−1K1 ⊕K2 ⊕ αK5 ⊕ αK8 ⊕K11 ⊕K13 ⊕ C0)
and B is determined by B ⊕ C1 ⊕ S2(B ⊕ C1) = A. Also, assume that K7 = C0 and K4 = K10 = K15 =
C0 ⊕ A. Then, for K ′ = (K0 ⊕B,K15, . . . , K1) and IV ′ = (A, . . . , A), we have
z′0 = z1 (5.14)
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Proof: We will show that
IS1 = (s131, . . . , s
1
0, R










16, . . . , y
′0
0 ) = IS
′0
(5.15)
As for the BOMM bytes yi, 15 ≤ i ≤ 0, in the (K, IV ) instance of the cipher, only y0 will be updated since
R0 = 0. In other words, y1i = A for 15 ≤ i ≤ 1. Moreover, from the specification of B, it follows that
y10 = A. Since IV
′ = (A, . . . , A), y
′0
i = A for 15 ≤ i ≤ 0 as well, i.e., (5.15) holds for the BOMM bytes.
As for the equality between R1 and R
′0, by the initialization procedure, R
′0 = 0. To have R1 = 0 as well, it






7 equal to C0 = S
−1(0), which is exactly the
case due to the values to which bytes K15, K8, K4 and K7 are set. Finally, to establish the equality of the
LFSR values in (5.15), the expression defining A are substituted into the way the LFSR is updated during
the initialization procedure with the feed-forward, verifying that s131 = s
′0
31 = K15 ⊕ A. As for the other
LFSR values, s1i = s
′0
i holds directly due to the specification of K, IV,K
′, IV ′.
Thus, the initialization procedures of the two cipher instances are slided, i.e., ISt = IS
′t−1 for
1 ≤ t ≤ 64. At time t = 64, in the (K, IV ) instance of the cipher, a regular keystream step is applied,
whereas in the (K ′, IV ′) instance, an initialization step is applied which destroys the slide property by
introducing a difference between s6531 and s
′64
31 . However, it can be verified that this difference does not affect
the two corresponding first keystream words, which proves (5.14). 
It should be noted that, as we verified by solving B ⊕C1 ⊕ S2(B ⊕C1) = A for each A ∈ F 82 , there
always exists a byte B specified by this observation.
Due to the requirement on bytes K7, K4, K10 and K15 from the formulation of the observation above,
a Loiss key K has a related key pair specified by the observation above with probability 2−32. For the related
keys K and K ′ satisfying the conditions above, the attack can be performed by going through all A ∈ F 82
and verifying whether the relation (5.14) is satisfied for IV = (A, . . . , A,B), and IV ′ = (A, . . . , A). If yes,
then such an A byte is a candidate for the right-hand side of the equation above specifying A, which depends
only on K bytes. Each false candidate out of 28 candidates for A will pass the test (5.14) with probability




We presented a practical-complexity related-key attack on the Loiss stream cipher. The fact that a
slowly changing array (the BOMM) has been added as a part of the FSM in Loiss allowed the difference
to be contained (i.e., do not propagate) during a large number of inner state update steps with a relatively
high probability. The attack was implemented and our implementation takes less than one hour on a PC
with 3GHz Intel Pentium 4 processor to recover 92 bits of the 128-bit key. The possibility of extending the
attack to a resynchronization attack in a single-key model was discussed. We also showed that a slide attack
is possible for the Loiss stream cipher.
79
6On the sliding property of SNOW 3G and
SNOW 2.0
In response to concerns about the security of the 3GPP encryption primitive KASUMI [3], [16]
(see also [47]), the Security Algorithms Group of Experts (SAGE) proposed a possible replacement for
KASUMI which is currently used in 3G systems as a component of the UEA1 confidentiality algorithm.
The core primitive of the new confidentiality algorithm, UEA2, is the SNOW 3G stream cipher [51]. The
design of SNOW 3G is based on SNOW 2.0 [49], a stream cipher which is chosen for the ISO/IEC standard
IS 18033-4 along with Decim [11], MUGI [132] and Rabbit [28]. SNOW 3G passed extensive internal
cryptanalytic efforts, surveyed in [52], but the full evaluation has not been released to public. Externally,
SNOW 3G was analyzed in [25].
In this chapter, we show that the initialization procedure of the two ciphers admits a sliding property,
resulting in several sets of related-key pairs. In case of SNOW 3G, a set of 232 related key pairs is presented,
whereas in case of SNOW 2.0, several such sets are found, out of which the largest are of size 264 and
2192 for the 128-bit and 256-bit variant of the cipher, respectively. In addition to allowing related-key key
recovery attacks against SNOW 2.0 with 256-bit keys, the presented properties reveal non-random behavior
which yields related-key distinguishers and also questions the validity of the security proofs of protocols
that are based on the assumption that SNOW 3G and SNOW 2.0 behave like perfect random functions of
the key-IV.
Biham et al. [16] showed that KASUMI does not behave randomly when examined in the related-key
model. As stated in [16], this renders the previous security proofs based on the assumption that KASUMI
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behaves like a perfect random function [63] as invalid and puts into question the security of the whole 3GPP
system. In [34], [118] the sliding properties of stream ciphers were used to find sets of related keys where
it was shown that a stream cipher may be slidable, in the sense that there exist key-IV values such that the
inner state of the cipher at some time t > 0 corresponds to another key-IV value. Such key-IV pairs produce
equal keystreams up to a slide by some number of positions and represent related keys.
We show that a similar strategy is also applicable to SNOW 3G and SNOW 2.0 due to the way the
key and the IV are written to the inner state before the first initialization step. More precisely, in this chapter,
it is shown that it is possible to find key-IV pairs such that after iterating the cipher for several initialization
steps, the inner state represents a starting inner state for some other key-IV value. Due to the nature of the of
the initialization processes of SNOW 3G and SNOW 2.0, such related keys do not generate slid keystreams,
but only keystreams that have several equal words. However, this still allows distinguishing the produced
keystream from random keystreams. The found sets of keys that have (not necessarily unique) related keys
for different SNOW variants are summarized in Table 6.1.
A feature of the related keys presented in this chapter is that, given a key for which a corresponding
key pair exists, it is straightforward to derive this related key, as opposed to related keys from [118] where
the relation was non-obvious and the keys corresponded to a solution of a complex system of equations.
XYZXYZ(related key relation) The simplicity of the related keys makes the potential related-key attack
more realistic, since if the encryption scheme is used in protocols with related keys, it is unlikely that the
relation will be complex and represent solutions to complex systems of equations. We also show that in
the case of SNOW 2.0 with 256-bit key, the presented properties allow related-key attacks with complexity
smaller than the exhaustive search. Finally, by using a property of the related keys by which given a (K, IV )
value, the related key K ′ depends on the value of IV , we present a simple time-memory trade-off for the
case where the attackers position is weakened with respect to the assumptions on the two related keys.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.1, we briefly review the specifications
of SNOW 3G and SNOW 2.0. The sets of related-keys are specified in Sections 6.2 and 6.3. The attacks












Figure 6.1: The SNOW 3G stream cipher
Snow Variant Source # of related key pairs # of slide steps Key recovery attack
SNOW 3G Th. 1 232 3 -
SNOW 2.0 (128-bit key) Th. 2 232 2 -
SNOW 2.0 (128-bit key) Th. 3 264 3 -
SNOW 2.0 (256-bit key) Th. 4 2160 2
√
SNOW 2.0 (256-bit key) Th. 5 2192 3
√
SNOW 2.0 (256-bit key) Th. 6 2192 4
√
Table 6.1: Summary of results
6.1 Specifications of SNOW 3G and SNOW 2.0
Both SNOW 3G and SNOW 2.0 contain two main components: a Linear Feedback Shift Register
(LFSR) and a Finite State Machine (FSM). The inner state of SNOW 3G (see Fig. 6.1) can be represented








3), where the s values represent 32-bit LFSR registers, the R values represent the
32-bit FSM registers and t denotes the number of iterations that have been executed so far. In SNOW 2.0,








Unlike SNOW 3G which supports only 128-bit keys, SNOW 2.0 can be used with 128-bit and 256-bit
keys. The size of the IV in both ciphers is 128 bits. In what follows, we briefly review the FSM and the
LFSR update steps for the two ciphers.














where S1 and S2 are two different 32 × 32 S-boxes, made of four parallel 8-bit S-boxes followed by a
multiplication by a 4× 4 matrix over GF(28) and ⊞ denotes addition modulo 232.




α−1 · st11 ⊕ st2 ⊕ α · st0 ⊕ F t, t < 32
α−1 · st11 ⊕ st2 ⊕ α · st0 t ≥ 32
(6.2)
where α is a root of the GF (28)[x] polynomial x4+β23x3+β245x2+β48x+β239, β is a root of the GF (2)[x]
polynomial x8 + x7 + x5 + x3 + 1, α−1 is the multiplicative inverse of α and Ft is the FSM output which is
given by
F t = (st15 ⊞R
t
1)⊕Rt2.
Let 1 denote the all-one 32-bit word. The cipher operates as follows: the secret inner state is popu-
lated by K = (K0, . . . K4) and IV = (IV0, . . . IV4) according to
s015 = K3 ⊕ IV0, s014 = K2, s013 = K1, s012 = K0 ⊕ IV1
s011 = K3 ⊕ 1, s010 = K2 ⊕ 1⊕ IV2,
s09 = K1 ⊕ 1⊕ IV3, s08 = K0 ⊕ 1 (6.3)
s07 = K3, s
0
6 = K2, s
0
5 = K1, s
0
4 = K0
s03 = K3 ⊕ 1, s02 = K2 ⊕ 1, s01 = K1 ⊕ 1, s00 = K0 ⊕ 1
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Figure 6.2: (K, IV ) and (K ′, IV ′) LFSR at times 3 and 0, respectively. For example, row 4 contains
K3 ⊕ 1 = s30 and K ′0 ⊕ 1 = s′00
(6.1) and (6.2) for 33 times without generating any output. Note that for t < 32, according to (6.2), the FSM
output Ft participates in the LFSR update, contrary to step t = 32. Finally, the keystream words (z
0, z1, . . .)
are produced by
zt−33 = st0 ⊕ F t, t ≥ 33. (6.4)
In each such step, after generating the keystream word, the FSM and subsequently the LFSR are updated by
(6.1) and (6.2).
SNOW 2.0: The FSM update function is defined by







where S is a permutation of Z232 based on the round function of Rijndael [44]. The LFSR update function,
and the FSM output Ft are defined in the same way as for SNOW 3G.
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For the 128-bit version of SNOW 2.0 with K = (K3, K2, K1, K0) and IV = (IV3, IV2, IV1, IV0),
the starting inner state is populated according to (6.3). For SNOW 2.0 with 256-bit key, K = (K7, . . . K0),
the LFSR is populated by
s15 = K7 ⊕ IV0, s14 = K6, s13 = K5, s12 = K4 ⊕ IV1
s11 = K3, s10 = K2 ⊕ IV2, s9 = K1 ⊕ IV3, s8 = K0 (6.6)
s7 = K7 ⊕ 1, s6 = K6 ⊕ 1, . . . , s0 = K0 ⊕ 1
The initialization process and the keystream generation are done the same way as in SNOW 3G.
The following notation will be used throughout the rest of the chapter. For both SNOW 3G and
SNOW 2.0, two instances of the cipher will be considered: one is initialized by (K, IV ) and the other one is
initialized by (K ′, IV ′). Adding “′” as a suffix to the word will distinguish whether it relates to the (K, IV )




k denote the keystream and the inner state
of the (K ′, IV ′) instance of the cipher. Let ISt denote the complete inner state of the (K, IV ) instance of
cipher at time t ≥ 0. For example IS ′0 represents the inner state of the cipher initialized by (K ′, IV ′), after
applying equations (6.3) and before executing any initialization steps.
The inner state at t = 0, i.e., the state right after applying (6.3) or (6.6) will be referred to as the
starting inner state. The iteration in which the cipher goes from time t to time t + 1 is denoted by step t.
Step t will be referred to as an initialization step if 0 ≤ t ≤ 31. If t ≥ 32, the step will be called a keystream
generation step. The operators ⊞ and ⊟ denote addition and subtraction modulo 232, respectively.
6.2 Related-key pairs for SNOW 3G
In this section, we show that it is possible to initialize SNOW 3G by (K, IV ) so that its inner state
at time t = 3 represents a valid starting inner state corresponding to another (K ′, IV ′). More precisely, we
show that there exists a set of 232 (K, IV ) values such that for each such value, a unique (K ′, IV ′) exists so
that IS3 = IS
′
0.
The initial equality IS3 = IS
′
0 is preserved until step 32, i.e., ISt = IS
′
t−3, 3 ≤ t ≤ 32. At that
point, a difference occurs due to the fact that in the (K, IV ) instance an initialization step is applied to
update the inner state whereas in the (K ′, IV ′) instance, a keystream generation step is applied according to
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(6.2). Nevertheless, due to the high degree of similarity among the corresponding inner states at the point
where the keystream words are produced, several such words will be equal, contrary to how a perfect stream
cipher should behave.




2 (0)), C2 = (S
−1
1 (0) ⊟ S1(0)) ⊕ S2(0) and C3 = (⊟S1(S−11 (S−12 (0)))) ⊕
S2(S1(0)) and let a0, b0, b1, b
′
0 be 32-bit words. The following theorem specifies a set of 2
32 related keys for
SNOW 3G.
Theorem 1 Let K = (a0, C1, C2, C3) and K
′ = (C3, a0 ⊕ 1, C1 ⊕ 1, C2 ⊕ 1). Then, there exist unique
IV = (b0, b1, 0, 0) and IV
′ = (b′0, b0, 0, b1) such that ISt = IS
′
t−3, 3 ≤ t ≤ 32 and
z3 = z
′
0, z4 = z
′
1, z8 = z
′
5, z9 = z
′
6. (6.7)























Unfolding the FSM registers at t = 3 yields
R31 = s
0
7 ⊕ S2(S1(0))⊞ S1(s05),
R32 = S1(s
0
6 ⊕ S2(0)⊞ S1(0)) , R33 = S2(S1(s05)).




7 according to s
0
5 = K1 = C1, s
0
6 = K2 = C2 and s
0
7 = K3 = C3 (which
follows by (6.2) and by the theorem formulation) shows that R31 = 0, R
3
2 = 0 and R
3





2 = 0 and R
′0
3 = 0 by the SNOW 3G specification, the equality of the FSM words is established.
As for the LFSR values of equality (6.8), the problem is depicted in Fig. 6.2. It suffices to equate the
expressions shown inside the rows using the keys specified by the theorem, skipping the first 3 rows. For
example, row 4 corresponds to s30 = s
′0
0 . This is trivially satisfied by the K and K
′ specified by the theorem
by setting K3⊕ 1 = C3⊕ 1 = K ′0⊕ 1, without imposing any constraint on IV , IV ′. It is straightforward to
verify that the same holds for rows 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 15. However, equating rows 10, 11, 13, 14 and 16 yields













α(K0 ⊕ 1)⊕K2 ⊕ 1⊕ α−1(K3 ⊕ 1)⊕K3 ⊕ IV0 = K0 ⊕ 1 (6.10)
α(K1 ⊕ 1)⊕K3 ⊕ 1⊕ α−1(K0 ⊕ IV1)⊕
((K0 ⊕ 1)⊞K1)⊕ S1(0) = K1 ⊕ 1
(6.11)
α(K2 ⊕ 1)⊕K0 ⊕ α−1(K1)⊕
((K1 ⊕ 1)⊞ (K2 ⊕ S2(0)⊞ S1(0))⊕ (6.12)
S1(K1) = K2 ⊕ 1⊕ IV ′0 .
It is clear that equations (6.10)-(6.12) can be solved explicitly in IV0, IV1 and IV
′
0 . In other words, by letting
K = (a0, C1, C2, C3) and K
′ = (C3, a0⊕ 1, C1⊕ 1, C2⊕ 1) as specified by the theorem and fixing a0, these
three equations yield a unique IV0, IV1 and IV
′
0 , which take the place of b0, b1 and b
′
0, respectively, showing
that for K, K ′, there exist unique IV , IV ′ of the form specified by the theorem, satisfying (6.8).
To complete the proof it suffices to show that (6.8) implies (6.7). From (6.8), using (6.2), it follows
that ISt = IS
′
t−3 for 3 < t ≤ 32. Again, according to (6.2), it follows that the difference in times
t = 33, 34, 35 is present in registers {s15}, {s15, s14}, {s15, s14, s13}, respectively. As for times t = 36, 37,
the difference in the inner states stays only in {s14, s13, s12}, {s13, s12, s11}, respectively. Then, using (6.4),
it follows that z3 = z
′
0, z4 = z
′
1. By following the difference propagation, it is straightforward to see that at
t = 41, 42 the active registers are {s14, s13, s12, s9, s8, s7} and {s13, s12, s11, s8, s7, s6}, respectively, which,
using (6.4), completes the proof of (6.7). 2
In the previous Theorem, related keys due to the slide of 3 steps are described. An attempt to change
the number of sliding steps is unlikely to yield new interesting sets of related keys for SNOW 3G. Namely,
slide pairs on the distance of 2 steps do not exist due to the fact that R23 = S2(S1(0)) is a constant different
than zero, which means that the inner state after 2 initialization steps cannot represent a starting inner state
of another slid instance of the cipher. As for the slide by 4 steps, the FSM constraint restricts the key K
to 232 possible values. Then, the K candidates are restricted by an additional 64-bit filter due to the LFSR






14. The two constraints together render the related-keys
highly unlikely to exist. Finally, an eventual slide by more than 4 steps does not produce related keys since
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the difference between the initialization and the keystream generation steps for longer than 4 steps destroys
the equivalence between the inner states which is needed to have some equal words in the corresponding
output sequences.
6.3 Related-key pairs for SNOW 2.0
In this section, we show that the strategy from Section 6.2 is also applicable against SNOW 2.0. In
particular, for SNOW 2.0 with 128-bit keys, we show that two different related key sets exist due to the slide
by 2 and by 3 steps. As for the 256-bit key version of SNOW 2.0, each of the slides by 2, 3 and 4 steps yield
related key sets.
6.3.1 SNOW 2.0 with 128-bit keys
The following theorem reveals a set of 232 related key pairs for the 128-bit version of SNOW 2.0,
due to the slide by 2 steps. Let C1 = S
−1(0) and C2 = ⊟S(0) and let a0, a3, b1 and b
′
0 be 32-bit words.
Note that, according to the SNOW 2.0 specification, K and IV are are indexed in reverse order.
Theorem 2 Let a0 and a3 satisfy
α(a0 ⊕ 1)⊕ C2 ⊕ α−1(a3 ⊕ 1)⊕ a3 = a0 (6.13)
Let K = (a3, C2, C1, a0) and K
′ = (C1 ⊕ 1, a0 ⊕ 1, a3, C2). Then, for any IV = (0, 0, b1, 0), there exists a
unique IV ′ = (0, b1, 0, b
′
0) so that for SNOW 2.0 with 128-bit key, we have ISt = IS
′
t−2 for 2 ≤ t ≤ 32 and
z2 = z
′
0, z3 = z
′





5, z8 = z
′




Proof: Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, it will be shown that the K, K ′, IV and IV ′ values obeying the




1 = s6⊞S(0) = K2⊞S(0) = ⊟S(0)⊞S(0) = 0 = R
′0
1
and R22 = S(s5) = S(K1) = S(S
−1(0)) = 0 = R
′0
2 , the equality of the FSM registers is established. The
88
LFSR constraint amounts to showing that
s2i = s
′0
i , 0 ≤ i ≤ 15 (6.15)
By substituting s2i = s
0
i+2 for i ≤ 13 and substituting s0i+2 and s′0i according to (6.3), it easy to verify that for
i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11}, (6.15) is satisfied without imposing any constraints on IV and IV ′. On the other
hand, using the same substitutions, due to (6.15) for i ∈ {7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13}, it follows that







1 = 0, IV0 = 0
(6.16)




0 unspecified. As for (6.15) for i = 14, it is satisfied due to (6.13).




0 is uniquely determined.
From IS2 = IS
′
0, by (6.2), it follows that ISt = IS
′
t−2 for 2 < t ≤ 32. In times t = 33, 34, the
difference is present in {s15}, {s15, s14} registers, respectively. In times t = 35, 36, 37 the difference in
the inner states is present only in {s14, s13}, {s13, s12}, {s12, s11}, respectively. Following the propagation
further reveals that in times t = 40, 41, 42, the difference is only in {s14, s13, s9, s8}, {s13, s12, s8, s7} and
{s12, s11, s7, s6}, respectively. Taking into account (6.4), (6.14) follows. 2
The number of K values for which related key-IVs exist is equal to the number of possible a0, a3
that satisfy the linear equation (6.13), i.e. 232 values.
The next theorem reveals a larger set of 264 related key pairs for 128-bit keyed SNOW 2.0, due
to the slide by 3 steps. Let a0, a1 be arbitrary 32-bit words and let A3 = ⊟S(a1). Define the constant
C1 = S
−1(0)⊟ S(0).
Theorem 3 Let K = (A3, C1, a1, a0) and K
′ = (C1 ⊕ 1, a1 ⊕ 1, a0 ⊕ 1, A3). Then, there exist unique
IV = (0, 0, b1, b0) and IV
′ = (b1, 0, b0, b
′
0), for SNOW 2.0 with 128-bit key, such that ISt = IS
′
t−3 for
3 ≤ t ≤ 32 and that
z3 = z
′
0, z4 = z
′
1, z8 = z
′
5, z9 = z
′
6







14 provide another 64-bit constraint. Since the expected number of such related key
pairs is 1, they are less relevant and their treatment is omitted. As for sliding by more than 4 steps, the
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difference between the initialization and the keystream generation steps for longer than 4 steps destroys the
equivalence between the inner states which consequently prevents having equal words in the corresponding
output sequences.
6.3.2 SNOW 2.0 with 256-bit keys
The theorem that follows uses sliding by 2 steps to describe a set of 2160 related key pairs for SNOW
2.0 with 256-bit key. Define the constants C1 = S
−1(0) ⊕ 1, C2 = (⊟S(0)) ⊕ 1 and let a0, a1, a2, a3, a4,
a7, b1, b3 and b
′
0 be 32-bit words.
Theorem 4 Assume that
α(a0 ⊕ 1)⊕ a2 ⊕ α−1(a3)⊕ a7 = a0 (6.17)
Let K = (a7, C2, C1, a4, a3, a2, a1, a0) and K
′ = (a1 ⊕ b3 ⊕ 1, a0 ⊕ 1, a7, C2, C1, a4, a3, a2). If IV =
(b3, 0, b1, 0), there exists a unique IV
′ = (0, b1, 0, b
′
0) such that for SNOW 2.0 with a 256-bit key, we have
ISt = IS
′
t−2 for 2 ≤ t ≤ 32 and
z2 = z
′
0, z3 = z
′





5, z8 = z
′




Due to (6.17), the number of K values for which related key-IV s exist is 2160.
Next, a set of 2192 related key pairs due to the slide by 3 steps is described. Let a0, a1, a2, a3,
a4, a5, b2 and b3 be arbitrary 32-bit words. Let A7 = (⊟S(a5 ⊕ 1)) ⊕ 1 and define the constant C1 =
(S−1(0)⊟ S(0))⊕ 1.
Theorem 5 LetK = (A7, C1, a5, a4, a3, a2, a1, a0) andK
′ = (a2⊕b2⊕1, a1⊕b3⊕1, a0⊕1, A7, C1, a5, a4, a3).
Then, there exist unique b1, b0 and b
′
0 such that with IV = (b3, b2, b1, b0) and IV
′ = (b1, 0, b0, b
′
0), for SNOW
2.0 with a 256-key, we have ISt = IS
′
t−3 for 3 ≤ t ≤ 32 and
z3 = z
′
0, z4 = z
′
1, z8 = z
′
5, z9 = z
′
6 (6.19)
Finally, another set of 2192 related key pairs is described by using a slide of 4 steps for SNOW 2.0 with
256-bit keys. Let a1, a2, a3, a4, a5 and a6 be arbitrary 32-bit values. Define A7 = (S
−1(0)⊟S(a5⊕ 1))⊕ 1
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and A0 = ⊟S((a6 ⊕ 1)⊞ S(0)).




0 such that for
K ′ = (a3 ⊕ 1, a2 ⊕ b2 ⊕ 1, a1 ⊕ b3 ⊕ 1, A0 ⊕ 1, A7, a6, a5, a4), IV = (b3, b2, 0, 0) and IV ′ = (0, 0, b′1, b′0)
for SNOW 2.0 with 256-bit key, we have ISt = IS
′
t−4 for 4 ≤ t ≤ 32 and
z4 = z
′




Theorems 4, 5 and 6 allow generic attacks against SNOW 2.0 with 256-bit key in which the attacker
queries the two instances of the cipher initialized by K and its related K ′ to find the IV and IV ′ that give
slide pairs. Then, the found IV and IV ′ are plugged in the equations that are necessary to be satisfied if
the slide is to happen. Since the equations are only in secret key bits and are easy to solve given that they
establish equivalence between the LFSR register values on the distance of only small number of steps less
than the number of slid steps, the key space is restricted.
Moreover, in case of SNOW 2.0 with 256-bit key, variations of the generic attack stated above, by
which related-key setting is relaxed up to some point, are possible. Namely, it can be observed that in
Theorems 4, 5 and 6, K ′ depends on the IV , the initialization vector of key K. It follows that, by varying
IV in (K, IV ), the key K is related to different related keys K ′, which in turn indicates that, given a cipher
instance initialized by K, it is not necessary for the attacker to have access to a single K ′ cipher instance,
but rather to a set of possible K ′ values. Furthermore, as shown below, in the scenario less favorable for the
attacker in which the difference between parts of K and K ′ is unknown, it is possible to reduce some of the
additional attack complexity at the expense of additional memory.
Let K[i] and K ′[j] be the two corresponding key subwords in the keys specified by one of the Theo-
rems 4, 5 or 6. In case K ′[j] does not depend on the IV , for the attack to work, the difference K[i]⊕K ′[j]
has to be equal to the constant specified by the Theorem. For example, in case of Theorem 6, the difference
K[0] ⊕ K ′[4] has to be equal to 1. Such a scenario between the two keys is common for the classical re-
lated key model. On the other hand, if K ′[j] depends on the IV , we distinguish the following two possible
scenarios:
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(a) K[i]⊕K ′[j] is an arbitrary value known to the attacker
(b) K[i]⊕K ′[j] is an arbitrary value unknown to the attacker
Clearly, scenario (b) is less favorable for the attacker than the scenario (a). In what follow, we examine
possible attacks when scenarios (a) and (b) are assumed for the key subwords in question. It should be noted
that the number of unknown key bits in the two related keys can be taken to be the smaller of the numbers
of unknown bits in the two keys. Since, in what follows, every two related keys have the same number of
unknown bits, the number of bits in the key is equal to the number of unknown bits in one (any) of the two
keys.
Let the attacker have access to two instances of the cipher, as specified by Theorem 4 and let K[1]
and K ′[7] be related by scenario (a), i.e. let b3 be known to the attacker. To find the IV and IV
′ such that
(K, IV ) and (K ′, IV ′) yield a slide pair, the attacker queries the K instance with IV = (b3, 0, 0, 0) once
and the K ′ instance around 232 times by varying b′0 in IV
′ = (0, 0, 0, b′0), i.e., until (6.18) is satisfied. Then,
due to (6.15) for i = 15, after simplifying the equation and substituting s115 = a0 ⊕ 1, we have
α(a1)⊕ a1 ⊕ a3 ⊕ α−1(a4)⊕ ((a0 ⊕ 1)⊞ C1)⊕ S(0)⊕ α(1) = α−1(b1)⊕ b3 ⊕ b′0 (6.20)
Since b1 = 0, b3 and b
′
0 are known, the equation above introduces a 32-bit constraint on key bits, reducing
the unknown key bits number from 160 to 128. In case we assume the scenario (b) between K[1] and K ′[7],
the following process can be applied:
- For each b3, query theK instance of the cipher using IV = (b3, 0, 0, 0). Save each (z2, z3, z4, z7, z8, z9)
as a row of table T .
- Sort table T
- For each b′0, query theK













value in table T . If found, return the corresponding (b3, b
′
0)
The advantage of the latter attack is that it does not assume any relation between K[1] and K ′[7]. It requires
232 chosen-IV queries to each of the two oracles, storage of size 232 and the computational effort dominated
by a key search over the space of 2128 keys.
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As for the attack based on Theorem 5, assume a relation of type (a) between K[1] and K ′[6] and also
between K[2] and K ′[7], where K and K ′ are the keys of the two instances of the cipher available to the
attacker. Since values b3 and b2 are known, trying all possible guesses for b1, b0 and b
′
0 yields the IV and
IV ′ that correspond to the slid inner states. The cost of such a procedure is 264 queries to the K instance
of the cipher and 296 queries to the K ′ oracle. Out of 296 (b1, b0, b
′
0) values, only the triplet that produces
slide inner states is expected to pass, since (6.19) represents a 128-bit constraint. Once the b1, b0 and b
′
0 have










15 that hold for slide pairs can be expanded. After
simplifying the equations and substituting s115 = a0 ⊕ 1 and s215 = a1 ⊕ b3 ⊕ 1, we have
α(a0)⊕ a2 ⊕ α−1(a3)⊕ (⊟S(a5 ⊕ 1))⊕ a0 ⊕ α(1)⊕ 1 = b0 (6.21)
α(a1)⊕ a3 ⊕ α−1(a4)⊕ ((a0 ⊕ 1)⊞ (a5 ⊕ 1))⊕ a1 ⊕ α(1)⊕ S(0) = α−1(b1)⊕ b3 (6.22)
α(a2)⊕ a4 ⊕ α−1(a5)⊕ ((a1 ⊕ b3 ⊕ 1)⊞ (C1 ⊕ 1)⊞ S(0))⊕
⊕ S(a5 ⊕ 1)⊕ a2 ⊕ α(1) = b′0 ⊕ b2
(6.23)
By guessing a0, a1 and a5 the system is linearized in GF (2
32) and can be rewritten as
a2 ⊕ α−1(a3) = L1, a3 ⊕ α−1(a4) = L2, (α⊕ 1)(a2)⊕ a4 = L3
where L1, L2 and L3 are known constants. These three equations above are independent and easy to solve
in a2, a3, a4. Consequently, the number of unknown key bits is reduced from 192 to 96. To summarize,
to attack 192 bits of the secret key in the related key scenario, we require 264 chosen-IV queries to the first
instance and 296 chosen-IV queries to the second instance of the cipher and finally a brute force over 296
values to find the two secret keys. Note that given the key of form K, it is sufficient for the attacker to
have access to any of the 264 possible keys related to K ′, as long as the difference between K[1] and K ′[6]
and also between K[2] and K ′[7] is known, i.e. scenario (a) is assumed for both pairs for key subwords. If
instead of (a), scenario (b) is assumed for one of the two key subword pairs in question, say for K[1] and
K ′[6], the attack proceeds as follows:
- For each b1, b0
- Create a table T with rows containing (z3, z4, z8, z9) generated by (K, IV ) where b3 is varying
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in IV = (b3, b2, b1, b0) and b2 is known and fixed
- Sort table T








6) generated using K
′ and IV ′ = (b1, 0, b0, b
′
0) in T . If found,
return values for b3, b1, b0 and b
′
1
- Otherwise: delete table T
On average one incorrect candidate for b3, b1, b0 and b
′
1 will be returned by the procedure above since (6.19)
is a 128-bit constraint. The procedure requires sorting 264 tables, each table containing 232 rows, storage
size of 232, 296 chosen-IV queries to both instances of the cipher and finally, an exhaustive search over 296
possible key values. If both of the key subwords pairs in question are assumed to follow relation (b), around
232 false candidates for b3, b2, b1, b0 and b
′
1 out of possible 2
32×5 values are expected to pass the 128-bit
constraint (6.19), which augments the computational effort of exhaustive search to 296× 232. Since for each
b1, b0 a table containing (z3, z4, z8, z9) is formed, there is an additional cost of sorting 2
64 tables, each table
containing 264 rows and a storage requirement of 264. The number of the chosen IV queries is 2128 and 296
to the K and K ′ instances of the cipher, respectively.
Compared to Theorems 4 and 5, Theorem 6 is less favorable for attacks since, for keys K of the
form specified by the theorem, the related key K ′ exists only for unique b3 and b2 which depend on the
key K. Moreover, the b3 and b2 values participate in the expressions for the key subwords K
′[5] and K ′[6],
respectively. In other words, given an instance with a key K, there exists no simple transformation, such
as rotation or exclusive-or with a constant, to obtain K ′. Thus, given an instance with an unknown key K,
the attacker does not know which transformation has to be applied on K to obtain K ′. Instead of assuming
that, nonetheless, the attacker has access to two instances with related K and K ′, we present the attack in
the following more relevant scenario. Let the attacker know the left-hand side values in equations s413 = s
′0
13
and s414 = s
′0
14 that determine the correct b3 and b2:
α(a1)⊕ a3 ⊕ α−1(a4)⊕ (((⊟S((a6 ⊕ 1)⊞ S(0)))⊕ 1⊕ b′1)⊞ (a5 ⊕ 1))⊕ S(0)⊕ a1 ⊕ α(1) = b3
α(a2)⊕ a4 ⊕ α−1(a5)⊕ ((a1 ⊕ 1⊕ b3)⊞ (a6 ⊕ 1)⊞ S(0))⊕ S(a5 ⊕ 1)⊕ a2 ⊕ α(1) = b2
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The assumption lowers the number of starting unknown key bits from 192 to 128. For a perfect stream
cipher, recovering 128 unknown bits of the keys should not be possible in less than 2128 operations. By
having the knowledge about the key, the attacker also has the values of correct b2 and b3. Now the b
′
1 and
b′0 values that produce a slide pair are found by applying 2
64 queries to the K ′ oracle and comparing with
the corresponding output with the output of the K instance of the cipher, used with the IV = (b3, b2, 0, 0).
After the correct b′1 and b
′








15 can be used to restrict the
key space:
α(⊟S((a6 ⊕ 1)⊞ S(0)))⊕ a2 ⊕ α−1(a3)⊕ (S−1(0)⊟ S(a5 ⊕ 1))⊕
⊕(⊟S((a6 ⊕ 1)⊞ S(0)))⊕ 1⊕ α(1) = b′1
α(a3)⊕ a5 ⊕ α−1(a6)⊕ (a2 ⊕ b2 ⊕ 1⊞ (S−1(0)⊟ S(a5 ⊕ 1))⊞ S(a5 ⊕ 1))⊕
⊕S((a6 ⊕ 1)⊞ S(0))⊕ a3 ⊕ α(1) = b′0
The key space is reduced to 128 − 64 = 64 bits. Since it is expected that one false b′0 and b′1 will pass the
test, the exhaustive search over 265 keys and 264 queries to the second oracle suffice to attack 128 unknown
key.
In the case of related key sets due to Theorem 1 and 2 for SNOW 3G and SNOW 2.0 with 128-bits,
the attacks are unrelevant since the number of initial unkown key bits is only 232. The attack against keys
specified by Theorem 3 is also less relevant since the exhaustive search over the initial unknown 64 bits is
more effective than the attack, since it would require around 296 chosen-IV queries.
Finally, it should be noted that equations that reduce the key space considered in this section contain
operations tat are not linear in GF (232). For example, (6.20) contains operation ⊞ and (6.21) contains an S-
box S application. So, in the attack based on Theorem 5, another key K ′′ equal to K ′ on all subwords except
on a5 would allow another equation of the form (6.21), with a
′
5 instead of a5, which would in turn reveal
(⊟S(a5⊕1))⊕ (⊟S(a′5⊕1)). However, in each case above, exploiting the non-linearity for obtaining more
key bit information requires introducing more related keys. For example, changing b3 in (6.23) requires new
related key K ′, since K ′ depends on b3. Moreover, introducing more related keys does not lower the number
of required chosen-IV queries. Since in this section the focus has been on extending the flexibility of the
related key attack, adding more related keys without improving the practicality of the related key attack
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scenarios has been omitted.
6.5 Discussion and conclusions
We presented related key pair sets for SNOW 3G and SNOW 2.0 cipher by using a sliding technique.
For several of the presented related key sets, the transformation from the key K to its related key K ′ is
simple and amounts to rotation and bit inversion.
Using the derived related key sets, related-key key recovery attacks against SNOW 2.0 with 256-bit
in complexity smaller than the exhaustive search can be mounted. Moreover, the fact that the K ′ depends
on the IV of its related key was used to mount attacks under different assumptions on the related keys.
Furthermore, the existence of the related keys exhibits non-random behavior of the ciphers, which questions
the validity of the security proofs of protocols (such as the ones used in the 3GPP networks [63]) that are
based on the assumption that SNOW 3G and SNOW 2.0 behave like ideal random functions when regarded
as functions of the key-IV. For a more detailed discussion on related-key and known-key distinguishers,
attacks, their security models and notions, the reader is referred to [81], [20].
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7Differential fault analysis of HC-128
The ECRYPT stream cipher project, also known as eSTREAM, is a project that aimed to identify new
promising stream ciphers. The first call for stream cipher submissions was made in 2004 and it consisted
of profile 1 and profile 2: software oriented ciphers and hardware oriented ciphers. The ciphers were put
through a three-phase elimination process, finalizing in 2008, when four software oriented ciphers, includ-
ing HC-128 and Rabbit, and three hardware oriented ciphers were selected as members of the eSTREAM
portfolio. In this and the following chapter, we provide differential fault analysis of HC-128 and Rabbit
stream ciphers.
HC-128 [134] is a high speed stream cipher that has passed all the three phases of the ECRYPT
eSTREAM competition and is currently a member of the eSTREAM software portfolio. The cipher design
is suitable for modern super-scalar processors. It uses a 128-bit secret key and 128-bit initialization vector.
At each step, it produces a 32-bit keystream output word. The inner state of the cipher is relatively large
and amounts to 32768 bits, consisting of two arrays, P and Q, of 512 32-bit words, each. HC-256 [133] is
another cipher similar in structure to HC-128 but uses a 256-bit key and 256-bit IV.
In this chapter, we present a differential fault analysis attack on HC-128. The fault model in which
we analyze the cipher is the one in which the attacker is able to fault a random word of the inner state of the
cipher but cannot control its exact location nor its new faulted value. To perform the attack, we exploit the
fact that some of the inner state words in HC-128 may be utilized several times without being updated. Our
attack requires about 7968 faults and recovers the complete internal state of HC-128 by solving a set of 32
systems of linear equations over Z2 in 1024 variables.
Along with the HC-128 proposal [134], an initial security analysis pointed out to a small bias in the
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least significant bit of the output words which allows a distinguisher based on 2151 outputs. Contrary to the
claims of the cipher designer [134], in [95] it was shown that the distinguisher can be extended to other bits
as well, due to the bias occurring in the operation of addition of three n-bit integers, which is utilized in
HC-128. However, the initial security claim [134] that there exists no distinguisher for HC-128 that uses
less than 264 bits [134] has not been even nearly contradicted. In [138], Zenner presented a cache timing
analysis of HC-256 but this attack is not directly applicable to HC-128.
Our attack presented in this chapter requires around half the number of fault injections when com-
pared to the attack [58] on RC4 in the equivalent fault model. In general, fault analysis attacks [30] fall under
the category of implementation dependent attacks, which include side channel attacks such as timing analy-
sis and power analysis. In fault analysis attacks, some kind of physical influence such as ionizing radiation
is applied to the cryptographic device, resulting in a corruption of the internal memory or the computation
process. The examination of the results under such faults often reveals some information about the cipher
key or the secret inner state. The first fault analysis attack targeted the RSA cryptosystem in 1996 [30]
and subsequently, fault analysis attacks were expanded to block ciphers (e.g., [19], [48]) and stream ciphers
(e.g., [58], [74]). The threat of fault analysis attacks became more realistic after cheap and low-tech methods
were found to induce faults.
Throughout our attack, we introduce a new technique which exploits what can be called the reuse of
inner state words in different iterations of the cipher. Unlike in the fault analysis model which assumes that
every fault inverts exactly one bit of the inner state, the fault model assumed in this chapter allows only the
assumption that the fault will be localized in one of the 32-bit inner state words and no assumption on the
distribution of the newly induced value, which impedes the differential analysis. The reuse of inner state
words allows us to overcome this difficulty as follows. After faulting the inner state value, at one of the next
iterations of the cipher, say at iteration r, the faulty value participates in the output. Based on the output at
iteration r, some information about the difference between the original and the faulty value can be learned.
If the same inner state value is reused at iteration r + t without being updated in the meantime, the faulty
value enters the output transformation with a partially known difference and the differential analysis can be
applied to deduce information about the other values that participated in the output. It follows that the reuse
of inner state values without updating it may facilitate fault analysis in weaker fault analysis models.
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7.1 HC-128 specifications and definitions
The following notation is used throughout the chapter:
+ and ⊟ : addition mod 232 and subtraction mod 512.
⊕: bit-wise XOR.
<<, >>: left and right shift, respectively, defined on 32 bit values.
<<<, >>>: left and right rotation, respectively, defined on 32 bit values.
xb: The bth bit of a word x.
xc..b, where c > b: The word xc|xc−1|..|xb.
s′i〈P [f ]〉, s′i〈Q[f ]〉: The faulty keystream, where the fault is inserted while
the cipher is in state i = 268 and occurs at P [f ], Q[f ], respectively.
The HC-128 Keystream Generation Algorithm
1: i = 0
2: repeat until enough keystream bits are generated
3: j = i mod 512
4: if (i mod 1024) < 512
5: P [j] = P [j] + g1(P [j ⊟ 3], P [j ⊟ 10], P [j ⊟ 511])
6: si = h1(P [j ⊟ 12])⊕ P [j]
7: else
8: Q[j] = Q[j] + g2(Q[j ⊟ 3], Q[j ⊟ 10], Q[j ⊟ 511])
9: si = h2(Q[j ⊟ 12])⊕Q[j]
10: i = i+ 1
Figure 7.1: The HC-128 Keystream Generation Algorithm
The secret inner state of HC-128 consists of the tables P and Q, each containing 512 32-bit words.
The execution of the cipher is governed by two public counters i and j. The functions g1, g2, h1 and h2 in
Fig. 7.1, are defined as follows:
g1(x, y, z) = ((x >>> 10)⊕ (z >>> 23)) + (y >>> 8),
g2(x, y, z) = ((x <<< 10)⊕ (z <<< 23)) + (y <<< 8),
h1(x) = Q[x
7..0] +Q[256 + x23..16], h2(x) = P [x
7..0] + P [256 + x23..16].
The key and IV initialization procedures are omitted since they are not relevant to our attack. We say that
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HC-128 is in state i, if i steps have been executed, counting from the initial inner state. We will denote the
iteration in which the cipher goes from state i to i+ 1 by step i.
Definition 2 Let Ps[j] denote the P [j] value after it has been updated for s times by the HC-128 KGA.
Similarly, let Qs[j] denote the Q[j] value after it has been updated for s times, j = 0, . . . 511.
Definition 2 allows representing P and Q values at different cipher states as follows. If s ∈ {1, 2, . . .},




P0[j], i ∈ {0, . . . j}




Q0[j], i ∈ {0, . . . 512 + j}
Qs[j], i ∈ {1024× (s− 1) + 512 + j + 1, . . .
1024× s+ 512 + j}
To simplify the notation, regardless of whether h1 or h2 was called, the input value will be called the h input
value. Both functions take a 32-bit word on the input. However, only the least significant byte and third least
significant byte of the input value are used. Let x denote the input to the corresponding h function called in
step i. Define Ai = x
7..0 and Bi = 256 + x
23..16.
7.2 The attack overview
The fault model in which we analyze the cipher is the one in which the attacker is able to fault a
random word of the inner state tables P and Q but cannot control its exact location nor its new faulted value.
We also assume that the attacker is able to reset the cipher arbitrary number of times. To perform the attack,
the faults are induced while the cipher is in state 268 instead of state 0. Such a choice reduces the number
of required faults to perform the attack. Throughout the rest of the chapter, whenever it is referred to a fault
occurrence, it is assumed that the fault occurs when the cipher is in step i = 268. The aim of the attack
is to recover the tables P1 and Q1, i.e. P and Q tables of the cipher in step i = 1024. Since the iteration
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function of HC-128 is 1− 1, the inner state can then be rewind to the initial state i = 0. The attack can now
be summarized as follows. First, the faults are induced and the corresponding output is collected as follows:
- Repeat the following steps until all of the P , Q words have been faulted at least once
- Reset the cipher, iterate it for 268 steps and then induce the fault
- Store the resulting faulty keystream words s′i, i = 268, . . . 1535
Then, the h input values, as defined in the previous section, are recovered for certain steps as follows:
- Recover the h input values in steps 512, . . . 1023 (details are provided in section 7.4.1)
- Recover a subset of the h input values in steps 1024, . . . 1535 (the size of the recovered subset is
quantified in section 7.4.2)
The inner state is recovered, bit by bit, in 32 phases. In phase b = 0, the bits P 01 [i], Q
0
1[i], i =
0, . . . 512 are recovered. Then, in phases b = 1, . . . 30, assuming the knowledge of P b−1..01 [i], Q
b−1..0
1 [i],
i = 0, . . . 512, the bits P b1 [i], Q
b
1[i] are recovered. In each phase, a system of linear equations over Z2 in
P b1 [i], Q
b
1[i] is generated as follows:
- Generate 512 equations of the form (P b1 [Ai] + P
b
1 [Bi])⊕Qb1[i] = sbi , i = 512, . . . 1023 (section 7.4.3)
- Recover a subset of the P b1 [0], . . . P
b
1 [255] and a subset of Q
b
1[0], . . . Q
b
1[255] values and add the recov-
ered information to the system (section 7.4.4)
- Generate more equations in P b1 [i], Q
b
1[i] values by considering the relations between faulty and non-
faulty keystreams (section 7.4.5)
- Solve the obtained system of linear equations
Finally, the most significant bits of all the P and Q words are recovered by phase b = 31.
7.3 The faulty value position and difference
In this section, two algorithms are provided. The first one is used to recover the XOR difference
between certain faulty and non-faulty inner state values after the fault has been induced and the cipher is
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iterated for certain number of steps. The algorithm is useful since the XOR differences between the non-
faulty and the faulty inner state values is used to perform differential cryptanlaysis when the corresponding
inner state values are reused in future cipher iterations. The second algorithm is used to recover the position
of the induced fault. Before describing these two algorithms, an analysis of how the fault propagates as
the cipher iterates is provided. Namely, we show that the position of the fault in the P or the Q tables
uniquely determines the way by which the difference propagates through the corresponding table. This is
due to the fact that, in HC-128, the update steps 5 and 8 in Fig. 7.1 use indices which are independent of
the current state. Furthermore, although the indices used in the keystream output generation steps 6 and 9
depend on the inner state information, this does not impede the recovery of initial fault position, as will be
shown below. To illustrate the above argument, assume that the fault occurred at Q[f ] while the cipher is in
state i = 268. Since, according to line 5 of Fig. 7.1, the faulty value Q′[f ] is surely not referenced is during
steps i = 0, . . . 511, it follows that P ′1[l] = P1[l], l = 0, . . . 511. Also, according to the update line 8 of Fig.
7.1, by which values Q[j], Q[j ⊟ 3], Q[j ⊟ 10] and Q[j ⊟ 511] are referenced, the first time in which Q′[f ]
will be referenced is during the state in which Q[f − 1] is updated, i.e., in step i = 512 + f − 1. Thus,




0, if Q1[j] = Q
′
1[j]
1, if Q1[j] 6= Q′1[j].
(7.1)




j=0 = 00 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
j=0,...f−2
110110110 111 . . . 11︸ ︷︷ ︸
j=f+8,...511
The difference propagation in the inner state is also partially projected to the keystream. For instance,
if the fault occurs at Q[f ], then sj = s
′
j holds for 512 ≤ j < 512 + f − 1. The first difference occurs at






0 if si = s
′
i
1 if si 6= s′i
(7.2)
to track the difference propagation in the keystream output. In the presented reasoning, we implicitly assume
that any difference in the right-hand side values of lines 5,6,8 or 9 of Fig. 7.1 always causes a difference in
the corresponding left-hand sides. For 100, 000 times, the inner state of HC-128 has been randomly initial-
ized, iterated for 268 times and then faulted at random word. In all the 100, 000 experiments, the correctness
of our assumption was verified. The following Lemmas provide the complete difference propagation pat-
terns for both the inner state and the keystream. The proofs are omitted since they are straightforward.
Lemma 4 If the fault occurred in the P table, its position f uniquely determines the sequence (∆P1[j])
512
j=0.
Similarly, if the fault occurred in the Q table, its position f uniquely determines the sequence (∆Q1[j])
512
j=0.
The corresponding sequences, depending on the fault positions, are given in Table 7.1.
Lemma 5 If the fault occurred in the P table, the fault position uniquely determines (∆si)
511
i=256|(∆si)1279i=1024.
Similarly, if the fault occurred in the Q table, the fault position uniquely determines sequence (∆si)
1023
i=512.
The corresponding sequences, depending on the fault position, are provided in Table 7.2.
7.3.1 Recovering the differences between faulty and non-faulty words
After a fault is introduced, other P and Q values are affected as the cipher iterates. In this section,
we show how to derive the difference between these affected faulty values and their original counterparts.
For illustration, assume that the fault occurred at Q[f ]. In step i = 512 + f − 1, the faulty and non-faulty
keystream words will be produced by
s512+f−1 = h2(Q[f − 13])⊕Q[f − 1], s′512+f−1 = h2(Q′[f − 13])⊕Q′[f − 1].
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Fault at P [f ] (∆P1[j])
512
j=0
f = 0 1 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
j=1...510
1
f ∈ {1, . . . 257} 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
j=0...f−1
1 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
j=f+1...511
f ∈ {258, . . . 264} 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
j=0...f−1
1000000000100100100110110110 1 . . . 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
j=f+28...511
f ∈ {265, 266, 267, 268} 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
j=0...f−1
100100100110110110 1 . . . 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
j=f+18...511
f ∈ {269, . . . 511} 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
j=0...f−2
110110110 1 . . . 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
j=f+8...511
Fault at Q[f ] (∆Q1[j])
512
j=0
f = 0 100100100110110110 1 . . . 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
j=18...511
f ∈ {1, . . . 501} 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
j=0...f−2
110110110 1 . . . 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
j=f+8...511
f ∈ {502, . . . 508} 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
j=0...f−503
100100100110110110 1 . . . 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
j=f−484...511
f ∈ {509, 510, 511} 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
j=0...f−510
100100110110110 1 . . . 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
j=f−493...511
Table 7.1: The effect of faults induced during state 268 on the P and Q tables
However, since Q′[f − 13] = Q[f − 13], it follows that s512+f−1⊕ s′512+f−1 = Q[f − 1]⊕Q′[f − 1], which
allows the recovery of Q1[f − 1]⊕Q′1[f − 1]. For a fault position f , define the set S(f) as follows:
l ∈ S(f)⇔ 0 ≤ l ≤ 511 and l ∈ {f − 1, f, f + 2, f + 3, f + 5, f + 6, (7.3)
f + 8, f + 9, f + 10, f + 13, f + 16, f + 19}
where “+” and “-” denote addition and subtraction in the set of integers Z. In other words, given a fault at
position f in the P or Q tables, the set S(f) defines the set of positions for which the difference from the
original counterpart words can be recovered as given by the following two Lemmas.
Lemma 6 Let HC-128 be in step 268 when a fault occurs in P [f ], 269 ≤ f ≤ 511. Then, for l ∈ S(f), we
have
P1[l]⊕ P ′1[l] = sl ⊕ s′l (7.4)
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Fault at Q[f ] (∆si)
1023
i=512
f = 0 100100100110110110 1 . . . 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
i=18...511
f ∈ {1, . . . 499} 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i=0...f−2
110110110 1 . . . 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
i=f+8...511
f = {500, 501} 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i=0..f−501
1 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i=f−499...498
1101101101111
f ∈ {502, . . . 508} 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i=0...f−503
101100100110110110 1 . . . 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
i=f−484...511
f = {509, 510, 511} 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
0..f−510
100100110110110 1 . . . 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
i=f−494...511
Fault at P [f ] (∆si)
511
i=256|(∆si)1279i=1024
f ∈ {0, . . . 247} 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i=0...254+f
110110110 1 . . . 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
i=263+f...511




f = 256 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i=0...11
1 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i=13...510
1
f = 257 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i=0...12
1 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i=14...511
f ∈ {258, . . . 264} 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i=0...f−247
101100100110110110 1 . . . 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
i=f−228...511
f ∈ {265, . . . 267} 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i=0...f−254
100100110110110 1 . . . 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
i=f−238...511
f = 268 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i=0...11
100100100110110110 1 . . . 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
i=30...511
f ∈ {269, . . . 511} 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i=0...f−258
110110110 1 . . . 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
i=f−248...511
Table 7.2: The effect of faults induced during state 268 on the keystream
Proof: The distribution of corrupted values in P1 when f ≥ 269 is provided in Table 7.1. If l = f − 1,
then
sf−1 = h1(P1[f − 13])⊕ P1[f − 1], s′f−1 = h1(P ′1[f − 13])⊕ P ′1[f − 1]
According to Table 7.1, P1[f − 13] = P ′1[f − 13] and since there is no corrupted values in the Q table, (7.4)
follows. Similar proof follows for the other l ∈ S(f) values, 269 ≤ f ≤ 511.
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Lemma 7 Let HC-128 be in state 268, when a fault occurs in word Q[f ], 0 ≤ f ≤ 501. Then, for l ∈ S(f),
we have
Q1[l]⊕Q′1[l] = s512+l ⊕ s′512+l (7.5)
The proof of Lemma 7 is analogous to the proof of Lemma 6. Note that the upper bound on f in Lemma
7 allows a simplified treatment of recoverable differences. Namely, if the fault is on Q[f ] for f > 501, the
propagation starts as early as in step i = 512 and the set of recoverable differences differs from S(f).
Given the fault position P [f ] or Q[f ], the above two Lemmas establish that for l ∈ S(f), P [l]⊕P ′[l]
or Q[l] ⊕ Q′[l] can be recovered. A converse question can also be posed: Given a position, say Q[l], which
fault positions in the Q table will allow the recovery of Q1[l] ⊕ Q′1[l]? For that purpose, it is convenient to
define the set S−1Q (l) for 0 ≤ l ≤ 511 as follows
f ∈ S−1Q (l)⇔ 0 ≤ f ≤ 501 and f ∈ {l + 1, l, l − 2, l − 3, l − 5, l − 6, (7.6)
l − 8, l − 9, l − 10, l − 13, l − 16, l − 19}
Now, given a position Q[l], the set S−1Q (l) provides all fault positions such that Q1[l]⊕Q′1[l] = s512+l⊕s′512+l
according to Lemma 7. Similarly, given a position 268 ≤ l ≤ 511 in the P table, the set S−1P (l) defined by
f ∈ S−1P (l)⇔ 269 ≤ f ≤ 511 and f ∈ {l + 1, l, l − 2, l − 3, l − 5, l − 6, (7.7)
l − 8, l − 9, l − 10, l − 13, l − 16, l − 19}
provides the fault positions f such that P1[l]⊕ P ′1[l] = sl ⊕ s′l can be recovered according to Lemma 6.
7.3.2 Recovering the position of the fault
In this section, we provide an algorithm to deduce the position where the fault occurred. Since,
according to Lemmas 4 and 5, the fault position uniquely determines the corresponding sequences, the
following functions can be defined:
φP : f 7→ (∆si)511i=256|(∆si)1279i=1024, φQ : f 7→ (∆si)1023i=512
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Algorithm 1: Fault Position Recovery
INPUT: (∆si)
1279
i=256 = (si ⊕ s′i)1279i=256
OUTPUT: The position where the fault occurred
1: If both (∆si)
1023
512 ∈ ∆P and (∆si)511i=256|(∆si)1279i=1024 ∈ ∆Q, return undefined
2: If (∆si)
1023
i=512 ∈ ∆P , return φ−1P ((∆si)1023i=512)
3: If (∆si)
511
i=256|(∆si)1279i=1024 ∈ ∆Q, return φ−1Q ((∆si)511i=256|(∆si)1279i=1024)
The functions are explicitly given in Table 7.2. By checking that no two right-hand side sequences in both
parts of the Table 7.2 are equal, it follows that
Lemma 8 The functions φP and φQ are 1-1.
Let ∆P = φP ({0, . . . 511}) and ∆Q = φQ({0, . . . 511}). If the fault does not cause (∆si)1023512 ∈ ∆P and
(∆si)
511
i=256|(∆si)1279i=1024 ∈ ∆Q at the same time, which, as will be shown, happens with negligible probability,
then Algorithm 1 returns the fault position.
From line 1 of Algorithm 1, if there is conflicting information on whether the fault occurred in the P
or the Q table, the algorithm returns undefined. To estimate the probability of this unwanted event, let FP [f ]
and FQ[f ] denote the event that the fault occurs at position P [f ] and Q[f ], respectively. Let U denote the




Prob[U ∩ FP [f ]] +
511∑
f=0






Prob[U |FP [f ]] +
511∑
f=0
Prob[U |FQ[f ]]) (7.8)
where Prob[U ∩ FP [f ]] = Prob[FP [f ]]Prob[U |FP [f ]] and also Prob[U ∩ FQ[f ]] = Prob[FQ[f ]]Prob[U |FQ[f ]].
To expand the probability Prob[U |FP [f ]], let n0 and n1 denote the number of faulty values among the values
P [0], . . . P [255] and P [256] . . . P [511], respectively, at state 512, given that the fault occurred at P [f ]. Also,




. If n(δ′i) is the number of 1 values in a 512-element sequence δ
′
i ∈ ∆Q, then
















As for the probability Prob[U |FQ[f ]], let n0 and n1 denote the number of faulty words amongQ[0], . . . Q[255]
and Q[256], . . . Q[511], respectively, at state 268, given that the fault occurred at Q[f ]. Let n2 and n3 denote
the number of faulty words among Q[0], . . . Q[255] and among Q[256], . . . Q[511], respectively, at state















i), denote the number of 1 values among δ
′




256, . . . δ
′
511, respectively, where δ
′
i ∈ ∆P ,
then




















Calculating the sets ∆P and ∆Q and substituting the corresponding values using Table 7.2 allows the com-
putation of the sums in Eq. (7.8) as 1
1024
∑511
f=0 Prob[U |FP [f ]] = 2−66.293 and 11024
∑511
f=0 Prob[U |FQ[f ]] =
2−30.406. Thus, the probability that Algorithm 1 returns undefined as fault position is is Prob[U ] = 2−30.406.
7.4 Using DFA to generate equations
As described in section 7.2, the attack is performed by introducing faults until every P and Q word
is faulted. Let T be the number of fault injections required to fault each of the 1024 words in the P and Q
tables at least once. The expected number of required faults, E(T ), is given by E(T ) = 7698.4 (see the
coupons’ collector problem in [105].) After inducing that number of faults, the average number of faults at a
particular word P [i] or Q[i] will be 7698.4/1024 ≈ 7.52. As stated in section 7.2, the attack proceeds in 32
phases. Each phase b relies on the knowledge of P b−1..01 [i], Q
b−1..0
1 [i], i = 0, . . . 511, recovered in previous
phases. Only the first phase, b = 0, does not require any previous bit knowledge. In each phase, a linear




1[i], i = 0, . . . 511 is generated and solved. Phase b = 31 proceeds
with minor modifications compared to phases 0 ≤ b ≤ 30, as explained below.
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7.4.1 The recovery of h input values for steps 512, . . . 1023
In every HC-128 step, one of the two h functions is called, i.e., either h1 or h2. The input for the h
functions is a 32-bit value, out of which only 16 bits, Ai, Bi, play a role in the computation. In this section,
we describe a method to recover all of the Ai, Bi values, for i = 512, . . . 1023.
To recover Ai, assume that the fault occurred at P [f ] while the cipher was in state 268. As can be
seen from Table 7.1, if 1 ≤ f ≤ 255, then as the cipher iterates through steps i = 512, . . . 1023, no other P
values gets corrupted. Also, the Q table does not get corrupted. Thus, in case 1 ≤ f ≤ 255, the non-faulty
and the faulty keystream words in step 512 ≤ i ≤ 1023 are
si = (P1[Ai] + P1[Bi])⊕Q1[j], s′i〈P [f ]〉 = (P ′1[Ai] + P1[Bi])⊕Q1[j]
Since P ′1[Ai] 6= P1[Ai] implies that Ai = f , then we have
si 6= s′i〈P1[f ]〉 ⇒ Ai = f (7.9)
In case f = 0, the fault does propagate to P [511] and if si 6= s′i〈P [0]〉, then it is unclear whether Ai = 0
or Bi = 511, or both equalities hold. However, if there exists no faulty keystream for 1 ≤ f ≤ 255 such
that (7.9) is true, then Ai = 0. As for Bi, assume that a fault is inserted at word P [f ], 256 ≤ f ≤ 268,
while the cipher is in state 268. From Table 7.1, it is clear that at state 1024, none of the P [0], . . . P [f − 1]
values will be corrupted and the value P [f ] will necessarily be corrupted. Similarly, if the fault is inserted
at P [f ] where 269 ≤ f ≤ 511, none of the values P [0], . . . P [f − 2] get corrupted and the value P [f − 1]




fmax if fmax ∈ {256, . . . 268}
fmax − 1 if fmax ∈ {269, . . . 510}
Finally, if fmax = 511, it is not clear whether Bi = 510 or Bi = 511. To differentiate between these two
cases, it should be verified whether si 6= s′i also holds for any f which does not corrupt P [511], for instance
for f = 507. The recovery of Ai, Bi, for all 512 ≤ i ≤ 1023 is given by Algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 2: Recovery of Ai and Bi, for some i = 512, . . . 1023
INPUT: Step i ∈ {512, . . . 1023}
OUTPUT: Ai, Bi
1: If exists 1 ≤ f ≤ 255 such that si 6= s′i〈P [f ]〉: Ai = f
2: else Ai = 0
3: Find fmax, the maximum f such that si 6= si〈P [f ]〉
4: If 256 ≤ fmax ≤ 268: Bi = fmax
5: else if 269 ≤ fmax ≤ 510: B′i = fmax − 1
6: else if si = si〈P [507]〉: Bi = 510
7: else Bi = 511
9: Return Ai, Bi




Q7..00 [j ⊟ 12] if i ∈ {512..523}





Q23..160 [j ⊟ 12] + 256 if i ∈ {512..523}
Q23..161 [j ⊟ 12] + 256 if i ∈ {524..1023}
(7.11)
7.4.2 The recovery of the h input values for steps 1024, . . . 1535
In this subsection, Ai, Bi values for a subset of i = 1024, . . . 1535 are recovered. While Bi values
will be recovered by a method similar to the one from the previous subsection, the same method is not
applicable for Ai recovery and we will utilize the reuse of inner state words to recover the Ai values.
As for the recovery of Bi for i = 1024, . . . 1535, from Table 7.1 it can be observed that if for some
1 ≤ f ≤ 501, Q[f ] is faulted at step 268, the value Q[f + 7] will remain unchanged and the values
Q[f + 8], . . . Q[511] will surely be corrupted. Thus, if fmin denotes the minimal 249 ≤ f ≤ 501 such that
si = s
′
i〈Q[f ]〉, then Bi = fmin + 7. Also, since Q[509], Q[510] and Q[511] will get corrupted regardless of
the fault position in Q, it is not possible to distinguish which of values 509, 510 or 511 Bi was equal to.
Thus, if for given step i, Bi < 509 holds, Bi will be recovered. Moreover, if Bi < 500, Q
7..0
1 [Bi] will
be recovered by (7.11). Assuming that Bi < 500 for step i, then Ai can be recovered as follows. Consider
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the faulty keystream s′i〈Q[f ]〉 where f ∈ S−1Q (Bi). According to Lemma 7 and (7.6)
Q1[Bi]⊕Q′1[Bi] = s512+Bi ⊕ s′512+Bi
Thus, Q
′7..0




1 [Bi] ⊕ s7..0512+Bi ⊕ s
′7..0
512+Bi
. After being used in step
512 +Bi, the value Q[Bi] is reused in step i as follows
si = (Q1[Ai] +Q1[Bi])⊕ P2[j], s′i〈Q[f ]〉 = (Q′1[Ai] +Q′1[Bi])⊕ P ′2[j]
If 257 ≤ f ≤ 501, Q1[Ai] = Q′1[Ai] holds according to Table 7.1. Also, the P table remains uncorrupted
and thus P2[j] = P
′




i 〈Q[f ]〉 = (Q7..01 [Ai] +Q7..01 [Bi])⊕ (Q7..01 [Ai] +Q
′7..0
1 [Bi]) (7.12)
Since s7..0i ⊕ s′7..0i , Q7..01 [Bi] and Q′7..01 [Bi] are known, (7.12) represents a test that allows eliminating some
wrong candidates for Q7..01 [Ai] value. One test of the form (7.12) will be generated for each faulty instance
for which the fault position is Q[f ], where f ∈ S−1Q (Bi). Consequently, an 0 ≤ Ai ≤ 255 can be discarded
if the corresponding Q7..01 [Ai] recovered by (7.11) does not satisfy (7.12).
Algorithm 3: Recovery of Ai and Bi, for some i = 1024, . . . 1535
INPUT: Step i ∈ {1024, . . . 1535}
OUTPUT: Ai or undef , Bi or undef
1: Calculate F = {257 ≤ f ≤ 501|si = s′i〈Q[f ]〉}
2: If |F | = 0: Bi = undef
3: Else Bi = min(F ) + 7
4: If Bi > 500 Ai = undef ; Return Ai, Bi
5: Else: let Cand(Ai) = {0, 1, ..255}
6: For each f ∈ S−1Q (Bi)
7: Deduce Q
′7..0
1 [Bi] = Q
7..0
1 [Bi]⊕ s7..0512+Bi ⊕ s
′7..0
512+Bi
8: For Ai = 0, . . . 255
9: If s7..0i ⊕ s′7..0i 6= (Q7..01 [Ai] +Q7..01 [Bi])⊕ (Q7..01 [Ai] +Q′7..01 [Bi])
10: Eliminate Ai from Cand(Ai)
11: If for every σi,σ
′
i ∈ {0, 1}, s23..16i ⊕ s′23..16i 6= d, where
12: d = (Q23..161 [Ai] +Q
23..16
1 [Bi] + σi)⊕ (Q23..161 [Ai] +Q′23..161 [Bi] + σ′i)
13: Eliminate Ai from Cand(Ai)
14: If |cand(Ai)| = 1, let Ai be the unique cand(Ai) member
15: Else: Ai = undef
16: Return Ai, Bi
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1 [Bi] + σi)⊕ (Q23..161 [Ai] +Q
′23..16
1 [Bi] + σ
′
i) (7.13)
where σi is a carry corrector defined to be 1 if Q
15..0
1 [Ai] + Q
15..0
1 [Bi] ≥ 216 and 0 otherwise. Another
carry corrector, σ′i, is defined analogously. The value Q
′23..16
1 [Bi] is obtained in the same way as the value
Q
′7..0
1 [Bi] above. If 0 ≤ Ai ≤ 255 and the corresponding Q23..161 [Ai] are substituted in (7.13) and none of
σi, σ
′
i ∈ {0, 1} satisfy the test, then Ai is discarded.
In what follows, we estimate the expected number of steps for which both the Ai and Bi values are
recovered by the presented method. Let 1024 ≤ i ≤ 1535 be a step of HC-128. If, for example, for step i,
257 ≤ Bi ≤ 492, then the Bi value will surely be recovered as provided by the above method. Furthermore,
for such a particular value Bi, |S−1Q (Bi)| = 12 will hold. Since for each f ∈ S−1Q (Bi) around 7.52 faults
occur at Q[f ], as shown at the beginning of section 7.4, around 7.52× 12 = 90.24 tests given by Eq. (7.12)
and the same number of tests given by Eq. (7.13) will be applied to the set of candidates for Ai. According
to our experimental results, such a number of tests is sufficient to discard all the false candidates for Ai.
In particular, an experiment in which Algorithm 3 was executed for all 512 steps i ∈ {1024, . . . 1535} for
10, 000 times, with random HC-128 instantiations, was conducted. On average, in 472.7 out of the 512 steps,
both Ai and Bi values were recovered.
7.4.3 Equations of the form P b1 [Ai]⊕ P b1 [Bi]⊕Qb1[j] = sbi ⊕ ci,b
After the steps given by subsections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2 have been executed, the attack proceeds in 32
phases, each consisting of 3 parts, as presented by the attack overview in section 7.2. In this subsection, the
first part of b-th attack phase is presented.
The first part of b-th phase, in which starting 512 equations are generated, proceeds as follows. In
steps i ∈ {512, . . . 1023}, the keystream output word is generated as (P1[Ai] + P1[Bi])⊕Q1[j] = si where
j = i mod 512. Since Ai and Bi for i ∈ {512, . . . 1023} have been recovered in subsection (7.4.1), focusing
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on the b-th bit yields 512 bits equations of the form
P b1 [Ai]⊕ P b1 [Bi]⊕Qb1[j] = sbi ⊕ ci,b, i = 512, . . . 1023 (7.14)
where ci,b is a known carry corrector which is equal to 1 if there is carry in (P
b−1..0
1 [Ai] + P
b−1..0
1 [Bi])
and 0 otherwise. In case b ∈ {0, . . . 7} or b ∈ {16, . . . 23}, relying on the knowledge obtained by (7.10)
and (7.11), the system can be extended by adding information Qb1[w] = aw, w = 0, . . . 499, regarded as
equations. However, for b /∈ {0, . . . 7, 16, . . . 23} such equations are unavailable. Hence, a method to
systematically add more equations to the system (7.14) that works for all b = 0, . . . 31, i.e., that makes the
corresponding system of rank 1024, is necessary. In order to provide a generic treatment for all b values, in
what follows, equations derived from information given by (7.10) and (7.11) will not be utilized.
7.4.4 Recovering bits P b1 [0], . . . P
b
1 [255] and Q
b
1[0], . . . Q
b
1[255]
In the second part of the b-th phase of the attack, the system of equations given by (7.14) is expanded.
Note that in steps 512 ≤ i ≤ 1023, the output is generated by si = (P1[Ai] + P1[Bi]) ⊕ Q1[j], whereas in
steps 1024 ≤ i ≤ 1535, the output is generated by si = (Q1[Ai] + Q1[Bi]) ⊕ P2[j]. The idea is to corrupt
P1[Bi] and Q1[Bi] in the previous two relations and recover P1[Ai] and Q1[Ai] by observing how these
values react to addition of different values. The difference of the corrupted values is controlled by utilizing
the reuse of P1[Bi] and Q1[Bi] over different states of the cipher. The analysis results in the recovery of a
subset of the P b1 [0], . . . P
b
1 [255] and also a subset of the Q
b
1[0], . . . Q
b
1[255] values.
As for recovering P b1 [0], . . . P
b
1 [255], let 512 ≤ i ≤ 1023 and 268 ≤ Bi ≤ 511. Consider a fault at
position P [f ], so that f ∈ S−1P (Bi). Using Lemma 6 and (7.7), define δ = sBi ⊕ s′Bi = P1[Bi] ⊕ P ′1[Bi].
Assume that for the faulty cipher instance in question, δb = 1. Consider the difference
∆ = si ⊕ s′i = (P1[Ai] + P1[Bi])⊕ (P1[Ai] + P ′1[Bi]),
and denote by cb and c
′
b the carry from the b− 1 to b-th bit in the sums P1[Ai] +P1[Bi] and P1[Ai] +P ′1[Bi],
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respectively. If cb = c
′
b, then the bit P
b[Ai] is recovered as follows
P b1 [Ai] =


δb+1 ⊕∆b+1, if cb = c′b = 0
δb+1 ⊕∆b+1 ⊕ 1, if cb = c′b = 1
(7.15)
If cb 6= c′b, the bit P b1 [Bi] is not uniquely determined and will not be recovered.
Algorithm 4: Recovery of P b1 [Ai], for some i = 512, . . . 1023
INPUT: Step i ∈ {512, . . . 1023}
OUTPUT: Bit P b1 [Ai], or undef
1: For every faulty keystream, where the fault occurred at P [f ], f ∈ S−1P (Bi)
2: Calculate δ = sBi ⊕ s′Bi and ∆ = si ⊕ s′i
3: If P b−1..01 [x] + P
b−1..0
1 [Bi] < 2
b, set cb = 0, else set cb = 1
4: If P b−1..01 [x] + P
′b−1..0
1 [Bi] < 2
b, set c′b = 0, else set c
′
b = 1
5: If cb = c
′
b:
6: Return P b1 [Ai] calculated according to (7.15)
7: Return undef
To recover P b1 [Ai], the explained procedure is repeatedly applied using each fault occurring at P [f ],
f ∈ S−1P (Bi). Let p1 = Prob[δb = 1] and p2 = Prob[cb = c′b], then the probability of success can be lower
bounded as follows:






1− (1− p1p2)|S−1P (Bi)|
)
(7.16)
The values |S−1P (Bi)| are given by Table 7.4 and Prob[δb = 1] = 12 . As for Prob[cb = c′b], it can
be modelled as the probability that there exists a carry at bit b in two random sums [127]. It achieves a
minimum for b = 31 and thus the lower bound for the success probability over possible bit positions is
given by Prob[Recovery of P b1 [Ai] succeeds] ≥ 0.908.
Now, the probability that for some particular k ∈ {0, . . . 255}, the value P b1 [k] will not be recovered
in some particular step i is then less than 1 − 1
256
× 0.908. Let Zk = 1 if P b1 [k] has not been recovered











E(Zk) ≤ 256× (1− 1
256
× 0.908)512 = 41.511 (7.17)
Thus, the method presented in this section when applied on steps i = 512, . . . 1023, is expected to recover
more than 256 − 41.511 = 214.49 of the P b1 [0], . . . P b1 [255] values. The exact procedure is presented by
Algorithm 4.
As for recovering Qb1[0], . . . Q
b
1[255], an analogous technique, applied on steps i = 1024, . . . 1535, is
used. The exact procedure is presented by Algorithm 5. The expected number of recovered values is calcu-
lated analogously to (7.16), whereas it needs to be taken into account that Ai and Bi, i ∈ {1024, . . . 1535},
need to be successfully recovered by subsection 7.4.2. The |S−1Q (Bi)| values, given at Table 7.3, are more
favorable than the corresponding |S−1P (Bi)| values in (7.16). The expected number of Qb1[0], . . . Qb1[255]
values to be recovered is 218.01.
Algorithm 5: Recovery of Qb1[Ai], for some i = 1024, . . . 1535
INPUT: Step i ∈ {1024, . . . 1535}
OUTPUT: Bit Qb1[Ai], or undef
1: If Ai or Bi are unknown, return undef
2: For every faulty keystream, where the fault occurred at Q[f ], Q ∈ S−1Q (Bi)
3: Calculate δ = s512+Bi ⊕ s′512+Bi and ∆ = si ⊕ s′i
4: If Qb−1..01 [x] +Q
b−1..0
1 [Bi] < 2
b, set cb = 0, else set cb = 1
5: If Qb−1..01 [x] +Q
′b−1..0
1 [Bi] < 2
b, set c′b = 0, else set c
′
b = 1
6: If cb = c
′
b = 0: Return: δ
b+1 ⊕∆b+1
6: If cb = c
′
b = 1: Return δ
b+1 ⊕∆b+1 ⊕ 1
8: Return undef
l 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
|S−1Q (l)| 2 2 3 4 4 5 6 6 7 8
l 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19, . . . 500
|S−1Q (l)| 9 9 9 10 10 10 11 11 11 12
l 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511
|S−1Q (l)| 11 10 10 9 8 8 7 6 6 5 4
Table 7.3: The number of fault positions which allow the recovery of Q1[l]⊕Q′1[l]
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l 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278
|S−1P (l)| 1 2 2 3 4 4 5 6 6 7 8
l 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288, . . . 510 511
|S−1P (l)| 9 9 9 10 10 10 11 11 11 12 11
Table 7.4: The number of fault positions which allow the recovery of P1[l]⊕ P ′1[l]
7.4.5 Utilizing equations in faulty bits
In this subsection, the system constructed in subsections 7.4.3 and 7.4.4 is expanded further for the
purpose of attaining the full rank of the system. Consider the faulty output word in steps 512, . . . 1023,
s′i = h2(Q
′
1[j ⊟ 12]) ⊕ Q′1[j]. Evidently, regarding the previous relation as an equation is useless since it
includes faulty inner state bits. Below, a method to transform the faulty inner state bits participating in the
equation to original inner state bits is provided. Again, the reuse of inner state words is utilized.
Let the fault position be Q[f ], where f ∈ S−1Q (l) and 244 ≤ l ≤ 499. The non-faulty and the faulty
instances of the cipher in step i0 = 512 + l + 12 are
si0 = h2(Q1[l])⊕Q1[l + 12], s′i0 = h2(Q′1[l])⊕Q′1[l + 12] (7.18)
Note that Q7..01 [l] = Ai0 and Q
23..16
1 [l] = Bi0 − 256 are known according to subsection 7.4.1 and that the
difference Q′1[l] ⊕ Q1[l] can be calculated as δ = Q′1[l] ⊕ Q1[l] = s512+l ⊕ s′512+l, according to Lemma 7.
Thus, A′i0 and B
′
i0
can be recovered as
A′i0 = Q
7..0
1 [l]⊕ δ7..0, B′i0 = Q23..16[l]⊕ δ23..16 + 256 (7.19)




⊕ ci0,b = P b1 [A′i0 ]⊕ P b1 [B′i0 ]⊕Q
′b
1 [l + 12] (7.20)
where A′i0 and B
′
i0









also known due to the assumption that bits b − 1, . . . 0 of all the P and Q words are known. Finally, to
add equation (7.20) to the system constructed in the previous sections, the variable Q
′b
1 [l + 12] needs to be
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eliminated. Once again, to reexpress Q
′b
1 [l + 12], the idea is to wait for this value to be reused once more
during steps 1024, . . . 1535.
Due to the assumed lower bound 244 ≤ l, it follows that l + 12 ≥ 256. Hence, it is possible for
the Bi index in some step 1024 ≤ i ≤ 1535 to take the value l + 12 which was used in step i0. If such
a step exists, denote it by i1. Also, assume that Ai1 < f − 1, so that Q1[Ai1 ] = Q′1[Ai1 ]. Finally, assume
that both Ai1 and Bi1 have been successfully recovered by the procedure given in subsection 7.4.2. Then,
if j1 = i1 mod 512, the non-faulty and faulty keystream words are si1 = (Q1[Ai1 ] + Q1[Bi1 ]) ⊕ P2[j1] and
s′i1 = (Q1[Ai1 ] +Q
′
1[Bi1 ])⊕ P2[j1] and the difference can be computed as
si1 ⊕ s′i1 = (Q1[Ai1 ] +Q1[Bi1 ])⊕ (Q1[Ai1 ] +Q′1[Bi1 ]) (7.21)




= Qb1[Bi1 ]⊕ ci1,b ⊕Q
′b
1 [Bi1 ]⊕ c′i1,b (7.22)
where ci1,b and c
′
i1,b
are carry indicators for Qb−1..01 [Ai1 ] + Q
b−1..0
1 [Bi1 ] and Q
b−1..0
1 [Ai1 ] + Q
′b−1..0
1 [Bi1 ],
respectively. The carry indicator ci1,b is calculated trivially and as for c
′
i1,b
, it is necessary to findQ
′b−1..0
1 [Bi1 ].
For that, it suffices to focus on the bits b− 1, . . . 0 in equation (7.21), since all values except Q′b−1..01 [Bi1 ] are






⊕ s′b−1..0i1 )⊕(Qb−1..01 [Ai1]+Qb−1..01 [Bi1]))−Qb−1..01 [Ai1] (7.23)
After finding ci1,b and c
′
i1,b
, from (7.22) and since Bi1 = l + 12, Q
′




1 [l + 12] = s
b
i1
⊕ s′bi1 ⊕Qb1[Bi1 ]⊕ ci1,b ⊕ c′i1,b (7.24)




⊕ ci0,b = P b1 [A′i0 ]⊕ P b1 [B′i0 ]⊕ sbi1 ⊕ s
′b
i1
⊕Qb1[Bi1 ]⊕ ci1,b ⊕ c′i1,b (7.25)
which is added to the system of equations without introducing any new variables. The described procedure
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is summarized by Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 6: Add equations by expressing the faulty with non-faulty bits
INPUT: Faulty keystream for a fault occuring at Q[f ], f ∈ S−1P (l), 244 ≤ l ≤ 499
OUTPUT: An equation of form (7.25)
1: Let δ = s512+l ⊕ s′512+l and i0 = 512 + l + 12




3: If P b−1..01 [A
′
i0
] + P b−1..01 [B
′
i0
] < 2b set ci0,b = 0, else ci0,b = 1
4: For 1024 ≤ i1 ≤ 1535 such that Ai0 and Bi0 are known
5: If Bi0 = l + 12 and Ai0 < f − 1
6: If Qb−1..01 [Ai1 ] +Q
b−1..0
1 [Bi1 ] < 2
b, let ci1,b = 0, else ci1,b = 1
7: Calculate Q
′b−1..0
1 [Bi1 ] according to (7.23)
8: If Qb−1..01 [Ai1 ] +Q
′b−1..0
1 [Bi1 ] < 2




9: Return equation (7.25)
Let N denote the number of equations generated by repeating the procedure above for all f ∈ S−1Q (l)
and 244 ≤ l ≤ 499. To estimate E(N), let ρ(l + 12) be the step number i, 1024 ≤ i ≤ 1535, for which
Bi = l + 12, if such a step exists. Also, let I denote the indicator function, returning 1 if the condition
in question is true and returning 0 otherwise. Finally, let FLTQ[f ] be the number of faults that occurr at








FLTQ[f ] × I[ρ(l + 12) exists]× I[Aρ(l+12) < f − 1]
× I[Aρ(l+12), Bρ(l+12) known]
Recall thatE(FLTQ[f ]) = 7.52. Also,E(I[ρ(l+12) exists]) ≈ 1−(255256)512. If f > 257,E(I[Aρ(l+12) < f−
1]) = 1 and otherwise f−2
256
. Finally, according to subsection 7.4.2, E(I[Aρ(l+12), Bρ(l+12) known]) ≥ 472.7512 .
Substituting the values above and using additivity of E(·) yields that E(N) ≥ 18380.1.
7.5 Attack complexity and experimental results
Adding the number of equations generated by the algorithms presented in subsections 7.4.3, 7.4.4
and 7.4.5 gives a lower bound of 512 + 214.49 + 218.01 + 18380.1 = 19324.6 equations expected to be in
the final system for bits b ∈ {0, . . . 30}. The correctness of the system and the uniqueness of the solution
have been verified experimentally as follows. For 100 times HC-128 was randomly initialized and the faults
have been simulated as specified by the attack. The procedures specified by by subsections 7.4.3, 7.4.4
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and 7.4.5 have been executed and the rank of the resulting system of equations for bits b ∈ {0, . . . 30}
was verified to be 1024 in all the 100 times. As for bit b = 31, the procedures from subsection 7.4.4 are
not applicable, leaving out the system to be generated only by subsections 7.4.3 and 7.4.5, yielding about
512 + 18380.1 = 18892.1 equations. Again, throughout the 100 experiments, the rank of resulting system
for bit b = 31 was 1022 each time. Thus, to yield a complete HC-128 inner state, the missing two bits need
to be guessed. The correctness of the guessed bits is easily verified by running the cipher and comparing the
resulting key stream with the observed one. As for the attack complexity, around 7698.4 faults at random
inner state words are required, as given by the beginning of section 7.4. The most expensive computational
factor in the attack is solving the linear system of equations in 1024 bit variables for 32 times.
7.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, a DFA attack on HC-128 was presented. The adopted attack model assumes that the
attacker is able to fault a random word of the inner state of the cipher but cannot control its exact location
nor its new faulted value. The attack operates by constructing 32 systems of linear equations over Z2, each
of 1024 bit variables representing the inner state values. It also utilizes what we called the reuse of inner
state words in different states of the cipher in order to facilitate the differential fault analysis.
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8Differential fault analysis of Rabbit
After passing all three phases of the eStream candidate elimination process, Rabbit [27] (also see
RFC 4503) has become a member of profile 1 eSTREAM portfolio. While originally designed with high
software performance in mind, Rabbit turns out to be also very fast and compact in hardware. Fully op-
timized software implementations achieve an encryption speed of up to 3.7 clock cycles per byte (CPB)
on a Pentium 3, and of 9.7 CPB on an ARM7. It uses a 128-bit secret key, 64-bit IV and generates 128
pseudo-random bits as keystream output at each iteration. The size of the secret internal state amounts to
513 bits, consisting of two sets of 8 32-bit words and one additional 1-bit value.
In this chapter, we present a practical fault analysis attack on Rabbit. The fault model in which
we analyze the cipher is the one in which the attacker is assumed to be able to fault a random bit of the
internal state of the cipher but cannot control the exact location of injected faults. Our attack requires
around 128 − 256 faults, precomputed table of size 241.6 bytes and recovers the complete internal state of
Rabbit in about 238 steps.
The security of Rabbit has been thoroughly investigated in the series of white papers published by
the crypto lab at Cryptico A/S. These papers include analysis of the key setup function [39], analysis of
IV-setup [42], mod n cryptanalysis [40], algebraic cryptanalysis [38] and periodic properties [41]. Also, a
distinguishing attack requiring 2247 128-bit samples was reported in [9]. The bias utilized in this attack was
resulting from the bias in the Rabbit core function where it was shown that images of the Rabbit core func-
tion, g, have significantly less zeros than ones at each offset and this was used to show that there exists a bias
in the least significant bit of certain keystream subblocks. This work was extended in [94], where the prob-
ability distribution of several keystream bits together was calculated by means of Fast Fourier Transform,
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using the techniques described in [97]. The complexity of the latter attack is 2158. The authors also pre-
sented an attack in which the 251.5 instantiations of the cipher are analyzed based on the first three keystream
output blocks of each instantiation. The additional assumption is that certain differences expressed in terms
of XOR among these 251.5 internal states are known. This attack recovers all 251.5 keys and requires 232
precomputation steps, 232 memory, and 297.5 steps. According to the authors, the attack is given under an
unusual cryptanalytic assumption. This attack was considered the first known key recovery attack on Rabbit.
The fault model is the one in which an attacker is assumed to be able to cause a bit-flip at a random
location in the internal state of the cipher. However, the exact position of the flipped bit is unknown to the
attacker. The attacker is also assumed to be able reinitialize the cipher sufficient amount of times, iterate
and obtain keystream words. The main idea of the attack is to gain information on the input value of the g
function based on its input-output differences obtained during fault analysis.
8.1 Fault analysis
Cryptanalytic attacks can be broadly classified into two classes. In the first class of attacks, the
attacker tries to exploit any weakness in the underlying mathematical structure of the cipher. This type
includes, for example, differential cryptanalysis, linear cryptanalysis and algebraic attacks. The second
class of attacks are implementation dependent attacks, which include side channel attacks, such as timing
analysis [83] and power analysis [84], and fault analysis attacks. In fault analysis attacks [30], the attacker
applies some kind of physical influence on the internal state of the cryptosystem, such as ionizing radiation
which flips random bits in devices’ memory. By examining the results of cryptographic operations under
such faults, it is often possible to deduce information about the secret key or the secret internal state of the
cipher.
Fault attacks were first introduced by Boneh et al. [30] in 1996 where they described attacks that
targeted the RSA public key cryptosystem by exploiting a faulty Chinese remainder theorem computation
to factor the modulus n. Subsequently, fault analysis attacks were extended to symmetric systems such as
DES [19] and later to AES [48] and other primitives. Fault analysis attacks became a more realistic serious
threat after cheap and low-tech methods of applying faults were presented (e.g., [6, 126]).
Hoch and Shamir [58] showed that fault analysis attacks present a powerful tool against stream
ciphers as well. Stream ciphers based on LFSRs, LILI-128 and SOBER-t32 as well as RC4 were shown to be
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insecure in a fault analysis model in which the attacker does not have the ability to choose the exact location
of the induced fault. In the case of RC4, the key recovery attack requires 216 faults and 226 keystream words.
In [17], RC4 was assessed using a different fault model in which the attacker may specify the location at
which the fault is induced but can not specify the value of injected faults. The attack requires 216 induced
faults. Another more advanced fault analysis attack on RC4 which requires 210 faults was also introduced
in the same paper.
Hojsı´k and Rudolf [59] presented an attack on another eSTREAM cipher, Trivium [33]. The attack
recovers the secret internal state using 42 fault injections. The fault model used is the one in which the
attacker is able to flip a random bit in the internal state of Trivium without being able to exactly control
its location. This work was subsequently improved in [60], providing an attack that recovers Trivium inner
state with only 3.2 fault injections on average. The authors used different cipher representation and were
able to reduce high-degree equations to linear ones, concluding that a change in the way by which the cipher
is represented may result in a better attack.
In this chapter, we use the same model as the one used in fault analysis of Trivium [59, 60]. The
attacker is assumed to be able to flip a random bit in the internal state of the cipher without being able to
exactly control its location. In other words, the exact location of induced fault is assumed to be unknown to
the attacker.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The Rabbit specifications that are relevant to our
attack are briefly reviewed in the next section. The main idea behind our attack is presented in section 8.3.1.
The procedure used to determine the location of induced faults is described in section 8.3.2 and the complete
attack is described in section 8.3.3. Finally, the attack success probability and its associated complexity are
analyzed in section 8.4.
8.2 Specification of Rabbit stream cipher
Internal state of Rabbit consists of 513 bits. It includes: eight 32-bit values: x0,t, · · · x7,t, eight 32-bit
counters, c0,t, . . . c7,t, and one additional bit φ7,t, used in the counter update. When the cipher steps from
time t to time t+ 1, the counter is updated independently of x values, by adding known ai values, corrected
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with carries φ as follows:
c0,t+1 = c0,t + a0 + φ7,t





1− 1Z/232Z(c0,t + a0 + φ7,t) if j = 0
1− 1Z/232Z(cj,t + aj + φj−1,t+1) if j > 0
and a0 = a3 = a6 = 4D34D34D, a1 = a4 = a7 = D34D34D3, a2 = a5 = 34D34D34D. Function




0 if x ≥ 232
1 if x < 232
The x values are updated by
x0,t+1 = g0,t + (g7,t <<< 16) + (g6,t <<< 16)
x1,t+1 = g1,t + (g0,t <<< 8) + g7,t
x2,t+1 = g2,t + (g1,t <<< 16) + (g0,t <<< 16)
x3,t+1 = g3,t + (g2,t <<< 8) + g1,t
x4,t+1 = g4,t + (g3,t <<< 16) + (g2,t <<< 16)
x5,t+1 = g5,t + (g4,t <<< 8) + g3,t
x6,t+1 = g6,t + (g5,t <<< 16) + (g4,t <<< 16)




Figure 8.1: Simplified view of the state update function of Rabbit, rotations omitted
gj,t = (xj,t + cj,t+1)
2 ⊕ [(xj,t + cj,t+1)2 >> 32] (8.2)
The 128-bit keystream output block s
[127..0]




















6,t+1 ⊕ x[31..16]3,t+1 , s[127..112]t+1 = x[31..16]6,t+1 ⊕ x[15..0]1,t+1
(8.3)
Figure 8.1 shows a simplified view the Rabbit state update function. The description of the key setup scheme
of Rabbit is omitted since it does not play a role in the attack outlined in this chapter.
8.3 Differential fault analysis attack
Throughout the rest of this chapter, faulty words will be denoted same as non-faulty ones, except that
a “′” sign will be added. This way, faulty Rabbit internal state words at time t will be denoted by x′i,t, c
′
j,t,
φ′7,t. The whole Rabbit internal state at time t, consisting of [(xi,t)i=0...7, (ci,t)i=0...7, φ7,t], will be denoted by
St. Accordingly, its faulty counterpart will be denoted by S
′
t. We will also use “ + ” to denote addition mod
32, unless otherwise stated.
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Faulty keystream output at step t will be denoted by s
′
t. The i-th 16-bit segment of word s will be
denoted by s(i). For example s
(1)
t denotes s
[31..16], i.e., bits 16 to 31 of word st.
According to our fault analysis model, the attacker has the power to flip a bit within the internal state
of the cipher, that is xi,t, ci,t, i = 0, . . . 7, φ7,t but the attacker can not control or know the exact location of
the induced fault (both at the bit and at the word level).
8.3.1 The Main Idea
Before stating the complete attack procedure, we provide a motivational example that illustrates
the idea behind the attack. Let states of Rabbit at step t, St and S
′
t, differ only in i-th bit of word x0,t.
Consequently, x′0,t + c
′
0,t+1 = x0,t + c0,t+1 + σ2
i, for some unknown σ ∈ {−1,+1} and i ∈ {0, . . . 31}.
Then, with high probability, g′0,t 6= g0,t and g′i,t = gi,t for i = 1..7. This implies that x′i,t+1 6= xi,t+1, for
























3,t+1 makes a candidate for values x0,t+1 and x
′
0,t+1 and consequently, using Eq.
(8.1), a candidate for
x0,t+1 − x′0,t+1 =
(g0,t + g7,t <<< 16 + g6,t <<< 16)− (g′0,t + g′7,t <<< 16 + g′6,t <<< 16) = g′0,t − g′0,t
Since inputs to g0,t and g
′
0,t differ by ±2i for some unknown i = 0, . . . 31, this constraint can be described
by a set of g function additive differentials {(±2i, δ)|i = 0, . . . 31}.
Suppose now the attacker obtains two more faulted keystream words s′′t+1 and s
′′′
t+1, derived from
states S ′′t and S
′′′
t differing from St on bits j and k of word x0,t, where k 6= j, k 6= i, j 6= i. Since in all










t+1 three sets of differentials
{(±2i, δ1)|i = 0, . . . 31}, {(±2i, δ2)|i = 0, . . . 31} and {(±2i, δ3)|i = 0, . . . 31} are obtained using the same
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guess in the way described above. As will be shown later, the probability that there exists an input x for
the g function such that it satisfies all three sets of differentials at once, i.e., such that there exist mutually
different i1, i2 and i3 such that
g(x)− g(x± 2i1) = δ1,
g(x)− g(x± 2i2) = δ2,
g(x)− g(x± 2i3) = δ3





3,t+1 . Also, if the guess is a correct one, the attacker obtains candidates for g input value x0,t + c0,t+1. In
the following we provide a full internal state recovery algorithm.
8.3.2 Determining the position of the fault
In the attack proposed in this chapter, the first step after inducing a fault is to make restrictions on
the position where the fault took place. The induced bit flipping can happen at one of the bits of words
x0,t, . . . x7,t, c0,t, . . . c7,t as well as at the 1-bit value φ7,t.
In the following we provide a tool for deducing important information on the location at which the
fault occurred. Based on difference among faulty and non-faulty keystreams, information on the difference
among internal states St and S
′
t is deduced. More precisely, only keystream words st and s
′
t will be used and
according to the fault model, it will be assumed that internal states St and S
′
t differ exactly on one bit.
To express these differences in a convenient way, we introduce the function dST , describing dif-






0, if a fault occured either at x0,t, c0,t or φ7,t
1 ≤ i ≤ 7, if a fault accured either at xi,t or ci,t
The function dST is defined for every pair of states (S, S
′) that differ exactly on one bit. If s and s′ are two






0, s(5) = s′(5), s(6) = s′(6) and s(i) 6= s′(i) for i 6= 5, 6
1, s(0) = s′(0), s(5) = s′(5) and s(i) 6= s′(i) for i 6= 0, 5
2, s(0) = s′(0), s(7) = s′(7) and s(i) 6= s′(i) for i 6= 0, 7
3, s(2) = s′(2), s(7) = s′(7) and s(i) 6= s′(i) for i 6= 2, 7
4, s(1) = s′(1), s(2) = s′(2) and s(i) 6= s′(i) for i 6= 1, 2
5, s(1) = s′(1), s(4) = s′(4) and s(i) 6= s′(i) for i 6= 1, 4
6, s(3) = s′(3), s(4) = s′(4) and s(i) 6= s′(i) for i 6= 3, 4
7, s(3) = s′(3), s(6) = s′(6) and s(i) 6= s′(i) for i 6= 3, 6
If a pair of 128 bit (s, s′) words does not satisfy any of the conditions proposed by the right-hand side
of the equation above, function dKS(s, s
′) is undefined.
To understand the motivation behind the above definition, assume that the injected fault affected the
input to the function g0,t. From Figure 8.1, it is clear that such fault directly affects the computation of x0,t+1,
x1,t+1 and x2,t+1. From Eq. (8.3), it follows that these three terms also directly affect the computation of all






′(6) which explains the first line in the
above definition. A similar argument applies to to rest of entries in the definition of dKS(s, s
′).
The criterion for determining the position of the fault dST (St, S
′
t) based on the first keystream word
can now be simply stated as follows:
- If dKS(st+1, s
′
t+1) is defined, put dST (St, S
′
t) = dKS(st+1, s
′
t+1)
- Otherwise, leave dST (St, S
′
t) undefined
During the attack, when after a fault dST (St, S
′
t) value is undefined, the fault will be discarded and the
attacker proceeds by inducing another fault.
The successfulness of this criterion can be measured by two types of errors, pincorr and pundef . Error
pincorr is defined as the probability that the criterion returns a wrong dST (S, S
′) value, while error pundef
is be defined as the probability that the criterion will leave dST (S, S
′) undefined. The probability that the
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criterion returns correct dST (S, S
′) value will be denoted as pcorr.
Estimating pcorr, pincorr and pundef The estimates for the above defined probabilities are derived analyti-
cally. Firstly, we estimate the probability that a fault in one of the ci,t, i = 0..6 values propagates to ci+1,t+1
and not only to ci,t+1 during the update step, via carry transfer mechanism implemented by auxiliary φi,t+1
value. Suppose the fault occurred at position ci,t, the probability that ci,t + ai + φi−1,t+1 will have a carry at








This probability is given by the event that that addition of ±2i, i = 0..31 to a random 32-bit number
x changes value of 1Z/232Z(x). While the ai values in the actual cipher are fixed (ai ∈ {4D34D34D,
D34D34D3,34D34D34D}), our experimental results confirmed the accuracy of the above approximation.
Then, values pcorr, pincorr, pundef are estimated in what follows. Suppose the a random fault was
induced in the internal state of the cipher. Then, the position of the bit-flip can be at
- xi,t, i ∈ {0, . . . 7} with probability 256513 . In this case, our criterion will return a correct dST (S, S ′) value
if g(xi,t + ci,t+1) 6= g(x′i,t + ci,t+1), i.e., with probability 2
32−1
232
. In case that is not true, the criterion
leaves dST (S, S
′) undefined.
- φ7,t with probability
1
513
. In this case, c′0,t+1 6= c0,t+1 with probability 1. Let z ∈ {0, . . . 7} such that
c′j,t+1 6= cj,t+1 for j = 0, ..z and c′j,t+1 = cj,t+1 for j = z + 1, ..7. If
- z = 0, which happens with probability 2
32−1
232




, then our criterion returns a correct value. If, however, in this case g(x0,t +
c0,t+1) = g(x
′
0,t + c0,t+1) which happens with probability
1
232
, the criterion leaves dST (S, S
′)
undefined.
- z = 1 which happens with probability 1
232
. In this case, we consider only the case g(xi,t +
ci,t+1) 6= g(x′i,t + ci,t+1), i = 0, 1, probability being (2
32−1
232
)3 and in this case again our criterion
leaves dST (S, S
′) undefined. Other possibilities within the case z = 1 are highly improbable and
hence do not have any practical implications on the success probability of our attack.




. We do not go into further consideration since these
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events are highly improbable.
- ci,t, i ∈ {0, . . . 7}, with probability 256513 . Again, let z ∈ {0, . . . 7} such that c′j,t+1 6= cj,t+1 for j =
i, . . . i+ z and c′j,t+1 = cj,t+1 for j = i+ z + 1, ..7. If
- z = 0, which happens with probability 1 − pcr if i ≤ 6 and with probability 1 if i = 7, the
same analysis as with a fault on xi,t values applies. Namely, the correct dST (S, S
′) value will be
returned with probability 2
32−1
232
and otherwise criterion value in question will be left undefined
- z = 1, which happens with probability pcr × 232−1232 if i ≤ 5, with probability pcr if i = 6
and with probability 0 if i = 7, the following analysis applies. If values g(xj,t + cj,t+1) and





respectively, the criterion leaves dST (S, S




)2 + ( 1
232
)2. However, if g(xj,t + cj,t+1) = g(xj,t + c
′
j,t+1) and g(xj+1,t + cj+1,t+1) 6=
g(xj+1,t + c
′
j+1,t+1) the criterion returns the wrong value as an answer. The probability for this




. In case g(xj,t + cj,t+1) 6= g(xj,t + c′j,t+1) and g(xj+1,t + cj+1,t+1) =
g(xj+1,t+c
′
j+1,t+1), which occurs with the same probability, the criterion returns the right answer.
- z = 2, which happens with probability pcr × 1232 × 2
32−1
232
if i ≤ 4, with probability pcr × 1232 if
i = 5 and with probability 0 if i ≥ 6, the following consideration applies. In the case where all
three g values are changed, dST (S, S




)3. Other cases are highly improbable and we do not consider them.
- z ≥ 3 occurs with probability pcr× 1232 × 2
32−1
232
. We do not go into consideration of further cases
since their corresponding probabilities are negligible.
Using the probabilities from the discussion above, but ignoring parts that are less than 1
232
, provides a



























Again, ignoring terms that are less than 1
232
, probability of dST (S, S
′) being left undefined is given by
pundef ≈ 6× 32
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Finally, ignoring terms less than 1
232
yields probability for the criterion to return a false dST (S, S
′) value is
pincorr ≈ 0.
To confirm the previous theoretical estimates pcorr ≈ 0.98635, pundef ≈ 0.013645 and pincorr ≈ 0,
the following experiment was conducted. A Rabbit internal state was randomly initialized and a random
fault was induced. The criterion was applied and it was noted which of the three options happened: correct
position of the fault returned, incorrect position of the fault returned or position of the fault left undefined.
After repeating the experiment for 106 times, the probabilities were obtained as pcorr = 0.98408, pundef =
0.015924, and pincorr = 0. Hence, given, say 100 faults, correct position will be determined for around 98
faults and 2 faults will be discarded. For no faults the incorrect position will be returned. Thus, it can be
concluded that the proposed criterion represents reliable means for determining the position of faults.
8.3.3 The complete attack
Before stating the complete attack we introduce following definitions. Throughout the following
three definitions, let k ∈ {0, 1, 2} and σ ∈ {−1,+1} be fixed values and let x be restricted to set Z232 .
By (σ2i, δ)k we denote a g function additive differential where the input difference is σ2
i and the output
difference δ, taken after rotating g function output for 8× k bits.
Definition 3 An x value will be considered to satisfy differential (σ2i, δ)k if
[g(x) <<< (8k)]− [g(x+ σ2i) <<< (8k)] = δ
Definition 4 A set of differentials
(±2i, δ)k|31i=0 := {(σ2i, δ)k|i = 0..31, σ = −1,+1}
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will be called a generalized differential. An x value will be considered to satisfy generalized differential
(±2i, δ)k|31i=0 if it satisfies any of the differentials contained in the set.
Definition 5 A set of generalized differentials
∆ = {(±2i, δ1)k|31i=0, (±2i, δ2)k|31i=0, . . . (±2i, δn)k|31i=0)}
will be considered satisfiable if at least one x value satisfies them all, i.e., if there exists an x value as well
as distinct values d1, . . . dn, chosen from the set {±2i|i = 0..31}, such that
[g(x) <<< 8k]− [g(x+ dj) <<< 8k] = δj, j = 1, . . . n
For such an x, we shall say that it satisfies set ∆.
The following procedure, flt init(t) induces a sufficient number of faults at the internal state of
the cipher at step t and arranges faulty keystream words to appropriate sets, using the mechanism described
in Section 8.3.2.
- Let FLTSi = Ø, i = 0..7.
- While |FLTSi| < 3 for any i = 0..7
- Reinitialize the cipher, forward to step t and induce a fault. Obtain s′t+1. If dKS(s
′
t+1, st+1) is
defined, let i = dKS(s
′
t+1, st+1) and add s
′
t+1 to FLTSi.
The procedure that follows, derive inf(i,k), utilizes information in FLTSi to deduce the set of pos-
sible values for xi,t + ci,t+1. Parameter k can take values 0,1 and 2 and it determines the way xi,t + ci,t+1
value will be recovered. Namely, as will be seen from the algorithm, there are three different ways to
derive candidates for this value and the logic of these three ways is encoded through values of αi,k, βi,k,
k = 0, 1, 2 in Table 8.1. The values for αi,k, βi,k have been derived utilizing Eq. (8.3). For exam-









5,t+1 , creating the set of generalized differentials using
g0,t − g′0,t = x0,t+1 − x′0,t+1 and finally finding g-input values that satisfy it. On the other hand running
derive inf(0,1) aims to recover the same value x0,t + c0,t+1, but in a different way. Namely, in this
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6,t+1 , derives the general-
ized differential set by g0,t <<< 8 − g′0,t <<< 8 = x2,t+1 − x′2,t+1 and then searches for g-input values that
satisfy the set. The objective of obtaining the same value in three different ways is to take the intersection
afterwards and hence minimize redundant candidates. Also, in the first case, a difference with no rotation
was obtained and in the second, a difference after 8-bit rotations was found. The table is encoded so that
whenever k = 0, k = 1 and k = 2, the number of rotations in the obtained difference will be 0, 8 and 16,
respectively. This justifies the same value k present as index both for α, β and for generalized differentials
themselves from ∆ki (A) sets in the procedure below.
The complete procedure derive inf(i,k) follows:
- Let Sat(∆ki ) = Ø
- For A = 0, . . . 232 − 1
- Form the set of generalized differentials as follows:
∆ki (A) = { (±2l, ([s(αi,k)||s(βi,k)]⊕ A)− ([s′(αi,k)||s′(βi,k)]⊕ A))k|31l=0
| s′ ∈ FLTSi }
- Let Sat(∆ki ) = Sat(∆
k
i ) ∪ Sat(∆ki (A)), where Sat(∆ki (A)) is the set of x values that satisfy
∆ki (A)
where αi,k, βi,k, i = 0..7, k = 0, 1, 2 are defined by Table 8.1. The Derivation of Sat(∆
k
i (A)) sets is
done using precomputation, as explained in Section 8.4.2. To recover g input values at step t, i.e., values
xi,t + ci,t+1, the procedure g inp(t) can be invoked, as follows:
- flt init(t)
- For i = 0, . . . 7
- Call derive inf(i,0), derive inf(i,1) and derive inf(i,2) to find Sat(∆0i ),
Sat(∆1i ) and Sat(∆
2
i )
- Cand(xi,t + ci,t+1) = Sat(∆
0
i ) ∩ Sat(∆1i ) ∩ Sat(∆2i )
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i 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
αi,0 1 4 3 6 5 0 7 2
βi,0 0 7 2 1 4 3 6 5
αi,1 4 3 6 5 0 7 2 1
βi,1 7 2 1 4 3 6 5 0
αi,2 3 6 5 0 7 2 1 4
βi,2 2 1 4 3 6 5 0 7
Table 8.1: α and β index values used during the attack
In the next section it will be shown that the probability that there will be more than one candidate for
xi,t + ci,t+1, i.e., that there will be more than 1 elements in the set Cand(xi,t + ci,t+1), is small.
Finally, the complete internal state at time t = 1 can be recovered by invoking the previous procedure
for t = 0 which yields values xi,0 + ci,1, i = 0..7. This in turn yields gi,0, i = 0..7 values, which yield xi,1,
i = 0..7, by Eq. 8.1. Invoking the previous procedure once again for t = 1 yields values xi,1+ ci,2, i = 0..7.
Subtracting according values reveals ci,2, i = 0..7. Now ci,1 values can be recovered by reversing the counter
one step backward, according to the specification of counter update step. Whether φ7,1 = 0 or φ7,1 = 1 is
found by mere trying both options and comparing the resulting keystream words.
8.4 Attack success probability and complexity
8.4.1 Success Probability
In this section we show that the procedure from previous section determines the internal state uniquely.
More precisely, it will be shown that |Cand(xi,t + ci,t+1)| = 1, for any i = 0 . . . 7 and t ≥ 0 with high
probability. This will be done by modelling g as a random function and then showing that if differences
([s(αi,k)||s(βi,k)] ⊕ A) - ([s′(αi,k)||s′(βi,k)] ⊕ A) are chosen uniformly randomly, i.e., not corresponding to the
actual values produced by the attack procedure, this set of candidates will have 0 elements with high prob-
ability. Then, this probability can be taken as probability that |Cand(xi,t + ci,t+1)| = 1 since following the
procedure with actual differences and using the real g function guarantees existence of one correct candi-
date for xi,t + ci,t+1. According to the way complete internal state is recovered from g input values at times
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t = 0 and t = 1, as described by the last paragraph of the previous section, it is clear that from uniqueness
and correctness of g input values, uniqueness and correctness of the recovered internal state at step t = 1
follows.





Sat(∆2i ), the probability distribution of the number of elements in these three sets is first examined. Assume
g is a randomly chosen function and differences (s(αi,k)|s(βi,k))⊕A−(s′(αi,k)|s′(βi,k))⊕A are chosen randomly
uniformly. Sets Sat(∆ki ), k = 0, 1, 2 are formed as follows, as described by derive inf(i,k):
Sat(∆ki ) = Sat(∆
k
i (0)) ∪ . . . ∪ Sat(∆ki (232 − 1))
For a given A, consider a generalized differential from ∆ki (A). The probability that random 32-bit x value
will satisfy it is 63/232. Since each set of generalized differentials ∆ki (A) contains at least three generalized
differentials
P [ x satisfies ∆ki (A) ] ≤ (63/232)3 = 2−78.068
The probability that among 232 possible x values there exists at least one that will satisfy ∆ki (A), i.e., the
probability that ∆ki (A) is satisfiable, is
P [ Some x ∈ {0, ..232 − 1} satisfies ∆ki (A) ] ≤ 1− (1− 2−78.068)2
32 ≈ 2−46
Finally, the probability that for at least one A there will exist an x that will satisfy ∆ki (A), i.e., the probability
that Sat(∆ki ) is nonempty in a random model, is
P [ Sat(∆ki ) is empty ] ≥ (1− 2−46)2
32
= 1− 2−14 (8.4)
The final set of candidates for xi,t + ci,t+1 in procedure g inp is derived as an intersection of Sat(∆
0
i ),
Sat(∆1i ) and Sat(∆
2
i ). The probability that, in a random model, the intersection of these three sets is
non-empty is
P [ Randomly modelled Cand(xi,t + ci,t+1) nonempty ] ≤ (2−14)3 = 2−42 (8.5)
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This can finally be taken as an upper bound for the probability that there will be an element other than the
correct one in Cand(xi,t + ci+1,t). Since Cand(xi,t + ci,t+1) is calculated for i = 0, . . . 7 at times t = 0, 1
during the attack procedure, it can be concluded that there will be no redundant candidates for the internal
state after the procedure is completed.
8.4.2 Attack complexity
The attack complexity can be measured by the number of faults required, computational complexity
as well as storage complexity. First, we examine the number of faults necessary to undertake an attack.
As described above, the input for the attack is a non-faulty keystream word st+1 as well as certain
number of faulty keystream words s′t+1. Also, the set of faulty states from which s
′
t+1 values are produced
needs to satisfy certain properties. More precisely, as specified by the flt init procedure, at each of the








the attacker has to produce at least three different faults and obtain three corresponding s′t+1 values. It
follows that the minimal number of required faults that will need to be induced is 3 × 8 = 24. However,
since an attacker does not have the possibility to choose locations of faults he induces, the number of
necessary faults will be higher.
Let n denote the overall number of induced faults. Let p(n) denote the probability that that there will
be at least 3 faults at each one of the 8 groups of bits above. Let Ai be the event that after inducing n random
faults there will be at most 2 faults at xi,t, ci,t, or xi,t, ci,t, φ7,t if i = 0. Then, Ai = B
0
i ∪B1i ∪B2i where Bji ,
j = 0, 1, 2, i = 0..7 is an event that at xi,t, ci,t or xi,t, ci,t, φ7,t if i = 0 there will be 0,1 or 2 different faults.
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Then, p(n) can be approximated as follows:
p(n) =
1− P [A0 ∪ . . . ∪ A7] =















P [Bj1i1 ∩ Bj2i2 ])
where the fact that P [Bj1i ∩ Bj2i ] = 0 for j1 6= j2 has been used. For i = 0 . . . 7
P [B0i ] = (
7
8
)n, i = 0 . . . 7
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The second order probabilities are provided as follows:
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Substituting the according values of n yields p(64) = 0.900, p(96) = 0.997 and p(128) = 0.999. The
quality of the approximation above has been verified by the following experiment. For 105 times, a data
structure equivalent to Rabbit internal state was initialized with zeros and n faults were simulated by writing
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1 to a uniformly random chosen bit location. After each iteration, if there was at least three 1-bits at each
of the groups of bits in question, a counter was incremented. At the end of the experiment, the probability
was obtained by dividing the counter by 105. Obtained ratios for n = 64, 96, 128 were 0.900, 0.996, 0.999
respectively. Consequently, throughout the rest of the chapter, we assume that 64-128 faults are practically
sufficient to grantee that there will be at least 3 faults at each one of the 8 groups of bits defined in Eq. (8.6).
Since during the attack, as described in Section 8.3.3, procedure flt init is called two times, the
number of necessary faults is around 128− 256.
As for computational and storage complexity, the flt init procedure can make use of precom-
putation. In particular, 32 tables T+0 , . . . T
+
31 can be created, such that cell T
+
i [j] contains all the x val-
ues such that j = g(x) − g(x + 2i). Another 32 tables T−0 , . . . T−31 can be created, such that cell T−i [j]
contains all the x values such that j = g(x) − g(x − 2i). Analogous sets of tables can be created for
[g(x) <<< 8] − g(x ± 2i) <<< 8] and [g(x) <<< 16] − g(x ± 2i) <<< 16]. Thus, the storage complexity is
given by 3 × 64 × 232 = 239.6 words, i.e., 241.6 bytes, and now the computational complexity for a query
for x such that it satisfies a generalized differential is O(1). Since around 2 × 8× 3 × 232 such queries are
made, the computational complexity of the attack is about 238 steps.
To summarize, the proposed attack requires around 128− 256 faults, precomputed table of size 241.6
bytes, and recovers the cipher internal state in about 238 steps.
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9Summary and future research directions
9.1 Summary of contributions
This section briefly summarizes the contributions of this thesis. In the first two chapters, the mo-
tivation and the background for this work was presented. In addition, basic approaches to constructing
symmetric key primitives and the corresponding cryptanalytic methods were explained.
In Chapter 3, a new heuristic for searching for compatible differential paths was presented. Our
work shows that more hash function rounds can be reached if one applies automated reasoning to resolve
the middle part of the boomerang structure. We have applied the proposed search heuristic to HAS-160
hash function. The heuristic has been explain by providing examples for the three types of propagations
used during the search (single-path propagations, quartet propagations and quartet addition propagations).
Using the 1-bit constraints along with these propagations yielded an acceptable rate of false positives and
the second order collision was successfully found. A particular colliding quartet found by the heuristic has
been provided.
In Chapter 4, a reduced-round SM3 compression function was studied in terms of resistance to second
order collision attacks. We provided an example of a second order collision for the function reduced to 32
out of 64 steps. In particular, the interaction between the top and the bottom differential was studied in
detail and by using a long carry propagation in one of the differentials, the contradictions were avoided. We
also pointed out a property that does not exist in the function that SM3 is built on, SHA-2. In particular, a
slide-rotational property of the SM3-XOR function is exposed. SM3-XOR is the SM3 hash function where
modular addition is replaced by XOR. An example of a slide-rotational pair for SM3-XOR compression
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function is given.
In Chapter 5, we presented a practical-complexity related-key attack on the Loiss stream cipher that
recovers the full secret key. The attack was implemented and our implementation takes less than one hour on
a PC with 3GHz Intel Pentium 4 processor to recover 92 bits of the 128-bit key. The possibility of extending
the attack to a resynchronization attack in a single-key model was discussed. The main problem in the
cipher is the innovation that has been added as a part of the Finite State Machine in the cipher structure. The
new component is a slowly changing array reminiscent of the RC4 stream cipher. This component allowed
differences to be contained (i.e., do not propagate) during a large number of inner state update steps with a
relatively high probability thus allowing certain form of differential cryptanalysis to be efficient against all
of the initial procedure steps. We also showed that a slide attack is possible for the Loiss stream cipher.
In Chapter 6, we studied the security of the two LFSR-based software oriented stream ciphers. In
particular, we presented related key pair sets for SNOW 3G and SNOW 2.0 cipher by using the sliding
technique. For several of the presented related key sets, the transformation from the key K to its related
key K ′ is simple and amounts to rotation and bit inversion. Using the derived related key sets, related-key
key recovery attacks against SNOW 2.0 with 256-bit in complexity smaller than the exhaustive search can
be mounted. Moreover, the fact that the K ′ depends on the IV of its related key was used to mount attacks
under different assumptions on the related keys. Furthermore, the existence of the related keys exhibits
non-random behavior of the ciphers, which questions the validity of the security proofs of protocols (such
as the ones used in the 3GPP networks [63]) that are based on the assumption that SNOW 3G and SNOW
2.0 behave like ideal random functions when regarded as functions of the key-IV.
In Chapter 7, a differential fault analysis attack was studied in the context of HC-128 cipher, which
is based on a slow-changing array with comparatively large inner state. The adopted attack model assumes
that the attacker is able to fault a random word of the inner state of the cipher but cannot control its exact
location nor its new faulted value. The attack operates by constructing 32 systems of linear equations over
Z2, each of 1024 bit variables representing the inner state values. It also utilizes what we called the reuse of
inner state words in different states of the cipher in order to facilitate the differential fault analysis.
In Chapter 8, differential fault analysis attack was devised for the Rabbit stream cipher which is an
eStream final portfolio member. Unlike in the Chapter 7, the adopted fault model assumes that the attacker
is able to fault a random bit of the inner state. Given this scenario and the different architecture of the Rabbit
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stream cipher, the proposed attack requires around 128 − 256 faults, precomputed table of size 241.6 bytes,
and recovers the cipher internal state in about 238 steps.
9.2 Future work
In what follows, we list some of the possible topics of interest for future extension of our work:
- In the context of our work on second order analysis of hash functions provided in Chapters 3 and 4, it
would be interesting to apply the proposed compatible differential search heuristic against other hash
functions such as SHA-2 or SM3. A successful application of the heuristic would increase the number
of steps for which the second order collision can be constructed. One possible direction would be to
attempt to extend the attacks provided in [22] and [10]. The impact of the high rate of contradictory
paths reported in the first order collision attack [100] should be investigated and re-measured in the
context of the second order analysis of these hashes.
- When it comes to cryptanalysis of stream ciphers, it would be interesting to work on improving the
attacks provided in Chapter 6 on the SNOW family. In particular, techniques for recovering the inner
state given a known-LFSR difference would be of use in this context [24]. This is relevant since that
after a slide pair of the inner states has been obtained, the difference in the LFSR typically has low
Hamming weight, e.g., it is localized in one 32-bit word, as is the case in some of the related keys
provided in 6. The same idea may also be evaluated in the context of our slide attack on Loiss stream
cipher provided in Chapter 5.
- In the fault analysis of stream ciphers, certain constructions appear to require more faults to recover the
inner state than others. One such construction is the construction based on slow-changing arrays and
particularly the one with comparatively large state, e.g., HC-128 (analyzed in Chapter 7) or RC4 (see
the respective fault attack [17]). The obstacle in applying the typical differential analysis approach
is that the faulty inner state words pass only through a small portion of the inner state before control
over the differences in the state is lost. The differential analysis in such a case allows only a small
portion of inner state information per fault to be extracted. Investigating methods to overcome this
problem in random-position fault models for the goal of reducing the overall number of random faults
is a possible research direction.
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